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This thesis examines three sets of recent initiatives aimed at reforming the international regime for 
sovereign debt restructuring. The first involved changes to the rules governing IMF lending and their 
role in triggering debt restructurings. The second entailed reforms to sovereign bond contracts in 
order to facilitate smoother restructuring processes. The third took place within the UN, where states 
advanced the idea of an international hard-law approach to debt restructuring but settled for a set of 
soft-law principles. Taken together, these initiatives had a mixed impact on the regime. Contract 
reforms strengthened bond restructuring processes; IMF reforms weakened the mechanism designed 
to trigger necessary restructurings; and UN reform efforts had little concrete impact in either direction.  
 
What explains the variation in these recent regulatory outcomes? I argue that this variation can be 
understood according to two dimensions: the process-trigger distinction and the legal-institutional design of 
process-oriented mechanisms. A trigger mechanism is hard to institutionalize because of the time-
inconsistent preferences of powerful states and their more general desire—supported by sovereign 
debtors and private creditors and amplified by recent experiences—for case-by-case decision-making 
when it comes to if and when to trigger a debt restructuring. Compared to the trigger, some but not all 
process mechanisms have greater odds of success, depending on their design. Hard-law designs face 
huge political opposition, whereas soft-law tools can encounter political challenges but are also of 
limited effectiveness in this issue area. By contrast, private-law contracts provide useful mechanisms 
for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt restructuring processes, especially for dominant states. 
I also argue that historical legacies and processes have influenced recent reform outcomes, but mainly 
through their ability to further enhance or diminish the prospects of mechanisms whose political utility 
had already been determined by the process-trigger distinction and/or their legal-institutional design.  
 
This thesis makes an empirical contribution to IPE and global governance literatures by providing the 
first comprehensive analysis of recent sovereign debt restructuring reforms. It makes important 
theoretical contributions to these literatures by developing an analytical framework for understanding 
the politics of regulatory reform within the sovereign debt restructuring regime. It also offers insights 
that contribute to wider debates about institutional design and development, including those related 
to the choice of international hard-law or soft-law governance instruments, the use of contracts in 
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Introduction and Overview 
 
1. The Topic and Research Question 
In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF or Fund) changed its lending rules so that it 
could provide Greece with a €30 billion loan without first requiring the country to restructure its debt, 
as the old rules would have done. The move was controversial, largely because it helped only to delay 
and complicate much-needed debt relief. When Greece finally did restructure its debt in the spring of 
2012—writing down roughly €200 billion worth of bonds owed to private investors—the operation 
failed to deliver sufficient debt relief, was marred by free riders, and created massive uncertainty about 
how future debt crises would be resolved, particularly in Eurozone countries. Months later, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, a controversial New York-court ruling against Argentina delivered a 
landmark victory to a group of litigious private creditors, in turn threatening to unleash cascades of 
litigation and make future debt restructurings “virtually impossible” under New York law, where the 
majority of international sovereign bonds are issued.1 These two episodes, unique as they were, 
highlighted what many had long considered to be the Achilles’ heel of debt restructuring: the lack of 
an adequate global framework or set of institutional arrangements capable of shepherding heavily-
indebted sovereigns through a timely, orderly, and predictable bankruptcy procedure.2 Previous 
attempts to address this governance gap had made some progress, particularly in the early 2000s, but 
the Greek and Argentine cases disavowed any illusions that these earlier efforts would be sufficient.  
 
These cases and the complications they created for a range of state and market actors generated new 
pressures and opportunities for change, giving rise not to a single reform process but rather to three 
separate sets of initiatives aimed at strengthening the ‘sovereign debt restructuring regime’ (SDRR): 
the mélange of formal and informal arrangements for reducing or rescheduling the debts of states that 
fail to meet their payment obligations.3 The first involved changes to the rules governing IMF lending 
                                                        
1 Martin Guzman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘How Hedge Funds Held Argentina for Ransom,’ The New York Times. April 1, 
2013. 
2 See Kenneth Rogoff and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1975-2001,’ 
IMF Staff Papers 49(3)(2002): 470-507. 
3 Sovereign debt restructuring can take one or both of two forms. The first is a debt rescheduling, which involves a 
lengthening of maturities on existing debt, extending the repayment of principal further into the future and, in some cases, 
lowering interest rates. The second is debt reduction, which involves an outright reduction in the nominal face value of 
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and their role in triggering necessary debt restructurings. The second comprised two separate 
initiatives both focused on revising the standard language in sovereign bond contracts—one 
concerned with the bonds of Eurozone states, the other with those of emerging market and 
developing economies (EMDEs)—in order to facilitate smoother and more equitable restructuring 
processes. The third took place within the United Nations (UN), where the Group of 77 (G77) and 
China called for an ambitious “multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring” but 
settled in the end for a more modest set of non-binding restructuring principles.4 
 
These reform initiatives set out to build new institutional arrangements and fortify existing ones, but 
their overall impact on the SDRR has been decidedly mixed. Compared to the reforms introduced in 
the early 2000s, when the regime was last updated, the recent initiatives described above have—as a 
whole—simultaneously strengthened, weakened, and left unchanged important elements of the 
SDRR. Contract reforms have strengthened the bond restructuring process, providing more robust 
mechanisms for binding a wider group of private creditors to a common restructuring agreement; 
IMF reforms have weakened the regime by eroding both the credibility and content of the IMF’s 
previous lending framework, which promised to encourage necessary debt restructurings by 
preventing the Fund from lending to countries with unsustainable debt burdens; and the UN initiative 
has had little concrete impact in either direction. Scholars have long emphasized the difficulties of 
building more muscular mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring, raising the question of why 
some recent initiatives succeeded in strengthening the regime where others failed, especially given that 
all took place within the same broad issue area and historical context.   
 
What explains the variation in reform outcomes? In other words, why did contract reforms flourish 
while the other initiatives floundered, failing to advance meaningful change (the UN case) or even 
weakening existing arrangements (the IMF case)? And what does this tell us about the politics of 
reform in this particular area of financial governance and in the global political economy more broadly? 
While scholars of International Political Economy (IPE) have examined a wide range of reforms to 
global financial governance since the 2008 global financial crisis, they have neglected these important 
                                                        
existing debt instruments (e.g., from $100 to $75). Both provide debt relief to the country in crisis, and both involved 
losses for creditors. However, rescheduling is typically milder than reduction in terms of the debt of debt relief.  
4 UN, ‘Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes,’ UNGA 
Resolution (A/RES/68/304). September 9, 2014. 
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questions and the reforms that motivate them. This dissertation fills this gap, making a clear empirical 
contribution to IPE and global governance literatures by providing the first comprehensive analysis 
of recent sovereign debt restructuring reforms. It also makes important theoretical contributions to 
these literatures by developing an analytical framework for understanding the politics of regulatory 
reform within the SDRR—specifically, for making sense of why certain types of institutional or 
regulatory designs have succeeded in securing sufficient political support while others have failed. This 
framework provides a lens through which to view more systematically the countless reform proposals 
and initiatives that animate debt restructuring debates, shedding new light on an important substantive 
topic that has not received enough attention from IPE scholars. It also offers insights that contribute 
to wider debates about institutional design and development, including those related to the choice of 
international hard-law or soft-law governance instruments, the use of private-law contracts in global 
governance, and the role of historical legacies and processes in shaping global regulatory outcomes. 
 
2. Existing Accounts of Regulatory Reform in the SDRR 
What do existing accounts tell us about the politics of reform in the SDRR and the determinants of 
regulatory variation in this governance domain? Although IPE and global governance scholars have 
largely ignored recent developments in the SDRR, there is a small body of literature that sheds light 
on previous episodes of cooperation, conflict, and regulatory reform in this issue area. Much of this 
work is focused on explaining patterns of creditor coordination and debtor-creditor bargaining 
outcomes during debt restructuring negotiations and processes.5 But a handful of scholars have also 
examined the politics of reform initiatives aimed at building new mechanisms to govern sovereign 
debt workouts.6 These accounts focus mostly on individual initiatives, such as the IMF’s high-profile 
plan for a treaty-based Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) in the early 2000s.7 A few 
                                                        
5 For example, see Charles Lipson, ‘Bankers’ Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts,’ World 
Politics 38(1)(1985): 200-225; Daphne Josselin, ‘Regime Interplay in Public-Private Governance: Taking Stock of the 
Relationship Between the Paris Club and Private Creditors Between 1982 and 2005,’ Global Governance 15(4)(2009): 521-
538; Christian Suter, Debt Cycles in the World-Economy: Foreign Loans, Financial Crises, and Debt Settlements, 1820-1990 (Westview, 
1992); Vinod K. Aggarwal, Debt Games: Strategic in International Debt Rescheduling (Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
6 A debt ‘workout’ is another commonly used term for debt restructuring. A number of other terms are also often used as 
synonyms for restructuring, including: haircut, write-off, write-down, and ‘private-sector involvement’ (PSI). These terms 
will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation.  
7 Brad Setser, ‘The Political Economy of the SDRM,’ in: Barry Herman, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Shari Spiegel (eds.), 
Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises (Oxford University Press, 2010). Sean Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework to 
Restructure Sovereign Debt,’ Georgetown Journal of International Law 36(2)(2005): 299-402. Susanne Soederberg, ‘The 
international dimensions of the Argentine default,’ Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies 28(55/6)(2003): 
97-125.  
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scholars also consider the fate of particular types of proposals throughout history. For example, Eric 
Helleiner asks why attempts to establish a formal international debt restructuring mechanism have 
repeatedly failed, documenting efforts to promote such a mechanism in the 1930s, 1940s, 1970s, and 
early 2000s.8 He and others point to several obstacles that have frustrated efforts to reform the SDRR, 
including the opposition of powerful states and private creditors concerned about the distributional 
consequences of reform,9 collective action problems among both sovereign debtors and private 
creditors,10 and the reluctance of key states to accept the sovereignty costs of a supranational regime.11  
 
The few brief, mostly policy-oriented accounts of the recent UN and IMF initiatives reinforce the 
impression that attempts to institutionalize debt restructuring face enormous political challenges. 
Documenting the UN case, Yuefen Li notes that private creditors and the states in which they reside 
resisted reform because they feared that “the introduction of the legal framework would lead to a loss 
by private creditors from the developed countries and a gain for debtors from the developing ones.”12 
She also points to the type of sovereignty concerns and collective action problems that frustrated 
previous initiatives. Likewise, existing accounts suggest that the weakening of the IMF’s lending 
framework and its role as a pillar of the SDRR reflects political power realities that make restructuring 
rules difficult to uphold. As Susan Schadler describes, political pressures to bailout Greece in 2010 
trumped existing IMF rules, resulting in an impromptu reform that undermined the credibility of its 
commitment not to lend to countries with unsustainable debt burdens.13 Barry Eichengreen and 
Ngaire Woods agree that this 2010 reform highlighted a ‘credible commitments’ problem with the 
Fund’s lending rules,14 while Paul Blustein notes that efforts to fix this problem and reinvigorate the 
                                                        
8 Eric Helleiner, ‘The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism,’ Contributions to Political Economy 
27(2008): 91-113. For an analysis of initiatives in the 1970s and early 2000s, see also Susanne Soederberg, ‘The 
Transnational Debt Architecture and Emerging Markets: the politics of paradoxes and punishment,’ Third World Quarterly 
26(6)(2005): 927-949. 
9 Helleiner, ‘The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism’; Soederberg, ‘The Transnational Debt 
Architecture and Emerging Markets.’ 
10 Helleiner, ‘The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism.’ 
11 Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller, and Brad Setser, ‘Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign 
Bonds,’ in: Martin Guzman, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve 
Sovereign Debt Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016): 109-143. Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework’; Setser, 
‘The Political Economy of the SDRM.’ 
12 Yuefen Li, ‘The Long March towards an International Legal Framework for Sovereign Debt Restructuring,’ Journal of 
Globalization and Development 6(2)(2015): 329-341, p. 335. 
13 Susan Schadler, ‘Unsustainable Debt and the Political Economy of Lending: Constraining the IMF’s Role in Sovereign 
Debt Crises,’ CIGI Papers No. 19, October 2013; Susan Schadler, ‘Living with Rules: The IMF’s Exceptional Access 
Framework and the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement with Greece,’ IEO Background Paper BP/16-02/08, Independent 
Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund, 2016.  
14 Barry Eichengreen and Ngaire Woods, ‘The IMF’s Unmet Challenges,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 30(1) (2015): 29-52.  
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rules from 2013-2016 were hamstrung by opposition from powerful actors, notably US officials.15 
These accounts resonate with Susan Strange’s view that the nature of world politics prevented states 
from cooperating to institutionalize a sovereign debt restructuring system,16 as well as Odette Lienau’s 
observation that “private creditor groups have historically been resistant to the establishment of a 
DWM [debt workout mechanism] or indeed any greater institutionalization of debt restructuring.”17 
 
Yet despite these seemingly insurmountable obstacles, not all attempts to institutionalize sovereign 
debt restructuring have failed. Recent contract reforms are a prime example of successful regulatory 
change in this area, as are previous contract changes in the early 2000s, both of which focused on 
replicating key features of a bankruptcy process within the contract terms of sovereign bonds. Why 
did these initiatives prevail? Scholars who analyzed the reforms of the early 2000s present contract 
change largely as a one-off event shaped by a number of idiosyncratic factors.18 Important as they may 
have been to that earlier episode, these context-specific factors fail to anticipate and explain the re-
emergence and strengthening of contract-based restructuring mechanisms more recently. Up-to-date 
explanations of these newer developments are scarce, though a few analysts have weighed in. Looking 
at recent changes to Eurozone bonds, Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati emphasize the role of contracts 
as a symbolic—rather than substantive—tool, which served the interests of European political elites 
looking to signal a new approach to crisis management in the wake of the Greek crisis.19 By contrast, 
reforms to EMDE bonds have been framed largely as a functional solution to the growing problem 
of holdout creditors.20 These recent interpretations provide useful insights but fail to explain why 
contracts would be a more effective symbolic or functional fix than other regulatory arrangements. 
 
                                                        
15 Paul Blustein, Laid Low: Inside the Crisis that Overwhelmed Europe and the IMF (CIGI Press, 2016). 
16 Susan Strange, Mad Money: When Markets Outgrow Governments (University of Michigan Press, 1998), p. 173. 
17 Odette Lienau, ‘Legitimacy and Impartiality in a Sovereign Debt Workout Mechanism,’ Discussion Paper Prepared for 
the Fourth Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism (July 2014), p. 40. Available at: 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsddf2014misc2_en.pdf. 
18 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study,’ Washington University Law Review 
84(7)(2006): 1627-1715; Eric Helleiner, ‘Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring,’ in: Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton 
University Press, 2009): 89-120. 
19 Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, ‘The wonder-clause,’ Journal of Comparative Economics 41 (2013): 367-385. 
20 Chanda DeLong and Nikita Aggarwal, ‘Strengthening the contractual framework for sovereign debt restructuring—the 
IMF’s perspective,’ Capital Markets Law Journal 11(1)(2016): 25-37. Gregory Makoff and Robert Kahn, ‘Sovereign Bond 
Contract Reform: Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses,’ CIGI Papers No. 56 (February 
2015). See also Gelpern, Heller, and Setser, ‘Count the Limbs.’ 
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The literature surveyed above points to a number of important factors that have helped shape the fate 
of different reform initiatives in the SDRR, but it provides a poor basis for understanding variation in 
regulatory outcomes. Existing analyses leave one with the impression that regulatory reform is either 
practically impossible or largely random. Virtually none of the studies reviewed above provide the 
kind of comparative analysis of failed and successful initiatives that would allow them to generate 
broader insights about the determinants of variation in this domain.21 To an extent, the absence of 
comparative research likely reflects the relatively small number of cases—especially of successful 
initiatives—available to scholars studying earlier reform efforts, combined with the fact that more 
recent cases have received little scholarly attention. In any event, the lack of a more systematic and 
generalized understanding of the types of governance arrangements that are politically possible in the 
SDRR remains a regrettable gap in our knowledge of this important area of global financial 
governance. My aim is to fill this gap by analyzing and comparing recent reform initiatives, which 
reveal new insights and reinforce existing ones in ways that are especially useful for generating broader 
inferences about the politics of sovereign debt restructuring reform. 
 
What exactly do existing analyses miss? What factors need to be taken into account to provide a fuller 
view of regulatory variation in the SDRR? The existing literature suffers from three major blind spots 
that limit its ability to explain variation in recent reform outcomes. The first stems from the tendency 
among analysts to treat debt restructuring as a single issue or phenomenon, with the implication being 
that different reform initiatives or proposals are essentially looking to govern the same set of issues 
and relationships and thus face the same challenges. This totalizing tendency has led scholars to 
overlook important distinctions that are critical to grasping variation in sovereign debt reform 
outcomes. Specifically, they have failed to disaggregate the temporal stages of sovereign debt 
restructuring into two basic categories: the trigger stage, concerning decisions about whether and when 
to restructure debt in the first place, and the process stage, concerning the renegotiation of payment 
terms among a debtor and its creditors once the decision to restructure has already been made. Policy 
                                                        
21 To be sure, Soederberg (‘The Transnational Debt Architecture and Emerging Markets’) and Helleiner (‘Filling a Hole in 
Global Financial Governance?’), respectively, discuss both the failure of the SDRM and the emergence of CACs within 
the context of a single article or book chapter. But neither provide the kind of systematic or in-depth comparison that 
generates broader insights about regulatory variation in this domain. The only other exception is an article I co-authored 
which outlined my earlier views on this issue. While it looked to address the question of regulatory variation directly, the 
article provided little in the way of a broader framework through which to understand different reform outcomes. See 
Skylar Brooks and Eric Helleiner, ‘Debt politics as usual? Reforming the sovereign debt restructuring regime after 2008,’ 
International Affairs 93(5)(2017): 1085-1105. 
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practitioners have designed mechanisms for both the trigger and process stage—at times seeing them 
as mutually-reinforcing pillars of the SDRR22—but analysts have overlooked the fact that trigger and 
process mechanisms aim to govern different aspects of debt restructuring and, as such, face distinct 
political challenges and opportunities that help to determine their relative prospects for success. 
 
The second major blind spot of the existing literature is its failure to appreciate the political 
implications of different process-oriented mechanisms on the basis of their compatibility with the 
existing legal arrangements that govern international sovereign debt markets. Bringing these 
implications into plain view points us toward another dimension through which to understand 
variation in reform outcomes: the legal-institutional design of different process-oriented proposals 
(whether they take the form of public international law (especially hard law but also soft law) or 
domestic private-law contracts). The third and final blind spot of the current literature is its inattention 
to the important role of historical legacies and processes—particularly related to the reform initiatives 
of the early 2000s—in shaping recent reform initiatives. Taking these omissions into account is crucial 
to understanding variation in the regulatory outcomes that motivate this research project.     
 
3. The Argument 
My argument addresses these major blind spots in the existing literature. It starts with the core 
contention that regulatory variation in the SDRR can be understood according to two dimensions: the 
trigger versus process distinction and the legal-institutional design of different process-oriented mechanisms. 
More specifically, I argue that an effective trigger mechanism is hard to institutionalize because of the 
time-inconsistent preferences of powerful capital-exporting states, as well as their more general 
desire—expressed most vigorously by the US, supported by sovereign debtors and private creditors, 
and amplified by recent experiences—for case-by-case decision-making when it comes to whether and 
when to trigger a debt restructuring. Compared to the trigger, I argue that some but not all process 
mechanisms have greater odds of success. Here I focus on three alternative kinds of mechanisms with 
different legal-institutional designs: public international hard-law instruments, public international 
soft-law instruments, and private-law contract instruments. I argue that hard-law mechanisms face 
huge political opposition from capital-exporting states, whereas soft-law tools can encounter political 
                                                        
22 For example, see John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007), chapter 4.  
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challenges but are also of limited effectiveness in the SDRR. By contrast, private-law contracts provide 
useful mechanisms for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt restructuring processes, especially 
for the dominant states that disproportionately shape outcomes in this arena. In addition to these core 
points, I also argue that historical legacies and processes have influenced recent reform outcomes, but mainly 
through their ability to further enhance or diminish the prospects of mechanisms whose political utility 
had already been determined by the process-trigger distinction and/or their legal-institutional design.  
 
Figure 1 depicts the overarching argument in the form of a decision tree, which might be better 
understood as a feasibility tree in the context of the current study. It is important to note that while 
the figure depicts the choice of feasible regulatory options in the SDRR according to, first, the trigger-
process distinction and, second, the legal-institutional design of different process mechanisms, it does 
not explicitly provide a visualization for the role of historical legacies and processes. The reason for 
this is simple: historical factors play an important but secondary role that only reinforces the feasibility 
(or lack thereof) of the different regulatory options shown in figure 1. Put simply, in the context of 
recent reform outcomes, historical legacies and processes can be seen as having reinforced both the 
“YES” and the “NO” pathways that lead to different regulatory options in figure 1. As a separate 
issue, it should also be noted that hard law and soft law have been grouped together under the heading 
of “public international law” in the feasibility tree displayed below and throughout this dissertation. 
 



























The remainder of this section unpacks the argument in greater detail, showing how it applies to the 
reform cases examined in this dissertation. Before proceeding, however, it is important to clarify the 
trigger-process distinction and the meaning of the terms hard law, soft law, and private law. The trigger 
stage of a debt restructuring is defined by the initial decision of whether and/or when to restructure 
debt. A trigger mechanism is thus one that can push or encourage a debtor to initiate a restructuring 
according to some pre-defined rules. The process stage of debt restructuring is separate from any 
mechanism that might trigger that restructuring in the first place. It involves the renegotiation of debt 
between the sovereign and its creditors and occurs only after the decision to initiate a debt workout 
has been made. A process mechanism is thus one that seeks to regulate debtor and creditor behaviour 
during the restructuring process in order to produce a more orderly and efficient debt settlement. 
 
A further distinction involves the legal-institutional design of different process mechanisms: namely, 
whether they constitute hard-law, soft-law, or private-law arrangements. Following standard discourse 
within IPE and global governance, the key distinction between international hard law and soft law 
concerns the extent to which an institutional arrangement is legally binding—that is, the degree of 
obligation to adhere to explicit commitments and the presence of formal enforcement mechanisms.23 
Hard-law agreements entail binding obligations, whereas soft law involves voluntary, non-binding 
commitments. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal offer a wider definition that sees hard- and soft-
law arrangements along a spectrum defined by three dimensions of legalization: obligation, precision, 
and delegation.24 In their view, the stronger the obligation to act in specific ways, the more precise the 
terms of the agreement, and the more that enforcement has been delegated to a third party, the closer 
an arrangement is to the hard-law ideal. While there is no single definition of hard or soft law, scholars 
agree on the basic distinction between legally-binding and voluntary commitments.25 They also tend 
to agree on what counts as hard and soft law when they see it. The classic example of hard law is the 
formal intergovernmental treaty. Examples of soft law include voluntary standards, best practices, and 
recommended guidelines, which can be promulgated and adopted by both state and non-state actors.26  
                                                        
23 Abraham L. Newman and Elliot Posner, Voluntary Disruptions: International Soft Law, Finance, and Power (Oxford University 
Press, 2018); Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark C. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in 
International Governance’, Minnesota Law Review 94(3) (2010): 706-799; Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial 
System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
24 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International Organization 54(3) 
(2000): 421-456. 
25 Newman and Posner, Voluntary Disruptions. 
26 Ibid.  
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Private law is best understood within the context of domestic legal systems. In contrast to public law, 
which governs relationships between individuals (including organizations) and the state, private law 
deals with relationships between different individuals or organizations within the shadow of the state.27 
Examples of private law include contract, tort, and property law. Despite involving government debt 
obligations, the sovereign bond contracts examined in this dissertation constitute private agreements 
between consenting parties and are governed by the domestic contract laws of the jurisdictions in 
which they were issued. They are thus a form of private law, one with transnational dimensions insofar 
as they involve cross-border relationships governed by domestic jurisdictions and authorities.  
 
I now turn to the task of unpacking the argument stated above and depicted in figure 1. Starting with 
the trigger, I argue that efforts to institutionalize an effective trigger mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring face 
powerful political barriers that have made this objective nearly impossible. The recent weakening of the Fund’s 
lending framework, which was originally designed in 2002 to trigger debt write-downs under certain 
pre-defined circumstances, reflects and provides a window through which to view these barriers. Due 
to its role as the gatekeeper of multilateral emergency financing, the IMF is uniquely placed to trigger 
necessary or desired restructurings by refusing to lend to countries with unsustainable debt burdens 
unless and until they obtain a certain level of debt relief from their creditors. The 2002 rules sought 
to institutionalize this role by laying out the specific circumstances under which the Fund would be 
required to condition its lending upon debt restructuring, but reforms in 2010 and 2016 significantly 
weakened the capacity of these rules to serve as an effective trigger mechanism going forward. 
 
The most significant obstacle to an effective trigger mechanism stems from the power and preferences 
of the leading capital-exporting states—namely the US and the major European powers. These states 
do not always and everywhere have a uniform set of preferences toward this type of institutional 
arrangement, but the nature of their structural position within global finance means that, at certain 
key moments, debt restructuring in a foreign country can threaten to unleash financial instability in 
their domestic economies.28 When such moments arise, these states will likely use their institutional 
power within the Fund to shape lending decisions in ways that discourage or delay restructuring, 
                                                        
27 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
28 The fact that foreign debt difficulties can threaten domestic financial interests is not, of course, a novel point. For 
example, see Daniel McDowell, Brother, Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last 
Resort (Oxford University Press, 2017).  
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regardless of what the rules say or how desperately the country in question needs debt relief. This is 
the key lesson of the IMF’s 2010 reform, as states that had been strong proponents of the 2002 rules 
insisted on ignoring those rules once they became a constraint on protecting national financial 
interests—a time-inconsistency problem that undermines the credibility of the Fund’s commitment 
not to lend.  
 
While the credibility of a trigger mechanism is perpetually in question due to these time-inconsistent 
preferences that diverge from the rule-creation to the rule-implementation stage of the policy process, 
I also argue that experience related to rule (non)implementation can change the direction and/or 
intensity of state preferences in ways that feed back into subsequent rule-creation processes. In the 
IMF case, experience with recent crises and the controversial 2010 episode only reinforced the 
preference for a more case-by-case approach to lending among those who traditionally held that 
position, and diminished enthusiasm for reintroducing firm lending rules among those who previously 
promoted them. When the Fund’s lending rules came up for reconsideration in 2013, the balance of 
forces—led by US officials but incorporating a wider array of state and market actors—had shifted 
decisively in favour of greater flexibility and discretion over lending decisions, leading to rule changes 
in 2016 that significantly watered down the content of the trigger mechanism compared to its 2002 
incarnation. The new framework provides enough flexibility to allow dominant states to protect their 
financial interests without having to change or break the rules, locking-in a much weaker institutional 
arrangement that is likely to persist precisely because of its inability to constrain powerful interests. 
Seen as a reflection and indication of the political limitations of a trigger mechanism, the weakening 
of the IMF’s lending framework is the first puzzle piece in our story and the subject of Chapter 2. 
 
In contrast to the trigger, the debt restructuring process is subject to a different set of governance challenges but also, 
I argue, a different and less constraining set of political considerations that make possible the establishment of more 
effective regulatory mechanisms to deal with these challenges. The lack of major financial stability concerns 
among capital-exporting states, the greater prospect of mutually-beneficial efficiency gains for 
sovereign debtors and their private creditors, and a collective interest among all three actors in dealing 
with increasingly disruptive ‘holdout creditors’—minority creditors that refuse to participate in and 
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can block restructurings that the majority of creditors accept—combine to make the process stage of 
restructuring more amenable to effective governance mechanisms than the trigger stage.29  
 
But there is a major caveat here. The lower barriers to establishing robust regulation for the process of 
debt restructuring in general do not mean that any kind of process-oriented mechanism will provide a 
politically feasible or functionally effective governance solution. Both the UN initiative covered in 
Chapter 3 and the bond reforms examined in Chapter 4 focused on institutionalizing the restructuring 
process, yet, as we shall see, one fizzled out while the other flourished. To make sense of variation 
within the category of process regulation, we need to make a further set of distinctions based on the 
legal-institutional design of the specific mechanisms that different regulatory initiatives seek to promote. 
In a sentence, public international law techniques face enormous obstacles that hinder their emergence 
in the case of hard-law designs and their effectiveness in the case of soft-law designs, whereas private-law 
contract designs possess characteristics that have enabled their emergence and strengthening as debt 
restructuring mechanisms. These basic design distinctions are critical to understanding the relative 
failure of the UN initiative, which sought to advance a hard-law framework before settling for a set of 
soft-law principles, and the relative success of recent bond reforms, which managed to replicate key 
features of a bankruptcy process within the private-law contracts that govern sovereign debt 
obligations. 
 
The divergent prospects of these different designs rest largely on their compatibility with the current 
legal foundations of international sovereign debt markets and thus, by extension, their compatibility 
with the interests of the dominant states that benefit from existing legal arrangements. Today, over 95 
percent of international sovereign bonds are issued in either New York or London and thus governed 
by American and British laws and courts.30 In an important sense, the US and UK have not developed 
international property law to protect sovereign debt investments but rather made available, and thus 
internationalized, their own domestic contract laws. This situation provides the US and UK with 
economic benefits as well as a potent but previously overlooked form of structural power over key 
                                                        
29 For a discussion of the rise of holdout creditors and sovereign debt litigation in recent years, see Julian Schumacher, 
Christoph Trebesch, and Henrik Enderlein, ‘What explains sovereign debt litigation?’ The Journal of Law and Economics 
58(3)(2015): 585-623; Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, and Henrik Enderlein, “Sovereign Defaults in Court,” ECB 
Working Paper No. 2135 (February 2018). 
30 IMF, ‘Third Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond 
Contracts’, IMF Policy Papers (2017). 
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legal and policy developments within the SDRR. It also serves their interests as the leading capital 
exporters by providing a relatively stable legal basis for routine cross-border sovereign bond 
investments. While US and UK contract law does not guarantee the enforcement of international 
sovereign debt agreements, it does help stabilize market expectations by embedding complex debt 
relations within clear and seemingly apolitical rights and obligations and providing predictable—and 
creditor-friendly—legal avenues for dispute settlement. Even within the Eurozone, where 
governments issue most of their bonds under their own laws, domestic contract law plays an important 
role in anchoring the legal rights and obligations surrounding sovereign debt. 
 
By establishing international legal procedures that authorize breaking or changing the payment terms 
of debt contracts, hard-law restructuring mechanisms would trump the domestic legal foundations of 
the debt regime, threatening the power and privileges that dominant states derive from the current 
order. Key capital-exporting states—principally the US and UK—have thus rejected and used their 
power to undermine hard-law initiatives such as the recent UN proposal, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Students of global financial governance might expect soft-law arrangements to fill the remaining 
governance gap. Indeed, the UN initiative advanced a set of voluntary principles once its loftier 
ambitions had been extinguished, but as I argue in Chapter 3, these principles are unlikely to have 
much impact due to both a lack of support from key political actors and the broader functional 
limitations of soft law in this particular issue area.  
 
Now consider a third regulatory option: writing the rules for a restructuring into sovereign debt 
contracts themselves. By embedding the ability to restructure debt into existing systems of contractual 
rights and obligations, contract reforms allow capital-exporting states to create stronger restructuring 
processes without undermining the authority of their own laws and courts or creating new forms of 
uncertainty around sovereign bond investments. The compatibility between existing legal structures 
and contract-based restructuring tools has made the latter a politically useful regulatory mechanism—
not only for the US and UK but also for Eurozone states—and is key to explaining the success of the 
bond reforms detailed in Chapter 4.  
 
The main actors shaping outcomes across all of the reform cases examined in this dissertation are the 
leading capital-exporting states—principally the US but also the UK, France, and Germany. At certain 
key moments, however, private creditors and debtor governments (mostly from the global South) 
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have played a decisive role in bringing about institutional changes already favoured by more powerful 
states, or have helped to further stifle reform efforts that these states already opposed. To an important 
degree, sovereign debtors and private creditor preferences are also informed by their roles and 
positions within the global economy, and by the anticipated effects of different regulatory designs on 
their material wellbeing. For example, both lobbied against a formal trigger mechanism for fear it 
would force them into more debt restructurings, which can be enormously costly for sovereign debtors 
and private creditors alike.31 Both have also been more willing to accept contract change over other 
process-oriented reforms for reasons of legal-institutional design. Even the debtor states driving the 
UN initiative found it difficult to come to terms with the sovereignty implications of a hard-law 
restructuring mechanism—a further obstacle to the emergence of this type of regulatory arrangement. 
But debtor and creditor preferences have been far from static, especially regarding contract reforms. 
Here, their views have changed fairly drastically over time and in ways that facilitated the recent 
emergence of substantial bond contract reforms. This observation points to the role of earlier 
historical developments in shaping subsequent preferences and reform processes.  
 
This brings me to the final major element of my argument: that historical legacies and processes—
particularly those related to the reform initiatives of the early 2000s—have played an important part 
in shaping recent outcomes. Earlier contract reforms laid the groundwork for the strengthening and 
spreading of this model more recently, reinforcing the US policy position, providing US and Eurozone 
officials with a ready-made blueprint for reform, shifting sovereign debtor and private creditor 
preferences in favour of more substantial contract innovation, and enhancing the utility of contracts 
as a tool for responding to the uncertainty generated by recent shocks. At the same time, US officials 
had no desire to relive some of the controversial debates of the early 2000s and refused to even discuss 
the merits of a hard-law regime, further suffocating efforts to establish this type of arrangement.32 The 
fact that the contractual approach had established a foothold in the early 2000s did not automatically 
lead to its recent strengthening. The IMF framework created in 2002 has been incrementally weakened 
over time, with historical experience and policy sequencing also playing an important role. Inter alia, 
                                                        
31 While the losses that creditors suffer from having their financial claims written-down may be obvious, there is a vast 
literature that points to the steep costs of sovereign defaults and debt restructurings for debtor countries. This literature is 
reviewed in Chapter 3, but for an example see: Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, ‘The Costs of Sovereign Default,’ 
IMF Working Paper 238 (October 2008).  
32 Mark Sobel, ‘Strengthening collective action clauses: catalysing change — the back story’, Capital Markets Law Journal 
11(1) (2016): 3-11. 
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the failure of this framework in 2010 further eroded political support for strong lending rules in ways 
fed back into subsequent reform processes, weakening the trigger mechanism by locking-in less 
constraining rules. 
 
To summarize, I present an analytical framework for understanding regulatory variation in the SDRR 
according to, first, the process versus trigger distinction and, second, the legal-institutional design of different 
process-focused regulatory mechanisms. I also argue that historical factors have played an important 
but supplementary role in shaping recent reform outcomes along the lines described above.   
 
4. Scholarly Contributions 
The regulatory politics of sovereign debt restructuring is an important but poorly understood facet of 
global financial governance. Scholars have paid little attention to recent reform initiatives in this area, 
and scholarly accounts of previous outcomes in the SDRR—while helpful—are limited in their ability 
to explain newer developments. This dissertation makes an important empirical contribution to our 
understanding of contemporary debt politics by drawing on extensive primary material to present the 
first in-depth study of recent efforts to reform the international debt restructuring regime. It also 
makes a key theoretical contribution, using concrete case studies to develop a broader analytical 
framework for making sense of regulatory variation in this global governance arena. By explicating the 
role of earlier regime developments in shaping later reform outcomes, this study sheds light not only 
on the politics of different regulatory options at a given moment in time, but also on the evolutionary 
trajectory of the SDRR since the turn of the century. For years, scholars, activists, and practitioners 
have called for a whole host of new arrangements to govern debt restructuring, but their proposals 
often pay little attention to the political prospects and limits of different reforms to the debt regime.33 
                                                        
33 For example, see: Christopher G. Oechsli, ‘Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter 
11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act,’ Virginia Journal of International Law 21(2)(1981): 305-341; Barry C. Barnett, Sergio 
J. Galvis, and Ghislain Gouraige Jr., ‘On Third World Debt,’ Harvard International Law Journal 25(1984): 83-151; Benjamin 
J. Cohen, ‘A Global Chapter 11,’ Foreign Policy 75(1989): 109-111; Kunibert Raffer, ‘Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to 
International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face,’ World Development 18(2)(1990): 301-311; 
Steven L. Schwarcz, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach,’ Cornell Law Review 85(2000): 
101-187; Anne Krueger, ‘A new approach to sovereign debt restructuring,’ address given at the National Economists’ Club 
annual members’ dinner, American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC (November 26, 2001); Anne Pettifor, Chapter 
9/11? Resolving International Debt Crises—The Jubilee Framework for International Insolvency (New Economics Foundation, 2002); 
Eurodad, ‘A fair and transparent debt work-out procedure: 10 core civil society principles,’ A report from the European 
Network on Debt and Development (December 2009); Joseph E. Stiglitz et al., The Stiglitz Report: Reforming the International 
Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis (New Press, 2010); Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, 
Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy,’ 
Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform. Brookings Institute (October 2013); Richard Gitlin and Brett 
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This study provides something of a guide for anyone interested not primarily in the economic and 
legal rationale behind different reform options, but rather in the politics of regulatory choice. 
 
In constructing the framework described above, this dissertation builds upon existing IPE literature 
on the political economy of SDRR reform, particularly the rich trove of studies focused on the early 
2000s.34 It marshals new evidence that reinforces some of the key insights of earlier analyses, including 
the significance of US power and preferences and the role of sovereignty-related concerns in shaping 
American government views on the hard-law SDRM proposal.35 But it also highlights the analytical 
limitations of existing literature by pointing to three previously overlooked factors that are critical to 
explaining recent reform outcomes: the process-trigger distinction, the importance of compatibility 
between new international mechanisms and the existing domestic legal foundations of the debt regime, 
and the role of historical legacies and processes in further enhancing or diminishing the prospects of 
certain reform options. The analysis also devotes more attention to the role of IMF lending rules in 
the SDRR, an issue that received less attention in the work on SDRR reforms in the early 2000s (which 
paid little mind to the establishment of the IMF’s 2002 lending framework). Indeed, even the vast IPE 
literature on the IMF has largely ignored the role of the Fund’s lending framework as a mechanism 
for triggering restructurings.36 This study calls attention to the IMF’s central role in the SDRR, and 
shows that dominant states disproportionately shape the organization’s approach to debt 
restructuring—reinforcing state power interpretations of IMF behaviour.37 It also identifies other 
                                                        
House, ‘A Blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Forum,’ CIGI Papers No. 27 (March 2014); UNCTAD, ‘Sovereign Debt 
Workouts: Going Forward. Roadmap and Guide’, United Nations (April 2015); Barry Herman, ‘Toward a Multilateral 
Framework for Recovery from Sovereign Insolvency,’ in: Martin Guzman, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds.), Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016): 206-222.  
34 For example: Gelpern and Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract’; Helleiner, ‘The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring Mechanism’; Helleiner, ‘Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance?’; Setser, ‘The Political 
Economy of the SDRM’; Soederberg, ‘The Transnational Debt Architecture and Emerging Markets.’ 
35 In addition to the references cited in the previous note, see Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure 
Sovereign Debt’; Gelpern et al., ‘Count the Limbs.’ 
36 The exception to this rule includes a small number of policy-oriented papers that understand the IMF lending rules as a 
trigger mechanism and an integral part of the broader SDRR. See Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, ‘For the Agenda of the 
German G20 Presidency: A Global Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime,’ CIGI Policy Brief No. 85 (September 2016); 
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, ‘Managing Deep Debt Crises in the Euro Area: Towards a Feasible Regime,’ Global Policy 9(1)(2018): 
70-79; Ross Leckow and Julianne Ams, ‘Sovereign debt restructuring in the IMF experience,’ ESCB Legal Conference 
2016, European Central Bank (January 2017): 14-22. 
37 Strom C. Thacker, ‘The High Politics of IMF Lending,’ World Politics 52(1)(1999): 38-75; Thomas Oatley and Jason 
Yackee, ‘American Interests and IMF Lending,’ International Politics 41(3)(2004): 415-429; Randall W. Stone, ‘The scope of 
IMF conditionality,’ International Organization 62(4)(2008): 589-620; Robert J. Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, ‘IMF Programs: 
Who is chosen and what are the effects?’ Journal of Monetary Economics 52(7)(2005): 1245-1269; Axel Dreher and Nathan 
Jensen, ‘Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of US Interests on IMF Conditions,’ The 
Journal of Law and Economics 50(1)(2007): 105-124; Mark S. Copelovitch, The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy: 
Banks, Bonds, and Bailouts (Cambridge University Press, 2010); Michael Breen, The Politics of IMF Lending (Palgrave 
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previously neglected elements of sovereign debt politics, including the structural power of the US and 
UK in the SDRR and the sovereignty considerations that constrain the debtor countries that would 
presumably benefit most from a hard-law restructuring regime. 
 
This dissertation also contributes to broader IPE and global governance debates about the design and 
development of international institutions. It shows how existing institutional design literature can be 
helpful in understanding aspects of the regulatory outcomes in question, but also highlights important 
limitations of rationalist and functionalist work in this tradition.38 A fuller picture of debt politics can 
be gained by combining insights from this tradition with historical institutionalist perspectives, which 
emphasize the importance of prior institutional developments—including, for example, the 
domestically-rooted contract laws that govern cross-border sovereign debt obligations—in shaping 
subsequent preferences and political processes.39 But I also suggest that the significance of historical 
institutionalist insights should not be overstated, nor should the direction of change promoted by 
historical forces be assumed—a tendency of IPE scholarship focused on the incremental, rather than 
transformative, bolstering of global financial governance after 2008.40 In the cases that animate this 
project, historical factors play an important but decidedly supplementary role in explaining outcomes, 
which themselves display both incremental strengthening (contract reforms) and incremental 
weakening (IMF reforms) as a result of policy sequencing and feedback over time. 
 
Finally, this thesis challenges the focus of global governance debates that analyze institutional design 
along a spectrum of international hard and soft law,41 and that see the latter as the natural option for 
                                                        
Macmillan, 2013); Daniel McDowell, ‘Need for speed: The lending responsiveness of the IMF,’ The Review of International 
Organizations 12(1)(2017): 39-73. 
38 Particularly useful are neoliberal institutionalist theories that emphasize the collective action problems that define world 
politics and the role of international institutions in providing mutually-beneficial solutions to these problems. See Robert 
O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton University Press, 1984). Also 
helpful are analyses that highlight the impact of distribution and uncertainty on institutional choice. See Barbara 
Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions,’ International 
Organization 55(4)(2001): 761-799. Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance’, International Organization 54(3)(2000): 421-456; Joseph Jupille, Walter Mattli, and Duncan Snidal, Institutional 
Choice and Global Commerce (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
39 See Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004); James Mahoney 
and Kathleen Thelen (eds), Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (Cambridge University Press, 2009); 
Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations,’ International Organization 65(2)(2011): 367-399. 
40 See Orfeo Fioretos, ‘Retrofitting Financial Globalization: The Politics of Intense Incrementalism After 2008,” in: 
Thomas Rixen, Lora Anne Viola, and Michael Zurn (eds.), Historical Institutionalism and International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2016); Manuela Moschella and Eleni Tsingou (eds.), Great Expectations, Slow Transformations: Incremental 
Change in Post-Crisis Regulation (ECPR Press, 2013). 
41Abbott and Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’; Shaffer and Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law.’ 
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governing global finance.42 It highlights the political utility of an alternative—private-law contracts—
that does not fit into the hard law-soft law dichotomy. To be sure, there are already strands of literature 
that examine the role of contracts in global politics, and some of these contributions can help to make 
sense of the cases that motivate this study.43 At the same time, existing literature is somewhat limited 
by its tendency to treat contracts as either generic agreements44—hard- and soft-law arrangements 
could both be ‘contracts’ from this perspective—or as tools of private order.45 By showcasing the role 
of private-law contracts in public and public-private hybrid reform initiatives, this study expands 
current understandings of the use and purpose of contracts in global governance. 
 
5. Situating the Project and Setting the Stage 
As the above discussion suggests, this dissertation situates itself within the multidisciplinary fields of 
IPE and global governance. IPE research has traditionally been concerned with questions of power 
and prosperity in the world economy. Global governance, as both a concept and field of inquiry, has 
typically focused on the variably institutionalized arrangements that regulate and/or constitute global 
relations, often stressing the variety of actors—including and beyond the state—that play significant 
roles in shaping these arrangements.46 Building on these foundations, I adopt a multi-actor framework 
for understanding rulemaking and regulatory change in the SDRR—one that recognizes the distinct 
roles of different actors but also acknowledges that some are more consequential than others. 
                                                        
42 Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System. 
43 For example, constructivist-oriented perspectives that see contracts as ‘legal fictions’ can shed light on the recent use of 
contract reform as a response to uncertainty. See Stephen Nelson, ‘Market Rules: Social Conventions, Legal Fictions, and 
the Organization of Sovereign Debt Markets in the Long Twentieth Century’, in: Gregoire Mallard and Jerome Sgard (eds), 
Contractual Knowledge: One Hundred Years of Legal Experimentation in Global Markets (Cambridge University Press, 2016): 118-
150; Annalise Riles, ‘Collateral Expertise: Legal Knowledge in the Global Financial Markets,’ Current Anthropology 
51(6)(2010): 795-818.  
44 Alexander Cooley, ‘Rationalist theories of institutions in American IPE’, in: Mark Blyth (ed), Routledge Handbook of 
International Political Economy (IPE): IPE as a global conversation (Routledge, 2009); Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, 
Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton University Press, 2009). 
45 A. Claire Cutler and Thomas Dietz (eds.), The Politics of Private Transnational Governance by Contract (Routledge, 2017). 
46 Scholars have shown how, in addition to states, global governance involves a range of actors, including: sub-state entities 
such as cities and provinces (Michele M. Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, ‘Cities and Multilevel Governance of Global Climate 
Change,’ Global Governance 12(2006): 141-159), supra-state actors such as regional and global intergovernmental institutions 
(Bjorn Hettne, ‘Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,’ New Political Economy 10(4)(2005): 543-571; Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004)), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) (John Boli and George M. Thomas (eds.), Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental 
Organization Since 1875 (Stanford University Press, 1999)), transnational corporations (Tim Buthe and Walter Mattli, The 
New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2011)), and transnational 
networks of activists (Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics 
(Cornell University Press, 1998)), government officials (Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University 
Press, 2004)), and knowledge-based experts (Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination,’ International Organization 46(1)(1992): 1-35).   
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The idea that a wider range of actors increasingly contributes to governing global affairs rests on the 
premise that, as globalization processes have produced new interdependencies and empowered new 
actors, global decision-making forums have proliferated and become more permeable.47 It is important 
not to overstate the extent and importance of these transformations for sovereign debt governance. 
While private financial interests and NGOs have undoubtedly become better organized and more 
influential in international debt politics over the past several decades, the overall shape and trajectory 
of the SDRR continue to be determined primarily by states and their preferences. And although one 
of the reform initiatives I examine (contract reform) proceeded through the type of informal and 
decentralized process associated with ‘new governance,’48 the remainder took place within traditional 
intergovernmental organizations: the IMF, the UN, and the European Union (EU). Still, given that 
these initiatives played out in different venues and involved different combinations of actors, it can 
be useful to think about the politics of SDRR reform as a multi-player game that unfolds within and 
across multiple venues. 
 
An analogy might sharpen the point. Think of the sovereign debt governance arena as a vast casino, 
populated by an array of actors who play various games. The main players we will see navigating this 
arena throughout the case study chapters are the leading capital-exporting states (primarily the US but 
also the UK, France, and Germany), transnational private creditors and their representatives, and 
sovereign debtors (mainly those from the global South but also some peripheral Eurozone countries). 
The games they play are the institutional venues and assemblages through which collective decisions 
are made—the prize is to have one’s regulatory preferences realized. Each game has its own set of 
rules and logic. Just as the rules and logic of poker, roulette, and craps differ, so too do the rules and 
decision-making norms of the IMF, the UN General Assembly, and the EU—not to mention more 
informal governance forums. Each player also has its own set of skills and resources—or capabilities 
in the terminology of international relations—especially within the context of certain games. The US, 
for example, has structural and relational power capabilities that transcend specific venues, but it also 
has special institutional advantages within the IMF. To varying degrees, the players can float around 
the casino trying their hands at different games. But not all games are equally open to all players. Some 
                                                        
47 For example, see Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), chapter 6; Jonathan 
GS Koppell, World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy, and the Design of Global Governance (University of Chicago Press, 2010); 
Philip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
48 For a discussion of new governance, see John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: 
Lessons from Business and Human Rights,’ Global Governance 20(2014): 5-17. 
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are exclusive, invite-only affairs (e.g., the EMDE bond reform process) or occur behind closed doors 
(e.g., IMF decision-making), while others are more open and inclusive (e.g., UN processes). 
 
This analogy can help to set the stage and illustrate the preponderant power and influence of the US 
and other capital-exporting states within and across the different rulemaking venues examined in this 
thesis. These states have a seat at the table for each game and are better positioned than others to use 
both their inherent capabilities and their privileged positions within specific games to shape outcomes 
within the SDRR. The claim is thus that a select group of powerful states—the US paramount among 
them—matter the most, with their influence being felt across all major reform initiatives, while private 
creditors and debtor states are of secondary importance, impacting the SDRR at particular times and 
places. For this reason, the three core actors—or actor groups—do not receive equal attention across 
the different case studies. Institutional actors such as IMF staff and select UN agencies also make 
appearances and play a role in particular reform initiatives, but their influence is more limited to the 
specific international forum in which they have a mandate to operate. And even within their 
operational domains, these actors are no match for dominant states when their preferences clash. 
 
The casino analogy should not be stretched too far. I avoid the temptation to designate any one actor 
or set of actors—even the US or a broader group of dominant states—as ‘the house,’ given the degree 
of structural control and dominance this implies and the connotation that all other actors are therefore 
engaged in a zero-sum, and in the long run hopeless, battle against this all-powerful ruler. The casino 
comparison is intended simply to help the reader visualize the politics of SDRR reform as a set of 
distinct but related political processes—or games—played out across a variegated institutional terrain. 
But it also raises a bigger set of questions about the relationship between structures and agents in this 
governance domain. While a deep ontological discussion of the structure-agent debate is unnecessary 
and beyond the scope of this dissertation, a few words on this subject are warranted. As the analogy 
suggests, the institutional venues in which reform initiatives take place are structures that provide 
some actors with greater voice and power to achieve their objectives than others. Broader structural 
features of the global political economy also condition the power capabilities of certain actors in ways 
that transcend specific forums. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, US and UK structural power in the 
sovereign debt regime allowed these states to decisively influence the UN initiative despite having no 
formal veto or in-built institutional advantage within the General Assembly. 
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Moreover, a consistent theme of this dissertation is that the preferences of the core actors introduced 
above are closely connected to their material structural positions in the global financial order. The use 
of the terms ‘capital-exporting states,’ ‘private creditors,’ and ‘sovereign debtors’ indeed implies that 
identifying these actors according to their economic status or position conveys useful information. 
But I do not go as far as to suggest that such positions determine preferences, let alone strategies for 
trying to realize them. Instead, actors have significant agency and, as will be shown at different points 
in this thesis, their preferences can shift despite little change in their material structural positions. That 
is because, in my reading, these positions are mediated by ideas—often shared perceptions—that 
translate them into actionable policy positions, and these mental filters can change as a result of lived 
experiences, changed circumstances (not related to one’s fundamental place in global finance), and so 
forth.49 In the pages that follow, the core actors are thus assumed to be agents making choices about 
what they want based on ideas about how specific outcomes will affect their interests, and acting upon 
those choices in an environment that both enables and constrains different actors in different ways. 
It should, therefore, not be surprising when actors behave in ways we would expect based on their 
material positions, nor should it shock us when they re-evaluate how specific regulatory arrangements 
affect their interests.      
 
In emphasizing the central role played by the leading capital-exporting states, this thesis resonates with 
state-centric perspectives on global financial governance and international regulatory regimes.50 It 
would not be inaccurate to say that recent outcomes in the SDRR largely reflect, in Daniel Drezner’s 
phrasing, “the preferences and capabilities of great power governments.”51 As discussed above, 
however, I also see an important though less pervasive role for debtor states and private creditors in 
shaping key aspects of this regime, making mine a multi-actor framework that privileges powerful 
states—particularly the US.  
 
                                                        
49 For a discussion on the role of ideas as filters through which material facts in the international political economy are 
interpreted, see Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth, and Craig Parsons (eds.), Constructing the International Economy (Cornell University 
Press, 2010). 
50 Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors, ‘Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle 
Accord,’ International Organization 52(1)(1998): 35-54; Beth A. Simmons, ‘The International Politics of Harmonization: The 
Case of Capital Market Regulation,’ International Organization 55(3)(2001): 589-620; Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics is Global: 
Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton University Press, 2007); Eric Helleiner, The Status Quo Crisis: Global 
Financial Governance After the 2008 Meltdown (Oxford University Press, 2014).  
51 Drezner, All Politics is Global, p. 32. 
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I conceive of dominant states as being motivated to pursue their national interests in international 
economic relations, as defined and understood by political elites. This does not mean that state officials 
are immune to pressures from powerful societal groups, but it does imply that the state is not simply 
an instrument of private capitalist interests. That said, we should still expect capital-exporting states—
the US and UK in particular—to promote global financial arrangements that benefit their domestic 
financial sectors, given the importance of these sectors to their national political economies and 
privileged positions on the world stage. Sometimes, promoting domestic financial interests can be 
seen as a means of advancing national objectives. Other times, a by-product of protecting the national 
public interest can be to protect the private interests of banks and bondholders as well—a dynamic 
on clear display in Chapter 4. Daniel McDowell makes this point eloquently when he says: “US foreign 
rescues reflect a joint product model where two outputs are produced by the same process: protecting 
the private financial interests of major banks while also protecting the stability of the national financial 
system.”52 In short, capital-exporting states are likely to see the health of their financial markets and 
firms as being inseparably tied up with the strength and stability of the nation. This is especially true 
for finance ministry officials whose job it is to promote and protect the country’s financial interests.53 
 
6. The Methodology 
This study relies on a qualitative, case study methodology. A case study approach is appropriate given 
the intrinsic interest of the cases in question. It also makes sense in light of the small universe of SDRR 
reform cases—ruling out large-N statistical analysis as a viable method—as well as the need to explore 
each of the recent cases in considerable depth to locate the causes of its failure or success. Exploring 
the cases in this way is all-the-more important because each initiative represents an attempt to establish 
a different type of governance arrangement, the distinct politics of which need to be understood in 
order to grasp the broader determinants of regulatory variation in this domain. The fact that each case 
plays a specific role in the broader explanation of variation points to a particular strength of case study 
research: its capacity to facilitate theory development as much as theory testing.54 In an important 
sense, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 emerged out of a detailed, more inductive 
interrogation of a set of empirically-rich cases. This framework can now be used as a lens not only for 
                                                        
52 McDowell, Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?, p. 91. 
53 McDowell makes this point with respect to US Treasury and Federal Reserve officials. See McDowell, Brother, Can You 
Spare a Billion?, pp. 90-91. 
54 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (The MIT Press, 2005).  
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understanding the cases examined herein, but also for viewing past and future reform initiatives, 
allowing for further testing and refining of the core ideas developed in this study. 
 
To pinpoint the drivers of outcomes within cases, I rely mostly on a process-tracing method, unfolding 
each reform process sequentially in order to identify specific causal variables when they arise and trace 
their effects throughout the remainder of the episode in question.55 This approach is well-established 
within the tradition of case study research and particularly well-suited for what is often called ‘historical 
explanation’—that is, drawing “inferences about the causes of specific outcomes in particular cases.”56 
In some cases, however, one of the key causal variables is a broader structural factor that conditions 
power capabilities and/or preferences from the beginning of the reform initiative, making it difficult 
to detect at some discrete moment of the process. In these few instances, deductive forms of reasoning 
are used in conjunction with supporting evidence to assess the significance of certain factors. 
 
To support my claims, I draw on several sources of evidence. The most important source consists of 
archival materials from the organizations in which reform processes played out. Archives are used 
most extensively in the UN and especially IMF cases, due to the fact that these formal organizations 
often document their meetings and decision-making processes and make these documents available 
to the public (with a time delay in the case of documents that detail the positions taken during IMF 
executive board meetings). The types of archives I draw from are mainly the recorded minutes of IMF 
executive board meetings and ad hoc UN meetings, and the written statements that country 
representatives submit in advance or at the time of these meetings. These sources are particularly 
useful in identifying or clarifying policy preferences and pinpointing key moments that subsequent 
developments turned upon.  
 
To supplement my archival evidence, I also conducted one-on-one interviews with key informants. 
The interviews were few in number but rich in content and insight. They involved lengthy discussions 
with key individuals who played critical roles in one or more of the initiatives I examine. These 
interviews were used most extensively to shine light on the bond reform episodes, particularly the 
process of changing EMDE debt contracts, which took place through a small, informal working group 
                                                        
55 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (eds.), Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).  
56 James Mahoney, Erin Kimball, and Kendra L. Koivu, ‘The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences,’ 
Comparative Political Studies 42(1)(2009): 114-146, p. 116. 
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led by US Treasury officials. In addition to having insider knowledge of this contract reform process, 
some of the individuals interviewed also participated as key insiders in recent IMF reform processes 
and one of them participated in aspects of the UN initiative. Interview materials are thus used to 
support elements of all three case study chapters. 
 
In total, I carried out four long-form interviews.57 These were conducted at a late stage in the research 
process. Their purpose was not primarily to identify the who, what, where, and when of the initiatives 
in question—as interviews at earlier stages are often used to do58—but rather to establish motivations 
and test hypotheses among select individuals with unparalleled knowledge of my subject. Earlier 
interviews were unnecessary because I had acquired sufficient information about the basic facts of my 
cases through background research as well as my pre-PhD experience as a think tank researcher, where 
I worked on sovereign debt restructuring and was exposed to high-level policy circles and 
discussions—often as a ‘fly on the wall’—in Washington DC, New York, Mexico City, and elsewhere. 
At the later stage when interviews were conducted, I found that it did not take many discussions to 
fill key research gaps and begin to see diminishing informational returns on additional interviews.59 
The questions I asked were open-ended in order to allow interviewees to give detailed answers about 
their particular knowledge and experience vis-à-vis recent reforms. Interviews were conducted on the 
basis that interviewees would remain anonymous unless they agreed to be identified. These individuals 
approved the limited information provided about them in this thesis. All interviews were conducted 
in accordance with the rules and protocols of the University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics. 
 
In addition to archival and interview-based evidence, I draw heavily on so-called ‘grey literature.’ Here, 
sources consist mostly of primary policy and advocacy documents from key organizations such as the 
IMF, the UN, and the private-sector Institute of International Finance (IIF). News articles from the 
financial press are also used to provide contextual details or fill small gaps in certain areas. Lastly, the 
                                                        
57 Interviews were conducted on the basis of anonymity, although one interviewee agreed to be named and limited 
information can be provided about the others. Interview 138790 was conducted on October 19, 2018 with an undisclosed 
sovereign debt expert who, among other things, participated in the US Treasury-led working group that led to recent 
EMDE bond reforms. Interview 107122 took place on October 31, 2018 with Leland Goss of the International Capital 
Market Association (or ICMA). Goss and his organization also played a key role in the recent EMDE bond reform process. 
Interview 114203 took place on January 22, 2019 with a former US Treasury official, and interview 138785 was conducted 
on February 1, 2019 with a former IMF official. 
58 Layna Mosley (ed.), Interview Research in Political Science (Cornell University Press, 2013).  
59 These diminishing returns are often called ‘data saturation’ in qualitative research. See Patricia I. Fusch and Lawrence 
R. Ness, ‘Are We There Yet? Data Saturation in Qualitative Research,’ Qualitative Report 20(9)(2015): 1408-1416.  
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dissertation draws on numerous books and journal articles to back up select claims. Much of this is 
academic literature, but I also benefit from a few more anecdotal articles written by practitioners who 
share their first-hand experience with sovereign debt restructuring reforms.   
 
7. Limitations of the Study 
This project has two notable limitations. First, the argument developed in this dissertation is informed 
by the specific characteristics and regulatory challenges of the SDRR, and while it generates insights 
that contribute to wider debates in IPE and global governance, its capacity to explain broader global 
governance dynamics or specific sovereign debt crises is much more limited. In short, this study is 
interested only in the politics of a particular international economic regime, not in global financial 
governance or world politics more broadly. Moreover, it does not seek to explain the causes and 
consequences of sovereign debt restructurings themselves.   
 
Second, the sovereign debt regime is made up of various markets, relationships, and arrangements, 
and the regulatory mechanisms examined in this project—at least the successful ones—do not apply 
to all aspects and corners of the broader sovereign debt landscape. Changes to EMDE debt contracts 
apply only to the bonds that debtor states issue in foreign jurisdictions. The outstanding stock of 
bonds in this category is valued at roughly $900 billion.60 Recent reforms to Eurozone debt contracts 
affect both the domestic and international bonds of all countries within the currency bloc—a much 
larger market worth tens of trillions of euros.61 But the contract mechanisms introduced through 
recent reforms—both to the international bonds of EMDEs and to the domestic and international 
bonds of Eurozone governments—do not cover the bonds that EMDEs issue under their domestic 
laws, nor do they apply to non-bond loans provided by commercial banks or other governments.  
 
The fact that considerable effort has been directed at reforming international and European sovereign 
bond markets makes sense given that private lending largely replaced government-to-government 
loans starting in the 1970s and bonds largely replaced bank loans starting in the early 1990s, and 
considering that the most troubling recent restructuring episodes—involving Greece and Argentina—
                                                        
60 IMF, ‘Progress Report on Inclusion of Enhanced Contractual Provisions in International Sovereign Bond Contracts,’ 
IMF Policy Papers (September 2015).  
61 Elena Carletti, Paolo Colla, and Mitu Gulati, ‘Evaluating the 2013 Euro CAC Experiment,’ in: Franklin Allen, Elena 
Carletti, and Joanna Gray (eds.), The New Financial Architecture in the Eurozone (European University Institute, 2015): 123-
136. 
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occurred within these markets. But there has also been a significant recent expansion in domestically-
issued EMDE debt and new bilateral lending from China.62 The rise of China as a major international 
public creditor has also raised questions about how future debt restructurings will play out in cases 
where China has lent substantial amounts to the country in question, and where its lending contributes 
to a more complex and unruly creditor base.63 It is important to acknowledge that the bond reforms 
examined in Chapter 6 do not apply to these expanding forms of debt and that this study does not 
concern itself with how the latter might be restructured in the future. The UN and IMF reform efforts 
considered in chapters 4 and 5 were more universal, in the sense that Fund lending rules apply to all 
189 of the organization’s member states and the UN’s proposed multilateral framework, if established, 
would have presumably covered the gamut of sovereign debt. But the UN initiative failed to produce 
much change, while IMF reforms actually weakened existing arrangements. Specifying the scope of 
successful reform helps to draw boundaries around the extent of change we have seen without 
diminishing the importance of understanding why some initiatives have fared better than others.  
 
8. The Organization of the Thesis  
The remainder of this dissertation unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous reform debates and 
initiatives in the SDRR, with a particular focus on the early 2000s when the regime was last updated. 
This episode is especially important because it established ideas and institutions that recent initiatives 
have built upon or departed from. The purpose of this review is to provide a benchmark against which 
to assess recent reforms, to introduce the reader to earlier changes whose significance to recent 
outcomes will become apparent later, and to survey explanations of the early 2000s in search of 
insights into the initiatives examined in subsequent chapters. Having identified key gaps in this existing 
literature, Chapter 3 outlines an analytical framework for recent reform outcomes and the variation 
they display. It maps out the core players, their powers, and their preferences, pointing to how these 
factors relate to the trigger-process distinction, the politics of a trigger mechanism, the politics of 
                                                        
62 For a discussion of growing domestic debt markets in EMDEs, see Aaron Metrotra, Ken Miyajima, and Agustin Villar, 
‘Developments of domestic government bond markets in EMEs and their implications,’ BIS Papers 67(2012). For updated 
numbers, see BIS statistics, ‘Debt securities statistics,’ updated March 5, 2019. For discussions of China’s increased 
sovereign lending, see Kevin P. Gallagher and Amos Irwin, ‘China’s Economic Statecraft in Latin America: Evidence from 
China’s Policy Banks,’ Pacific Affairs 88(1)(2015): 99-121; The Economist, ‘China’s financial diplomacy: Rich but rash,’ 
(January 31, 2015); Kevin P. Gallagher, ‘Latin America’s China Boom,’ NACLA Report on the Americas 48(3)(2016): 265-
270; Christian Shepherd, Lucy Hornby, and James Kynge, ‘China rethinks approach after surge in lending to risky 
countries,’ Financial Times (October 13, 2016). 
63 For an example of these questions in the context of a discussion about how Venezuela might restructure its debt, see 
Robert Kahn, ‘Venezuela after the Fall: Financing, Debt Relief and Geopolitics,’ CIGI Papers No. 147 (October 2017).  
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different legal-institutional designs for process mechanisms, and the importance of prior 
developments in shaping subsequent preferences and political processes. The chapter then turns to a 
discussion of the ways in which this basic framework fits within and contributes to various IPE and 
global governance debates. 
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present and analyze the empirical cases that animate this project. Chapter 4 looks 
at the 2010 and 2016 reforms to the IMF’s lending framework, elucidating the factors that led to its 
weakening and that stand in the way of an effective trigger mechanism more generally. Turning to the 
UN initiative, Chapter 5 sheds light on the political obstacles that roadblocked the G77 and China’s 
ambitious proposal for an international hard-law approach to the debt restructuring process. It then 
discusses the soft-law principles that ultimately emerged from the reform process, arguing that they 
face political and functional barriers that will limit their impact on the SDRR. Analysis of both aspects 
of the UN initiative suggest that public international law techniques face enormous challenges and are 
unlikely to succeed as regulatory devices for debt restructuring processes.  
 
By contrast, Chapter 6 focuses on the successful emergence of sovereign bond contract reforms, 
which produced tangible and meaningful—albeit not transformative—improvements to debt 
restructuring processes. The chapter first analyzes contract changes in the Eurozone and then explores 
the US Treasury-led effort to revamp the bonds that EMDE governments issue abroad, almost 
exclusively in New York and London. In both episodes, I show how the legal-institutional design of 
contract mechanisms made them a politically useful tool for navigating the trade-offs of regulating 
sovereign debt restructuring, especially for powerful capital-exporting states. Both episodes also reveal 
the ways in which earlier contract reforms helped pave the way for the spreading and strengthening 
of the contractual approach more recently. Chapter 7 concludes by relating these cases back to the 
broader framework this dissertation develops for understanding regulatory variation in the SDRR, and 





What Came Before:  
A Review of Earlier Initiatives and Explanations 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews earlier reform outcomes in the SDRR that took place before the recent initiatives 
that motivate this thesis. It focuses particularly on the early 2000s, when the regime was last updated. 
This earlier episode is especially important because it established ideas and institutional arrangements 
that recent initiatives have built upon or departed from. 
 
Reviewing this episode serves three purposes. First, it provides a benchmark against which to assess 
recent reforms and the degree/direction of change they represent. To substantiate the claim that 
recent IMF reforms weakened the Fund’s lending framework as a trigger mechanism, or that recent 
contract reforms strengthened the debt restructuring process, it is important for the reader to have a 
sense of the baseline from which I am assessing change. Second, reviewing the early 2000s introduces 
the reader to previous developments whose significance to recent outcomes will become apparent as 
this dissertation unfolds. It is worth putting these previous initiatives in the reader’s mind at this early 
stage. The final purpose of this chapter is to survey explanations of the early 2000s in search of insights 
into the initiatives examined in subsequent chapters. The chapter also moves beyond the early 2000s 
to review the small handful of works that examine the recent reforms at the core of this project. 
Surveying the existing literature reveals important gaps that limit our ability to understand variation in 
recent outcomes. Chapter 3 takes up the task of constructing a framework that fills these gaps and 
provides a fuller understanding of SDRR reform outcomes. 
 
Although this chapter focuses mainly on reform outcomes between 2001 and 2004, the historical 
review starts with a quick look at IMF reform debates of the 1990s, which set the stage for the SDRR 
reforms of the early 2000s. In order to properly frame these debates and initiatives, the chapter begins 
with a brief conceptual overview of IMF lending and how it can serve as either a substitute or trigger 
for sovereign debt restructuring. Not only does this overview of IMF lending help to illuminate key 
motivations of reform efforts in the early 2000s, and to later contrast this earlier reform context with 
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the more recent one, but it also provides important background information for understanding the 
arguments laid out in chapter 3 and, especially, chapter 4.  
 
After discussing the effects of IMF lending in the next section, this chapter moves on to review the 
debates of the 1990s and the reform initiatives of the early 2000s. It shows how, during this earlier 
episode, trigger and process mechanisms were seen as two necessary components in a larger regime 
change, inseparably connected both conceptually and practically. In terms of specific outcomes, a 
trigger mechanism was established via the creation of new IMF lending rules, while two competing 
process-oriented proposals (the SDRM and CACs) were hotly debated, with the contractual approach 
prevailing over the international treaty-based alternative. A set of soft-law restructuring principles were 
also unveiled in this context. After outlining these initiatives, the next section probes the existing 
literature for explanations that could shed light on recent reform outcomes. It reviews accounts of the 
early 2000s as well as the few analyses of recent initiatives themselves. The final section identifies three 
major omissions in the literature and briefly outlines how my argument seeks to fill these gaps.   
 
 
2. IMF Lending and the Reform Debates of the 1990s  
2.1 IMF Lending as Substitute or Trigger for Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
When a debtor state finds itself unable to continue servicing its debts to foreign creditors, it will 
typically seek emergency financial assistance from the IMF. Since the organization’s inception in 1944, 
and especially since the early days of financial globalization in the 1970s, few viable alternatives have 
existed for struggling sovereigns looking to regain their financial footing. To be sure, crisis-stricken 
countries can and often do secure supplemental sources of financing from other public and private 
lenders, but these contributions are usually conditional upon a country first being approved for IMF 
lending.64 The Fund has thus been the gatekeeper of emergency financing for debtor governments, 
giving it enormous power to shape crisis responses and extract policy reforms from loan recipients. 
 
One crucial element of this power is the Fund’s capacity to shape decisions about whether and when 
distressed debtors restructure the debt they owe to private creditors. The organization provides the 
financing that debtors use to remain current on their payments to creditors. When this financing helps 
                                                        
64 Erica R. Gould, Money Talks: The International Monetary Fund, Conditionality, and Supplementary Financiers (Stanford University 
Press, 2006). 
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countries overcome short-term difficulties and restore their independent capacity to service debt, it 
allows them to avoid an otherwise probable restructuring. But when countries face deeper problems 
that require some form of debt relief, IMF lending can postpone necessary restructurings, which tends 
to exacerbate and extend crises and undermine the effectiveness of Fund programs.65 If the IMF 
anticipates the need for debt relief from the outset, it can condition its support on the completion of 
an upfront restructuring that puts the debtor’s finances on a more sustainable trajectory.66 It is in this 
sense that IMF lending decisions have the capacity to trigger sovereign debt restructurings.  
 
When should the Fund use its lending tools to encourage debt restructuring? The IMF recognizes that 
there are different types of financial crises that require different types of responses. The key distinction 
that first has to be made is whether a crisis is one of liquidity or solvency.67 For a country in a liquidity 
crisis, the key problem is a short-term shortage of the hard currency used in cross-border transactions. 
In such cases, the Fund’s optimal solution, from its own perspective, is to provide a bailout package 
conditional on the country’s implementation of key policy adjustments. If the crisis has been accurately 
diagnosed and the Fund’s program is credible in the eyes of global financial markets, the combination 
of financing and adjustment should be sufficient to resolve the crisis by restoring market confidence 
and ‘catalyzing’ the return of private lending to the country.68 In the Fund’s view, debt restructuring 
is neither necessary nor desirable in liquidity crises. Solvency crises, which occur when a state has 
become so indebted it can no longer afford to service its obligations over the medium to long term, 
are a different story. They generally cannot be resolved without some degree of debt relief. In these 
cases, the optimal approach for the Fund is to condition its financial support not just on a set of policy 
changes—as it does in all lending programs—but also on an upfront debt restructuring operation that 
is sufficiently deep and comprehensive to restore the sovereign’s debt-servicing capacities.69 
 
                                                        
65 David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert (eds.), The IMF and its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture (Cambridge 
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69 Ibid. 
 31 
As the checkered history of IMF lending shows, failing to condition Fund financing on early or large 
enough debt workouts in cases of sovereign insolvency tends to produce perverse outcomes for the 
debtor country, a portion of its creditors, the IMF, and the international system as a whole. At best, 
bailout loans do little to resolve insolvency crises; at worst, they deepen them by adding more debt to 
an already-unpayable financial burden.70 In either case, bailouts simply delay the need for restructuring 
and prolong painful economic crises.71 They also have the effect of bailing out private creditors, as 
debtor states use Fund resources to avoid default by repaying banks and bondholders whose claims 
are reaching maturity.72 This has allowed large swathes of private lenders to exit from many crises 
scot-free, shifting the burden of adjustment squarely onto the debtor country and, according to some 
critics, sowing the seeds of future crises by creating creditor moral hazard.73 Replacing a large portion 
of private-sector claims with IMF loans, which cannot be restructured because of the Fund’s ‘preferred 
creditor status,’ also reduces the amount of debt that can be written-down when delayed restructurings 
do occur. As a result, a debtor may receive less debt relief than if it had restructured before accepting 
IMF assistance, and its remaining non-IMF creditors will have to take larger haircuts to provide the 
same level of relief that could have been achieved earlier through moderate haircuts spread over a 
wider creditor base.74 These outcomes undermine the success of Fund programs and erode the 
organization’s legitimacy as an impartial and effective crisis manager.    
 
Despite these suboptimal outcomes, the Fund has lent without requiring or even encouraging early or 
adequate debt restructuring in numerous cases where debtor countries were effectively insolvent. A 
certain amount of error is to be expected and can be explained by the fact that, while the liquidity-
solvency distinction is, in theory, relatively clear, in reality it can be notoriously difficult to distinguish 
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between these two ideal types.75 What begins as a liquidity problem can mutate into a solvency one. 
More fundamentally, whether or not a government can pay its external debts over a given period of 
time depends not only on economic factors but also on its political will and ability to impose certain 
levels of austerity and adjustment on domestic society. And there is no formula for determining how 
the politics of adjustment will play out in different countries and contexts. The difficulties of 
distinguishing between different types of crises are only compounded by a bigger challenge: persistent 
political pressures to lend to countries without requiring restructuring, even when the underlying 
problem is clearly or probably one of insolvency. Because restructurings can be enormously costly and 
destabilizing for debtor states, their transnational private creditors, and the key capital-exporting states 
in which the majority of those creditors reside, one or more of these actors will often press the IMF 
to lend in ways that avoid, or at least delay, a large debt write-down. As the IMF has acknowledged, 
“pressures to delay a restructuring of unsustainable debt have historically been commonplace.”76  
 
2.2 The Need for Rules? The IMF Reform Debates of the 1990s 
The significance of IMF lending as a determinant of sovereign debt repayment and restructuring 
decisions began to attract widespread international attention during the Latin American debt crisis of 
the 1980s. It was then that the Fund cemented its role as the chief architect of international responses 
to large-scale sovereign debt crises. Initially, the organization was under immense pressure at the time 
from its largest shareholder—the US—to orchestrate a response that allowed debtor countries to 
avoid defaulting on or writing-off a significant amount of their external debt.77 In this context, the 
Fund’s approach was to mobilize new financing which allowed indebted countries to continue 
servicing their interest payments, impose macroeconomic and structural adjustments on debtors in 
hopes of restoring their independent capacity to pay, and encourage the rescheduling of the payment 
of principal on outstanding loans.78 Despite the fact that it failed to acknowledge the underlying 
problem—that debtors were effectively insolvent and would need substantial debt relief—this strategy 
was maintained from roughly 1982 until 1989, at which point deeper debt restructuring had become 
politically acceptable to the US and was delivered via the Brady Plan. In the end, critics accused the 
                                                        
75 Otaviano Canuto, Brian Pinto, and Mona Prasad, ‘Orderly Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Missing in Action! (And Likely 
to Remain So),’ The World Bank Research Observer 29(1)(2014): 109-135.  
76 IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring,’ p. 20. 
77 Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Managing the LDC Debt Crisis,’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2(1986): 397-440; Stephen S. Golub, 
‘The Political Economy of the Latin American Debt Crisis,’ Latin American Research Review 26(1)(1991): 175-215. 
78 James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989 (International Monetary Fund, 2001). 
 33 
Fund of contributing to Latin America’s ‘lost decade’ by delaying the resolution of the crisis.79 The 
episode was an early and powerful example of how IMF bailouts could exacerbate solvency crises and 
delay restructurings, and how political pressures could encourage questionable lending choices. 
 
The 1990s saw an uptick in the size and intensity of financial crises and IMF rescue loans. In this 
context, IMF lending became increasingly controversial and heated debates emerged, particularly 
among US and European policymakers, about the appropriate role and size of bailouts and whether 
there should be rules governing the Fund’s lending decisions. These debates were triggered first by 
the 1994 Mexican financial crisis. Unable to service its short-term domestic dollar-linked debt, Mexico 
secured a bailout of $20 billion from the US and an additional $18 billion from the IMF—more than 
the Fund had previously made available to any other country—to pay off its maturing debt and avoid 
default. 80 The US contribution to the Mexican bailout had been controversial in domestic politics, and 
the Clinton Administration wanted to bolster the IMF’s lending capacity so that it would not have to 
make such large bilateral loans to supplement Fund financing in future crises. But the major European 
powers were already uncomfortable with the scale of IMF lending to Mexico, as well as the fact that 
private creditors were not asked to contribute to resolving the crisis via private financing or debt 
restructuring—also referred to at the time as “private-sector involvement” (PSI) or “bail-ins.”81 
European officials saw the IMF contribution to Mexico as serving American financial interests, and 
they wanted to limit and impose stricter rules on large-scale multilateral lending.82 
 
In response to these competing pressures, the G7’s 1995 Halifax Summit focused mainly on ways to 
increase the size and speed of IMF lending, while the G10’s 1996 Rey Report tackled the issue of how 
to encourage the restructuring of sovereign bonds when necessary.83 Among other things, the Rey 
Report recommended that debtor states insert ‘collective action clauses’ (CACs)—a contract-based 
mechanism to facilitate debt restructuring processes—into their sovereign bonds, but debtors and 
their private creditors showed little enthusiasm for this idea (despite the fact that CACs were already 
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a common feature of the sovereign bonds issued in London under English law). American and 
European concerns were thus both on the agenda, but major questions remained about how IMF 
resources should be deployed, and when large-scale lending should be accompanied or preceded by 
debt restructuring. Debate over these questions only intensified over the next few years with the 
outbreak of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis, which resulted in record-sized IMF loans. 
Normally, countries can borrow up to 100 percent of the size of their IMF quotas in a year. Thailand, 
Indonesia, and South Korea were given loans worth 600, 490, and 1,939 percent of their respective 
quotas.84 These crises were followed shortly after by Russia’s financial meltdown of 1998, prompting 
another large IMF loan. In this case, Fund lending failed to prevent subsequent default, which in turn 
triggered the collapse of the US hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.85     
 
In this context, the US Congress agreed to expand the IMF’s lending capacity. Beefing up the Fund’s 
financial firepower focused attention again on “the need to define the circumstances when the IMF 
should mobilize its expanded lending capacity.”86 The US and Europe remained divided on the key 
questions of whether different types of crises required fundamentally different IMF policy responses, 
and the extent to which those responses should be governed by rules versus discretion. US officials 
believed that a combination of financing and adjustment was an appropriate response to liquidity 
crises, but that solvency crises called for debt restructuring. They supported the creation of an informal 
lending framework based on this distinction, but one that still provided significant room for discretion 
and case-by-case decision-making in determining how to define and respond to individual crises.87 
 
European policymakers, especially the Germans, wanted to make large-scale IMF lending conditional 
on private creditors taking at least some financial losses in all crises. Moreover, they preferred a rules-
based framework to prevent politically-motivated bailouts and limit moral hazard by making a credible 
commitment not to rescue private creditors. Some movement toward compromise was made at the 
IMF’s Annual Meetings in 2000, where countries agreed on the Prague Framework outlining three 
possible approaches to crisis management: one where catalytic financing plus policy adjustment was 
sufficient; one where private creditors should be encouraged to voluntarily roll-over their debt and 
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maintain their exposure to countries; and one where circumstances called for a comprehensive debt 
restructuring.88 While the framework made important distinctions, it did not go as far as specifying 
hard rules or precise circumstances for when each of these different approaches should be employed. 
 
While agreement was difficult to reach, there was a growing sense that private creditors should have 
to bear more of the burden of sovereign debt crises, and that bailouts should therefore be replaced or 
accompanied in many cases by debt restructurings. This sentiment was not confined to high-level 
policy circles. By the early 2000s, the international management of financial crises had become 
intensely politicized in Western countries, particularly the US. Critics on both the left and right took 
issue with the distributional implications of giving massive taxpayer-funded loans to crisis-stricken 
governments to help them rescue failing firms and service debts owed to foreign private creditors.89 
Conservative voices in particular also complained about the moral hazard that bailouts generated.90 
 
3. The Reform Initiatives of the Early 2000s 
The US position on the “bailouts versus bail-ins” and “rules versus discretion” debates took a sharp 
turn in 2001 with the arrival of George W. Bush to the White House, which brought to power a US 
administration committed to limiting the use of big IMF bailouts and encouraging, in their place, a 
greater reliance on sovereign debt restructuring to resolve crises.91 For key officials on the new US 
Treasury team, the objective of limiting bailouts required firm rules to govern IMF lending—as the 
Europeans had been advocating—as well as a more institutionalized process for debt restructuring. 
In their view, a lot of the pressure to provide bailouts in the first place came from the fact that the 
alternative of letting debtors and creditors work out debt problems among themselves through a 
negotiated restructuring was often chaotic, conflictual, time-consuming, and unnecessarily costly for 
the parties involved.92 It was believed that this pressure could only be relieved by establishing a more 
orderly and predictable bankruptcy-like system to facilitate smoother restructuring processes. The 
twin-task of establishing new IMF lending rules and a better restructuring process began to look even 
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more urgent late in 2001, when Argentina underwent a massive default that highlighted both the limits 
of IMF bailouts—the default occurred despite prior IMF lending that failed to recognize the need for 
restructuring—and the need for predictable rules to facilitate more orderly debt restructurings.93  
 
3.1 Debating the Design of a Process Mechanism 
While discussions about IMF lending rules had been ongoing and continued largely in the background, 
the idea of an international sovereign bankruptcy procedure captured widespread attention and quickly 
moved into the foreground of sovereign debt debates. The first major reform proposal for a better 
debt workout process to emerge in this context involved establishing a formal sovereign debt 
restructuring framework under international law. Paul O’Neill, then US Treasury Secretary, had 
become fond of the idea of creating something akin to Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code but 
for sovereign states, and he encouraged the two top officials at the IMF to start developing this kind 
of framework.94 In November 2001, then IMF deputy managing director Anne Krueger used a high-
profile keynote address to launch her proposal for a treaty-based ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism’ (SDRM).95 The proposal attracted enormous attention and gained momentum within the 
Fund, where staff developed detailed blueprints for how the SDRM would work in practice.96  
 
The new mechanism was to be housed within the IMF. For debtors that requested and were granted 
support, the earliest and most ambitious versions of the SDRM proposal envisioned a supranational 
entity with the power to authorize and/or enforce: temporary payment standstills (to give the 
sovereign breathing space and prevent a run on its debt), stays on litigation (to stop creditors from 
suing debtors during the restructuring process), ‘debtor-in-possession’ financing (to encourage fresh 
financing during the crisis by giving new loans seniority over existing claims), and settlements agreed 
to by a qualified majority of creditors (to prevent holdouts from undermining restructuring deals).97 
The SDRM would thus be able to override existing debt contracts and the domestic legal jurisdictions 
that governed them in order to provide the global public good of orderly and equitable sovereign debt 
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restructuring. This ambitious plan would require an amendment to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement 
to establish a legal basis for the IMF to act as an international bankruptcy court. 
 
The SDRM—known also as the ‘statutory approach’—enjoyed the support of the major European 
powers. As described above, European officials, led by the Germans, had become strong critics of 
large IMF bailouts and wanted private creditors to share more of the burden of crisis resolution via 
sovereign debt restructurings. But their support for the Fund’s proposed reform was contingent on 
the introduction of IMF lending rules that would deny financing to insolvent countries and thus push 
them to initiative a restructuring under the SDRM. As Gelpern and Gulati note, the Europeans wanted 
“firm crisis management rules” and the “SDRM was their chance.”98 In a sense, getting IMF lending 
rules that could limit bailouts and thus trigger debt restructurings in the first place was their primary 
goal, and establishing a more robust restructuring process was a means to that end and a way of 
making it operative.99 The Europeans supported process reform only if coupled with the creation of 
a formal trigger mechanism; the Americans and IMF staff stressed that a trigger mechanism could 
only work if accompanied by a reform to the debt restructuring process. The trigger (represented by 
IMF lending policies) and process (represented at first by the SDRM) were politically inseparable.100  
 
Meanwhile, private creditors and EMDE debtors were virulent critics of the SDRM. Creditors worried 
that this reform would not only encourage more restructurings and thus shift the burden of crisis 
resolution from debtors and the official sector onto themselves, but also institutionalize a process by 
which their contracts could be subordinated and their ability to seek legal remedy curtailed.101 
Essentially, they feared that a SDRM would result in a more debtor-friendly international regime. 
Sovereign borrowers, for their part, “had to choose whether to represent their interest as debtors 
seeking to raise money on capital markets at the lowest possible cost and their interest as countries 
that might benefit from an efficient process for restructuring sovereign debt should they ever be 
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forced to default.”102 Concerned that creditors would respond to the risks of a SDRM by charging 
higher borrowing costs and curtailing capital to the developing world, many debtors—especially large 
international bond issuers like Mexico and Brazil—choose the former and railed against the SDRM.103 
As Sean Hagan, director of the IMF’s Legal Department from 2004 to 2018, recalled: “The private 
sector consistently warned that the SDRM, if adopted, would adversely affect the volume and price 
of capital to these countries.”104 For debtor states and the private creditors with whom their interests 
were entangled, the SDRM was a risky proposition with potentially large distributional consequences.  
 
As the SDRM proposal continued to be discussed, it also became increasingly clear that the US 
Treasury Department was not on board with the IMF’s idea. Despite the fact that Paul O’Neill had 
encouraged the IMF to work on a sovereign bankruptcy framework, it turned out that most of his 
colleagues did not share his enthusiasm for this plan. On this issue and others, O’Neill had been out 
of sync with other senior officials at the Treasury Department and within the Bush Administration 
more broadly, leaving him marginalized and isolated.105 The consensus view that gained support and 
soon emerged as the US Treasury position was that, while a more orderly restructuring process was 
indeed needed, an international hard-law SDRM would be an inappropriate means of achieving that 
objective. The details of the SDRM proposal were revised more than once between 2001 and 2003 to 
address concerns that had been raised and soften the opposition. Later iterations of the proposal had 
abandoned the idea of enforcing payment standstills, stays on litigation, and priority financing. They 
focused instead on the SDRM’s role in bringing together creditors, allowing them to vote on proposed 
restructurings as a supermajority, and binding any minority holdout creditors to the agreed deal.106 For 
the US, however, the problem was less the content and more the hard-law form of the proposal.  
 
Seeing little promise in a treaty-based scheme, US Treasury authorities—led by undersecretary for 
international affairs, John Taylor—began to promote a less centralized alternative approach that called 
upon debtor governments to voluntarily adopt CACs, an idea that had been endorsed a few years 
earlier in the G10’s 1996 Rey Report. CACs were legal provisions that debtors could insert into their 
                                                        
102 Setser, ‘The Political Economy of the SDRM,’ p. 322. 
103 Alejandro Diaz de Leon, ‘Mexico’s adoption of new standards in international sovereign debt contracts: CACs, pari 
passu and a trust indenture’, Capital Markets Law Journal 11(1) (2016): 12-24. 
104 Hagan, ‘Designing a Legal Framework,’ pp. 391-392. 
105 Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (Simon & Schuster, 
2004). 
106 Setser, ‘The Political Economy of the SDRM.’ 
 39 
international bond contracts. If  invoked, these provisions would allow a supermajority of  bondholders 
(typically 75 percent, occasionally 85) to amend the payment terms of  their bonds and bind dissenting 
minorities to the agreed restructuring. Despite involving government debt obligations, these 
restructuring clauses and the bond contracts in which they were embedded would be governed not by 
public international law but rather by the domestic contract laws of  the jurisdiction in which they were 
issued—typically New York or English law for internationally-issued bonds. A form of  private law 
governed by domestic legal institutions, CACs would constitute a commercial contractual agreement 
between the sovereign and its creditors.      
 
The ability to amend contract terms via supermajority voting was already a standard feature of  the 
sovereign bonds issued in London, not because of  some earlier policy initiative but rather because of  
the particular historical development of  that market. But the standard bonds issued under New York 
law were different. At the time, they could be amended only with the unanimous consent of  
bondholders. Unanimity protected the rights of individual bondholders, but it also meant that a single 
non-cooperative creditor could block a restructuring deal that was supported by every other creditor. 
Workouts could still get done—for example, by exchanging old bonds for new ones rather than 
changing the terms of existing bonds—but the processes for doing so were ad hoc, and there was 
nothing to prevent holdout creditors from refusing to participate and litigating for full repayment. A 
few landmark cases around the turn of the century—notably Elliott Associates v Republic of Peru—
demonstrated that holding-out could be a profitable strategy, thus strengthening the incentive for 
creditors to holdout from future restructurings.107 CACs, it was believed, would create a more 
predictable and efficient process by allowing creditors vote on a debtor’s restructuring offer as a 
supermajority and force potential holdouts to go along with their collective decision.  
 
Although the US had tremendous power in global financial governance, including the power to veto 
the SDRM, the nature of its preferred solution to debt restructuring called upon EMDE debtors and 
their private creditors to voluntarily adopt and accept CACs. But debtor governments were worried 
that these new clauses would undermine the credibility of their commitment to repay and therefore 
raise their borrowing costs, much as they feared the SDRM would do.108 Transnational private creditor 
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groups were similarly skeptical of CACs, which had been framed as part of an overall international 
policy shift toward more sovereign debt restructurings, which translated into more creditor losses.109 
Debtors and creditors thus both feared the adverse distributional consequences of CACs. 
 
3.2 The Blueprint for an IMF Trigger Mechanism 
Meanwhile, as the CACs versus SDRM debate raged, moves were being made within the IMF to 
establish a formal lending framework that defined the circumstances under which the Fund could 
provide ‘exceptional access’ (EA) financing—that is, large-scale loans that exceeded a country’s 
normal borrowing limit according to its quota. In July 2002, Fund staff produced a paper for the 
Executive Board (EB) outlining a proposed EA lending framework based on the following four 
criteria, each of which would have to be met to justify EA financing: (1) “The member is experiencing 
exceptional balance of payments pressures on the capital account resulting in the need for Fund 
financing that cannot be met within the normal limits”; (2) “There is a high probability that debt will 
remain sustainable, based on rigorous and systematic analysis”; (3) “The member has good prospects 
of regaining market access, so that the Fund financing would provide a bridge”; and (4) “The policy 
program of the member country provides a reasonably strong prospect of success.”110  
 
The second criterion was particularly crucial to the framework and its ability to trigger restructurings. 
On the basis of debt sustainability assessments, it differentiated between two broad scenarios. Under 
the first scenario, when an IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) indicated with high probability 
that a country’s debt would remain sustainable, the situation would be seen as a liquidity crisis and a 
combination of financing and adjustment via IMF conditionality would be considered the appropriate 
response. Under the second scenario, when a DSA indicated that a country’s debt was unsustainable, 
or when it could not establish with high probability that the country’s debt was sustainable, the situation 
would be treated as more of a solvency crisis and EA financing could only be justified if the country 
also underwent a restructuring that was large enough to restore sustainability with a high probability.111  
 
There was a strong technocratic rationale for this kind of lending framework. By continuing to lend 
to countries with sustainable debt burdens, the Fund would send a clear and credible signal to markets 
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that the country did not need debt restructuring, which would help to maintain or restore the country’s 
market access. In other words, by lending only to countries with clearly sustainable debt, the IMF 
would preserve the effectiveness of ‘catalytic financing’ in resolving liquidity crises. By refusing to lend 
to countries without clearly sustainable debt burdens, Fund policy would have the effect of triggering 
or at least strongly encouraging debt restructurings, which were seen as both a necessary and more 
equitable approach to resolving solvency crises. As the IMF and its members had learned from 
experience, lending to countries with unsustainable debt burdens was not simply ineffective; it also 
produced new winners and losers and routinely made the actual debt situation worse.  
 
The proposed framework aimed at improving not only crisis resolution but also crisis prevention. By 
credibly committing not to lend in certain, well-defined circumstances, the framework would signal to 
creditors and debtors that they would not be bailed out from particular types of crises. This would, in 
principle, lead to more prudent lending and borrowing decisions and fewer crises in the first place. 
This objective of improving market discipline had been a key priority for many European officials, 
particularly the Germans, and now found support among US rule-makers who also believed strongly 
in the imperative of eliminating moral hazard through credible constraints on lending.112 
 
For these constraints to be credible, they had to be embedded in formal rules that could not be ignored 
when a crisis erupted. There had frequently been strong political pressures on the IMF to lend precisely 
to avoid, delay, and/or minimize restructurings because of their distributional impacts and potential 
implications for financial stability. Institutionalizing a rules-based approach that minimized the scope 
for political influence over IMF lending was thus a key motivation for embedding lending criteria 
within a formal framework. As staff noted in their proposal for a new approach, “the degree of 
discretion and flexibility in the present framework may make the Fund more vulnerable to pressure 
to provide exceptional access even when prospects for success are quite poor and [the] debt burden 
of the sovereign is likely to be unsustainable.”113 As mentioned earlier, many also believed that the 
credibility of the commitment not to lend hinged on the viability of the debt restructuring process. If 
the IMF’s framework was going to have the effect of triggering restructurings, then there had to be a 
more orderly and predictable debt restructuring process available to debtor countries. If restructurings 
remained chaotic and unpredictable, strong pressures to avoid them through bailouts would persist.  
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3.3 Establishing the Pillars of a New SDRR 
In September 2002, the EB held a meeting to discuss the staff’s proposed lending framework. There 
was a general consensus among the most powerful member-states in favour of the four criteria and 
the idea of embedding them within a formal set of rules. Executive Directors (EDs) from these states 
agreed that decisions of when to condition lending upon upfront debt restructuring should be based 
on assessments of debt sustainability. The German ED was particularly adamant on this point, stating:   
 
In cases where the balance of probabilities indicates that the sustainability condition is 
not met, the onus should be on debt restructuring, in addition to domestic adjustment, 
to address the underlying program […]  we would argue that “Capital Account Crisis 
plus Uncertain Debt Sustainability requires Debt Restructuring.””114  
 
Directors also noted that for the proposed IMF framework to become an effective trigger for debt 
restructurings, it would have to be complemented by a more institutionalized process for restructuring. 
As the US representatives put it, “we believe that efforts to create a more orderly process for sovereign 
debt restructurings will allow the official sector to be less reliant on official sector lending to help 
stabilize the international financial markets.”115 The German ED echoed the point, noting that “[t]he 
discussion on access policy in capital account crises has to be seen in close conjunction with […] our 
discussions on PSI, SDRM, and CACs.”116 A number of EDs stressed that the EA framework could 
only function as an effective trigger if the commitment not to lend was credible. According to the 
German Director, “any attempt to tie the hands of the official sector, in the sense of constrained 
discretion, in responding to such crises needs, however, to be extremely credible, otherwise the desired 
effect of preventing moral hazard and inducing PSI could, as already noted above, not be achieved.”117 
The UK representatives agreed: “If the policy on exceptional access is not sufficiently clear and 
credible, and not applied in a consistent manner, the other pillars of our crisis prevention framework 
are likely to be much less effective.”118 The importance of making a credible commitment underpinned 
the case both for establishing the four criteria as formal lending rules rather than voluntary guidelines, 
and for making debt workouts a viable alternative to bailouts by improving the restructuring process. 
                                                        
114 Statement by Mr. Bischofberger on Access Policy in Capital Account Crises. Executive Board Meeting 02/94, 
September 6, 2002. GRAY/02/1222, p. 3. 
115 Statement by Ms. Lundsager and Mr. Baukol on Access Policy in Capital Account Crises. Executive Board Meeting 
02/94, September 6, 2002. GRAY/02/1236, p. 1.  
116 Statement by Mr. Bischofberger, p. 1.  
117 Statement by Mr. Bischofberger, p. 2. 
118 Statement by Mr. Scholar and Ms. Stuart on Access Policy in Capital Account Crises. Executive Board Meeting 02/94, 
September 6, 2002. GRAY/02/1250, p. 2.  
 43 
Directors also discussed whether considerations regarding contagion should be included in the new 
framework. Large-scale lending had, in the past, been justified on the grounds of stemming systemic 
spillover effects, and it was highly likely that, in a world of globalized financial flows, cross-border 
contagion would be a prominent potential feature of future crises. Despite this, representatives from 
the leading capital-exporting countries agreed that prospects of contagion, while always important 
considerations, would be inappropriate criteria upon which to base decisions about EA financing—a 
view that reflected the staff’s position on this issue. As US representatives put it, “contagion and 
systemic issues can play a role in the justification for exceptional access, but it is critical that neither 
be viewed as a necessary condition for exceptional access.”119 Their British counterparts concurred.120 
Japanese officials also agreed,121 as did the German ED who, in dismissing the case for special 
treatment to deal with potential spillovers, stated: “Experience seems to indicate that in many if not 
most cases of “contagion”, the countries in question had pursued unsustainable policies.”122 In other 
words, countries that faced the prospect of systemic spillovers had only themselves to blame.  
 
The EMDE debtors that had been at the center of many debt crises were more critical of the Fund’s 
proposed lending framework. They feared a world in which their access to emergency financing and 
their ability to avoid painful debt restructurings were curtailed. Some of the larger debt issuers argued 
that, in the words of Brazil’s ED, “a curtailment of the Fund’s ability to lend in capital account crises 
would be a severe blow to the prospects of further global integration,”123 and, according to Mexico’s 
representatives at the Fund, “the lack of official financial support other than the Fund and other IFIs 
calls for greater not less flexibility in the institution’s lending policies.”124 Private creditor groups were 
surprisingly silent on the issue of IMF reform, although they had opposed efforts to institutionalize 
restructuring via either CACs or a SDRM. Creditors likely focused their lobbying efforts on these 
mechanisms because they were much more visible in public debates and the financial press, whereas 
discussions of the Fund’s lending framework happened behind-the-scenes and were barely publicized. 
Moreover, because CACs and the SDRM had been framed as part of a broader policy shift toward 
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fewer bailouts and more restructurings, creditor resistance to these process-oriented mechanisms was 
essentially pushback against the idea of a debt restructuring trigger too. The two pillars had been so 
tightly linked in reform discussions that creditors did not really distinguish between the two.125   
 
Despite the direct opposition of EMDE debtors and the more implicit resistance of private creditors, 
the leading capital-exporting states were committed to establishing firm multilateral lending rules. With 
the US and Europe on board, the staff’s proposal was approved and became operationalized as Fund 
policy in September 2002.126 For the first time, large-scale lending would be governed by a set of pre-
defined rules that specified the conditions under which EA financing could be justified and, in doing 
so, created a mechanism for triggering debt restructurings when those conditions could not be met.  
 
With the new IMF rules in place, efforts to establish an international mechanism to facilitate the debt 
restructuring process intensified. Under the leadership of John Taylor, US Treasury staff stepped up 
what they had already started in early 2002: a behind-the-scenes outreach campaign to persuade 
EMDE debtors and their creditors of the merits of CACs and to find a debtor willing to be the ‘first 
mover’ to adopt these new contract terms. Treasury officials met with key investors and bankers on 
both the buy-side and sell-side of sovereign bond markets to raise awareness about CACs and promote 
them as a market-friendly mechanism.127 They also made intensive efforts to persuade their EMDE 
counterparts of the benefits of these clauses, repeatedly calling ministers, organizing meetings, and 
promoting CACs in speeches and at public events.128 For some time, market participants and EMDE 
finance officials remained unconvinced. Neither saw CACs as being in their interest for the reasons 
discussed above.129         
 
Eventually, however, the private sector began to soften its position on contract reform, and a coalition 
of leading financial industry associations—including the IIF—even endorsed a model set of CACs in 
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hopes that their version would become the market standard. This newfound support was considered 
a major policy reversal for the transnational creditor community.130 In March 2003, after receiving 
assurance from creditors that CACs would not raise its borrowing costs, Mexico issued bonds 
containing CACs under New York law.131 When other EMDEs saw that the new contract terms had 
no effect on Mexico’s borrowing costs, they quickly embraced CACs, which rapidly became a standard 
feature of EMDE international bonds.132 The widespread adoption of CACs put to rest any further 
discussion of the need for a SDRM, which until that point was still being developed and promoted 
within the IMF. Despite the strong initial resistance and the implicit quid pro quo that it took to get 
contract change, the original CACs were a relatively modest reform. While they were novel in New 
York, supermajority voting procedures had been a standard feature of  sovereign bonds issued in 
London under English law for nearly a century.133 
 
Within a relatively short period of  time, a new SDRR had emerged through the creation of  a rules-
based IMF lending framework and the widespread adoption of  CACs in international sovereign bonds. 
In the eyes of  their proponents, the Fund’s new lending rules would reduce bailouts and trigger more 
restructurings, and CACs would provide a predictable and efficient process for these restructurings to 
proceed. As emphasized above, trigger and process reforms were thus seen as mutually-reinforcing 
pillars of a new regime and a broader international policy shift toward fewer bailouts and more debt 
restructurings. Not only were these two elements portrayed as highly complementary; according to 
their advocates, one hardly made sense without the other. As John Taylor later put it: “a rules-based 
reform of the IMF was inseparably linked to a reform of the process for sovereign debt restructuring.”134  
 
While new contract terms and IMF lending rules were the core innovations of the early 2000s, one 
other reform emerged in that earlier era and is worth mentioning. Before the SDRM was abandoned, 
private creditor and debtor-country representatives had begun working on a self-regulatory initiative 
they hoped could win support as part of a less radical approach to debt restructuring. Launched in 
2002 and led by the private-sector IIF, the initiative aimed to develop and promote a voluntary code 
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of conduct to help debtors and their private creditors work together to prevent and manage sovereign 
debt workouts. In 2004, the IIF unveiled the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring 
in Emerging Markets, a soft-law governance framework whose content revolves around four core 
principles: transparency and information sharing, close debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to 
avoid restructuring, good-faith actions during restructuring, and the equal treatment of all creditors.135 
Soon after their release, the Principles were endorsed by a number of emerging-market debtors, as 
well as by several major capital-exporting states, the Paris Club of official creditors, and the G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors as a whole.136 
 
4. How Do Scholars Explain Reform Outcomes in the SDRR? 
There are strong parallels between the regulatory initiatives reviewed above and the more recent 
reform efforts analyzed in later chapters. Both the early 2000s and the recent UN episode saw the 
emergence of a regulatory initiative aimed at establishing an international hard-law mechanism to 
govern the debt restructuring process. In both cases, the initiative gained intellectual and institutional 
support within a prominent international organization but ultimately fizzled out. In lieu of a hard-law 
mechanism, contract reforms were again promoted as the preferred approach to debt restructuring 
among the leading capital-exporting states, as discussed in Chapter 6. Moreover, a set of soft-law 
principles was created both in 2004 and as the culminating act of UN reform efforts in 2015. Finally, 
recent reforms included changes to the IMF’s lending framework and its role as a trigger mechanism—
albeit in the opposite direction to the changes of 2002. Because of these parallels, any attempt to 
understand recent reforms in the SDRR should thus first consider explanations of what happened in 
the early 2000s. What lessons emerge from existing accounts of these earlier reform outcomes? 
 
4.1 Explanations of the Early 2000s 
A number of scholars have attempted to explain the failure of the SDRM. Soederberg attributes it to 
the power of transnational private creditors and the US government.137 In her account, creditors 
opposed this approach because they feared it would lead to more applications for debt relief and shift 
bargaining power toward debtors—a source of creditor opposition that others have also pointed to.138 
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They lobbied the US government to block the SDRM, which it could unilaterally do as a result of its 
veto power within the IMF. Others concur that US opposition doomed the SDRM—given American 
power within the Fund—but disagree that US preferences were simply the product of creditor 
influence. Hagan and Gelpern et al. note that the SDRM threatened to curtail US sovereignty in ways 
that were unacceptable to American officials.139 And Helleiner notes that the market-oriented ideology 
of Bush-era Treasury officials was antithetical to the type of top-down, bureaucratic solution implied 
by the SDRM.140 
 
In a separate piece analyzing the SDRM and earlier reform initiatives in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1970s, 
Helleiner highlights another important obstacle that has frustrated efforts to create a formal debt 
restructuring mechanism.141 His analysis shows that although private creditors and the US government 
have frequently opposed such a mechanism, debtors have also consistently failed to unite in favour of 
substantial reform for fear that their actions would be seen by creditors as increasing the likelihood of 
default, in turn raising their borrowing costs. Indeed, large debtors such as Mexico and Brazil were 
hostile to the SDRM for this reason. Kathryn Lavelle attributes the failure of this initiative to the 
confluence of interests between sovereign borrowers, who wanted to preserve their access to global 
financial markets, and private lenders, who “sought to maximize the likelihood they would be 
repaid.”142 With the US, private creditors, and the largest debtors all opposed to the SDRM, the great 
surprise, concludes Brad Setser, was not that the proposal failed but rather that the IMF found 
sufficient political space to develop it in the first place.143 
 
Why, then, did CACs succeed where the SDRM failed? US preferences were again central, as Treasury 
officials emerged as the leading proponents of contract reform. Soederberg argues that CACs were 
preferred by US officials because they were more market-friendly and therefore less threatening to 
creditor interests than the SDRM.144 Likewise, Helleiner suggests that the more market-oriented CACs 
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were favoured by Bush-era officials for ideological reasons.145 Gelpern and Gulati (legal scholars who 
write extensively about sovereign debt) offer an alternative perspective on US motives, arguing that 
CACs served a largely symbolic—rather than substantive—purpose.146 Committed to reigning-in the 
large IMF bailouts and ensuring a greater role for private creditors in sharing the burden of crises, US 
policymakers touted CACs as a mechanism that would limit the need for bailouts by providing an 
alternative: a predictable and orderly restructuring process. CACs thus symbolized the policy shift 
toward fewer/smaller bailouts and more/bigger restructurings, even if private contracts themselves 
could not affect such broad policy change. 
 
The US position is the first part of the equation, but what about the preferences of sovereign debtors 
and private creditors? Why did they perform a U-turn and come to accept contract reform after initially 
rejecting it? Here, scholars agree that debtors and creditors changed course because they came to see 
the adoption of CACs as a strategic move to pre-empt the even-more-hated SDRM.147 Although 
debtors and creditors initially opposed both hard-law and contractual reforms and were generally of 
the view that debt restructuring was not a problem in need of fixing, they saw CACs as a lesser evil 
compared to the SDRM. Creditors saw the latter as a bigger threat to creditor rights and a bigger 
source of uncertainty than the former. Large EMDE debt issuers complained that even continued talk 
of the SDRM was starting to destabilize debt markets. From a strategic perspective, they rightly 
believed that getting contract reform done would extinguish any remaining support or argument in 
favour of the hard-law approach. As Gelpern and Gulati noted: 
 
[T]he investment community and Mexico deployed CACs to preempt official initiatives, 
notably SDRM. Preemption was an instrumental use of clauses, albeit not one readily 
discernable from reading their language. Adopting CACs sent the message that the market 
solved the collective action problem on its own; the contractual solution obviated the 
need for SDRM. 
 
Guillermo Ortiz, then president of the Mexican central bank, was not shy in confirming that Mexico 
issued CACs as “a way to get rid of the SDRM.”148 
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Based on these political dynamics, scholars have been keen to highlight the historically-contingent 
nature of contract reform in the early 2000s. CACs were adopted, after all, not primarily to improve 
the efficiency of debt restructuring processes but rather to pre-empt a historically-specific sovereign 
bankruptcy proposal. The fact that the SDRM made it into global financial governance debates in the 
first place was highly contingent and, in Setser’s view, surprising.149 Gelpern and Gulati describe the 
SDRM as being “in large part a product of the idiosyncratic leadership at the U.S. Treasury and the 
IMF, the U.S. political transition, Argentina’s debt crisis, and even the attacks of 9/11.”150 They 
conclude that “CACs owed their success to a peculiar confluence of events and personalities.”151 In 
sum, although proponents of contract reform trumpeted CACs as an important technical device for 
resolving coordination problems, existing accounts suggest that some cocktail of distributional, 
ideological, symbolic, and strategic motivations—all within a contingent historical context—was more 
important than functionalist factors in explaining contract reform in the early 2000s.152 
 
Compared to the SDRM and CACs, there is little written about the IMF’s 2002 lending framework or 
the IIF’s 2004 Principles. Analysis of IMF reform is in fact so scarce that the above description of this 
initiative is based largely on archival material. As for the IIF Principles, scholars who have analyzed 
them generally agree that the creation of this soft-law arrangement was—like the embrace of CACs—
a self-regulatory move aimed at pre-empting the SDRM.153 Private creditor and EMDE debtor 
representatives wanted to show that action was already being taken to improve the system and that a 
more heavy-handed approach was thus unnecessary. Helleiner notes that the IIF Principles were also 
intended to promote debtor-creditor cooperation and creditor-friendly norms at a time when 
Argentina’s aggressive approach to bondholders and the official sector’s efforts to encourage bail-ins 
seemed to be steering the sovereign debt regime in a more uncertain and debtor-friendly direction.154 
Support for these Principles, he suggests, was likely aided by their voluntary and relatively ambiguous 
nature. But have they had any impact on actual debt restructuring processes? Raymond Ritter claims 
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that the Principles have been an effective governance tool, but his faith that this true is based on little 
evidence beyond what the IIF itself has said.155 
 
These accounts point to several factors that also played a role in recent initiatives. Most importantly, 
US power and preferences remained central in both constraining the hard-law ambitions of the UN 
proposal and promoting recent contract reforms. US opposition to a hard-law framework also 
continued to reflect some of the concerns identified in the early 2000s, such as sovereignty concerns. 
Moreover, despite the UN initiative being driven by debtors, these states ultimately failed to forge a 
coherent vision for reform—a problem Helleiner identified in past initiatives.  
 
But existing accounts also fail to explain important aspects of recent outcomes. By focusing on US 
power within the IMF as the key source of American leverage over the SDRR, they do not tell us how 
the US (not to mention the UK) was able to constrain an initiative that took place within the UN 
General Assembly, where it lacked veto power. And although debtor states were unable to establish a 
coherent vision for reform in the UN case, they were held back mostly by sovereignty considerations 
rather than the borrowing-cost concerns highlighted in previous accounts. Moreover, while a few 
scholars have analyzed the IIF’s Principles, these accounts stress contextual factors, offering little 
guidance on the 2015 UN Principles and whether we should expect this soft-law arrangement to have 
an impact on future debt restructurings. The lack of literature on the Fund’s 2002 reform leaves even 
less of a path to follow for understanding recent changes to IMF lending rules. The best one can do 
here is use the actions and statements of officials involved in that earlier episode as a guide.   
 
Existing literature also struggles considerably to make sense of recent contract reforms. Scholars treat 
the emergence of the original CACs largely as a one-off event shaped by idiosyncratic factors—the 
conservative ideology of Bush-era officials, the need for a symbolic solution to big bailouts, the 
strategic action of debtors and creditors in response to the SDRM. These factors fail to explain the 
re-emergence and strengthening of contracts in the more recent historical context and in response to 
new challenges. To the extent that existing accounts point to a particular aspect of CACs that might 
have made them attractive both in the early 2000s and recently, it is their market-oriented nature, 
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which resonates with broader regulatory preferences in the neoliberal era.156 But these explanations 
fail to capture the specific legal characteristics that make private-law contract mechanisms—rather than 
some other market-based approach—particularly well-suited for governing the SDRR. 
 
In sum, explanations of the early 2000s provide some important foundations to build upon, but they 
also leave many questions unanswered. They offer useful but partial guidance on the UN initiative, no 
explanation of IMF reforms, and limited insight into recent contract changes. As emphasized in the 
introductory chapter, few scholars have analyzed the recent SDRR reforms themselves. But there are 
a small number of analyses that speak to these initiatives. What do they tell us about the cases examined 
in this dissertation? 
 
4.2 Explanations of Recent Reform Outcomes 
To my knowledge, there are no books or articles dedicated to explaining the recent UN and IMF 
reform outcomes.157 What exists instead are a few policy-oriented papers as well as brief discussions 
within more broadly focused works. These sources reinforce the idea that private creditors and the 
states in which they reside oppose the type of hard-law restructuring regime proposed within the UN, 
pointing to the sort of distributional, sovereignty, and collective action issues that frustrated previous 
initiatives.158 They also suggest that recent IMF reforms were driven by the political preferences of 
powerful states rather than the sort of technocratic considerations often associated with Fund 
policy.159 Eichengreen and Woods also note, more specifically, that IMF lending rules face a ‘credible 
commitments’ problem—a diagnosis supported by the analysis laid out in chapters 3 and 4.160  
  
There is slightly more written about recent contract changes, thanks mostly to Gelpern and her co-
authors. Analyzing the introduction of the new Eurozone CACs (discussed in Chapter 6), Gelpern 
and Gulati again emphasize the role of contracts as a symbolic rather than technical tool, this time 
serving the interests of Eurozone political elites looking to signal a new approach to crisis management 
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in the wake of the Greek debt debacle.161 From their perspective, CACs were deployed in Europe—
where they previously did not exist—not to end bailouts and solve the technical challenges of 
restructuring, but instead to send multiple messages to different audiences simultaneously. For voters 
in surplus states such as Germany, CACs symbolized a new burden-sharing agreement whereby private 
creditors would be made to contribute more to the resolution of future crises. In sending the same 
message to private creditors, policymakers hoped that CACs would also instill greater discipline in 
European sovereign debt markets, particularly those in periphery countries. At the same time, CACs 
were framed as a pragmatic, market-friendly approach to restructuring, signaling to investors that more 
radical alternatives, such as a SDRM-style bankruptcy framework, would not be pursued.  
 
Gelpern, Heller, and Setser also examine the recent Treasury-led contract initiative, which resulted in 
the implementation of the most robust CACs to date in the international bonds of dozens of EMDE 
debtors.162 A striking feature of this initiative was that, despite introducing a significantly stronger 
mechanism than the original CACs, the political process of reform was much smoother and more 
cooperative than the early 2000s, with debtors and creditors quickly embracing contract reform this 
time around. While Gelpern and colleagues are predominately concerned with describing this reform 
process and the technical features of these new CACs, they briefly suggest a few possible explanations 
for “the relatively smooth introduction of potent contract changes.”163 Their analysis points first to 
functionalist factors, noting that contract change was a logical response to governance gaps highlighted 
by the recent Greek and Argentine episodes. This reading of events resonates with the dominant 
narrative expounded by the policy practitioners involved in the reform initiative.164 But Gelpern et al. 
also point to what they call ‘substance learning’ and ‘process learning.’ Substance learning came from 
markets and governments having over a decade of experience with the original CACs, which taught 
them that this mechanism was “hardly revolutionary” and diminished hardcore resistance to further 
improvements to the model.165 Process learning stemmed from the experience of the early 2000s and 
the lessons for how to successfully bring about a shift in standard contract terms. While both sources 
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of learning appear to be promising explanatory factors in this case, the authors dedicate just a single 
paragraph to each. They also consider learning only in the context of Treasury-led contract reform.   
 
These explanations identify important factors behind recent contract reforms, but they are not fully 
satisfactory. There is clearly something specific about contract mechanisms like CACs that has enabled 
them to emerge at different times and in different places where other SDRR reform initiatives have 
failed or been rolled back. But existing accounts treat each contract reform episode separately and do 
little to draw systematic connections between them. Nobody, for example, has tried to explain both 
the Eurozone and the US Treasury-led contract initiatives within an overarching analytical framework. 
Moreover, if we take the main explanations of contract reform and apply them across cases, they do 
not provide a sufficiently compelling set of reasons for why contract mechanisms have prevailed rather 
than some other regulatory arrangement. Purely functionalist explanations ignore the fact that hard-
law mechanisms are equally justified on technical grounds but have been ruled-out for deeper political 
reasons. Symbolic explanations fail to specify what it is that makes contracts, as opposed to some 
other arrangement such as soft-law principles, a particularly potent symbol in the SDRR. 
 
The lack of a satisfactory explanation of contract reforms, combined with patchy accounts of the UN 
and IMF initiatives, points to a larger shortcoming in the existing literature as a whole: it provides an 
inadequate basis for understanding variation in reform outcomes. As observed in Chapter 1, existing 
studies do not offer the type of in-depth comparison of failed and successful initiatives that would 
allow them to generate broader insights about the determinants of variation in this domain. But what 
exactly do current explanations miss? What are the broader blind spots in the literature that prevent 
us from gaining a clearer picture of variation in recent reform outcomes and the SDRR more generally?  
 
5. Larger Gaps in the Literature 
In addition to the various gaps identified above, I argue that existing explanations of SDRR reform 
suffer from three blind spots that limit their ability to explain variation in recent outcomes. First, they 
fail to distinguish analytically between the ex ante mechanisms aimed at triggering debt restructurings, 
such as the IMF’s lending rules, and the ex post mechanisms that seek to facilitate the restructuring 
process once the decision to renegotiate debt has already been made, such as the SDRM and CACs. 
Scholarly attention has focused overwhelmingly on the latter, to which the lack of analysis of previous 
or recent reforms to the IMF’s lending rules attests. This analytical distinction is crucial to 
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understanding an important dimension of variation, because trigger and process mechanisms face 
distinct political challenges and opportunities that go a long way to determining their relative prospects 
for success. The claim that scholars have neglected the process-trigger distinction requires some 
unpacking before moving on to the second major omission of the existing literature. 
  
Contrary to my claim, one could argue that the SDRM implied both a trigger and process and that 
scholars were analyzing both when assessing this proposal. Indeed, one of the features of early SDRM 
proposals was the ability to authorize payment standstills, which some might interpret as a kind of 
trigger insofar as it would halt debt repayments at the outset of the announcement to restructure. I 
maintain, however, that the SDRM was not a trigger mechanism in the way the concept is used here. 
In my analysis, a trigger mechanism is one that can push or encourage an otherwise reluctant debtor 
to initiate a restructuring in the first place. The SDRM, as it was proposed, could only be activated at 
a debtor country’s request. In the absence of lending rules that prevented the IMF from financing 
insolvent states, a debtor government could still request and be granted an IMF loan, allowing it to 
avoid (or delay) a potentially costly and reputation-damaging debt restructuring. IMF rules were 
designed to be a trigger insofar as they would take away the bailout option under certain circumstances, 
effectively forcing debtors to accept the reality of a restructuring and avail themselves of the SDRM—
or, as it turned out, use their CACs. Even though early SDRM proposals envisioned a debt moratorium 
as soon as a government announced its plan to restructure, this would still have been part of the 
restructuring process because it would have come after the initial decision to pursue debt relief. 
 
Although it is true that private creditors and debtor states opposed the SDRM partly because they 
thought it would lead to more restructurings—an outcome that should be associated with a trigger—
that is not because the SDRM was in fact a trigger mechanism. Instead, it was because the trigger and 
process were so tightly coupled in the policy discussions and objectives of the early 2000s that all 
reform initiatives in this context implied both elements of restructuring, at least to some extent. Recall 
that creditors also feared that CACs would result in more restructurings, and Gelpern and Gulati’s 
argument that CACs symbolized as much only makes sense in a context where the trigger and process 
were seen as inseparable and were thus conflated. This context was likely an important part of why 
scholars did not draw the trigger-process distinction in clearer and more explicit terms. As we will see 
in the chapters that follow, recent reform initiatives have taken place in a very different context, one 
in which the trigger and process elements of restructuring have been pulled apart and treated as distinct 
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aspects of the SDRR that do not necessarily move in tandem. It is therefore increasingly important to 
understand the distinctive political implications and dynamics of trigger and process mechanisms.   
 
The SDRM did not fail because it was seen as a trigger mechanism (even the debt standstill feature 
had been dropped from the final proposal that was ultimately rejected), but rather because of its legal-
institutional design as an international hard-law restructuring arrangement. This observation brings us 
to the second significant blind spot of existing literature: its inattention to how different process-
oriented mechanisms would complement or clash with the current legal foundations of the sovereign 
debt regime. Understanding the degree of compatibility between prospective and existing institutional 
arrangements is key, I argue, to making sense of variation within the category of process mechanisms. 
While hard-law schemes clash with existing legal arrangements in ways that are politically unacceptable 
to powerful capital-exporting states, private-law contract mechanisms like CACs are compatible with 
prevailing arrangements—like clicking new Lego blocks onto an existing Lego structure—which 
makes them a politically useful tool for institutionalizing the debt restructuring process. Beyond the 
contrasting political prospects of hard-law and private-law contract designs, I also suggest that soft-
law restructuring arrangements can, depending on their content, clash with existing legal structures in 
ways that provoke political opposition from dominant states. (But soft-law restructuring rules also 
face functional challenges unrelated to their fit with the existing legal foundations of the debt regime.) 
 
The third and final major gap in the existing literature relates to the role of historical legacies and 
processes—particularly surrounding the reform initiatives of the early 2000s—in shaping recent 
outcomes. While we would not expect scholars studying the early 2000s to have anticipated the 
significance of that period for later reform initiatives, historical and temporal factors are nevertheless 
important to understanding variation in recent regulatory outcomes. As I show in subsequent chapters, 
contract reforms in the early 2000s laid the groundwork for the strengthening and spreading of this 
model more recently, while the earlier SDRM debate only reinforced US opposition to a hard-law 
regime. Historical experience and policy sequencing also played an important role in incrementally 
weakening the 2002 IMF lending rules and their capacity to serve as an effective trigger mechanism. 
To be sure, Gelpern et al. point to elements of policy learning that link earlier contract reforms to the 
recent Treasury-led initiative to strengthen EMDE bond contracts. I build on their basic insight by 
examining the broader role of historical legacies, including learning effects, and extending the analysis 
to Eurozone reforms as well as, to a lesser but important extent, the UN and IMF initiatives.  
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6. Conclusion: What Lies Ahead 
The next chapter develops an analytical framework for understanding regulatory variation in recent 
reform outcomes—and the SDRR more generally—by filling these three gaps in the existing literature. 
Rooted in the power and preferences of the core actors outlined in Chapter 1, this framework explains 
variation in terms of first, the process versus trigger distinction and, second, the legal-institutional design of 
different process-focused regulatory mechanisms. It suggests that an effective trigger mechanism is 
hard to institutionalize because of the time-inconsistent preferences of powerful capital-exporting 
states, as well as their more general desire—expressed most strongly by the US, supported by debtors 
and creditors, and amplified by recent experiences—for case-by-case decision-making when it comes 
to whether and when to trigger a debt restructuring. Compared to the trigger, it argues that some, but 
not all, process mechanisms have greater odds of success. Hard-law designs face huge political 
opposition from capital-exporting states. Soft-law tools too can encounter political challenges—as did 
the UN principles—but are also of dubious effectiveness in the SDRR. By contrast, private-law 
contracts provide politically useful mechanisms for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt 
restructuring, especially for the dominant states that disproportionately shape outcomes in this arena. 
I also argue that historical factors have played an important role in shaping recent reform outcomes, 
most notably in the contract reform episodes. But I suggest that historical legacies and processes have 
exerted influenced mainly through their ability to further enhance or diminish the prospects of 
mechanisms whose political palatability had already been determined by their underlying attributes. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
Players, Preferences, and Power in the SDRR 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the core players in the SDRR, their preferences 
regarding different regulatory options, and their power to promote their desired outcomes within and 
across international decision-making venues. In doing so, it lays a theoretical basis for understanding 
the determinants of variation in the outcomes of recent sovereign debt restructuring reform initiatives. 
It highlights the power and preferences of the leading capital-exporting states—most importantly the 
US—as the primary determinants of outcomes within and across regulatory initiatives, and the power 
and preferences of sovereign debtors and private creditors as secondary factors that take on greater 
importance at particular moments. I also include a brief discussion of IMF staff preferences and power 
within the Fund, for they play a notable role in the reform processes analyzed in Chapter 4.  
 
The various sections of this chapter represent pieces of a bigger puzzle that, when put together, 
provide a framework for understanding regulatory variation in the SDRR. The chapter thus provides 
the foundations for understanding the different branches of the feasibility tree presented in Chapter 
1 and reproduced below, through which each case study can be visualized and understood. It supports 
the broader argument that: (1) efforts to institutionalize an effective trigger mechanism for sovereign 
debt restructuring face powerful political barriers that frustrate this objective, whereas (2) the debt 
restructuring process is subject to a different and less constraining set of political considerations that 
make possible the establishment of more effective process-oriented regulatory mechanisms, but (3) 
there remains variation in the relative success/failure of different process-oriented mechanisms, which 
can be explained by the legal-institutional design of the specific mechanism in question. The weakening 
of the IMF trigger mechanism through reforms examined in Chapter 4 reflect this reality, as does the 
failure of the UN reform initiative studied in Chapter 5 (which failed because of the legal-institutional 
design of the reforms in question) and the success of bond contract reforms analyzed in Chapter 6 
(which succeeded due to both their process-orientation and their design features). This chapter also 
specifies the role that historical legacies and processes have played in helping to steer reform initiatives 
toward the outcomes described above (and in line with what we would expect based on the process-
trigger distinction and the role of legal-institutional design). In unpacking the players, preferences, and 
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power dynamics that underpin my argument, I draw upon and contribute to broader conversations 
within IPE and global governance, engagements which are highlighted near the end of the chapter.  
 














The regulatory preferences of the various actors are informed by, but not directly derived from, their 
material positions in the global financial order. Actors evaluate regulatory arrangements in terms of 
the anticipated impact on their material interests, but perceptions of how particular rules and 
mechanisms serve or threaten their interests can change over time as a result of historical experience 
and/or changes in the context in which existing rules are implemented or new rules are made. How 
do we know what different actors want in the first place? In this chapter and in the dissertation more 
generally, preferences are derived from a combination of deduction and ‘revealed preferences.’ The 
preferences of sovereign debtors, private creditors, and capital-exporting states are deduced from 
theory and empirical evidence on the impacts of sovereign debt restructuring and the incentives these 
impacts produce in terms of regulatory arrangements. (IMF staff preferences are also deduced from 
prior literature on the IMF.) What we would expect these different actors to want is then generally 
reinforced by their revealed preferences—that is, what they do and what they say they want. 
 
The next section of this chapter unpacks the preferences of capital-exporting states with respect to, 















the preferences of sovereign debtors and private creditors, looking first at factors relevant to their 
policy stances on trigger arrangements and then moving on to process mechanisms. The preferences 
of IMF staff regarding an IMF trigger mechanism are then briefly considered. The following section 
discusses the power that various actors have to shape reform outcomes in line with their preferences. 
It organizes the discussion around the specific decision-making venues in which recent SDRR reform 
initiatives took place, recognizing that the venue and type of initiative unfolding within it can influence 
the roles and capabilities of different actors. I then highlight how the analysis of power and preferences 
draws upon and contributes to IPE and global governance literatures, and a final section concludes. 
 
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly reiterating the trigger-process distinction. The trigger stage is 
defined by the initial decision of whether and/or when to restructure debt. A trigger mechanism is 
one that can push or encourage a debtor to initiate a restructuring on the basis of some pre-defined 
rules that justify such debt relief. The process of restructuring sovereign debt is separate from any 
mechanism or set of considerations that might trigger that restructuring in the first place. The process 
involves the renegotiation of debt between the sovereign and its creditors and the legal procedure that 
finalizes any agreement they reach. It occurs after the decision to initiate a debt workout has been made 
and constitutes a distinct stage in the overall debt restructuring operation. This distinction between 
the process and the trigger has been overlooked by IPE scholars but, as this dissertation highlights, it 
is an important one that bears fruitful insights for the study of regulatory variation in the SDRR.166 It 
is not, of course, the only important distinction. The political implications of different types of process 
mechanisms are equally important to understanding the failure and success of recent reform initiatives. 
 
2. Preferences 
2.1 Capital-Exporting States 
2.1.1 Preferences Toward a Trigger Mechanism 
The interests of the leading capital-exporting states in whether and/or when particular countries 
restructure their debt are inseparably linked to their structural position in the global financial system. 
Starting in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1970s, these states—predominately the US but also the 
                                                        
166 I am not the first to make the distinction between process and trigger. Leckow and Ams, two IMF staff members, do 
so in a conference paper on the IMF’s experience with debt restructuring. To my knowledge, however, no scholars have 
yet made this distinction or used any similar classification to analyze the politics of different aspects of debt restructuring. 
See Ross Leckow and Julianne Ams, ‘Sovereign debt restructuring in the IMF experience,’ ESCB Legal Conference 2016, 
European Central Bank (January 2017): 14-22. 
 60 
UK, Germany, France, and Japan—saw their banking sectors internationalize and become increasingly 
enmeshed and invested in foreign markets.167 One of the first major activities through which domestic 
banking sectors in the West became directly exposed to financial developments in EMDEs was 
sovereign lending, fueled especially by the petrodollar recycling following the 1973 and 1979 oil 
shocks.168 The funding of foreign governments by big banks in New York and London—as well as 
Frankfurt, Paris, and Tokyo—created direct transmission channels through which sovereign defaults 
and debt restructurings in distant countries could spread to and destabilize the domestic financial 
systems of the major capital-exporting states. 
 
These channels and the threats they posed to the financial stability of dominant states became painfully 
clear with the outbreak of the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s.169 Starting with Mexico in 
1982, Latin American states that had borrowed large sums from foreign banks during the 1970s found 
themselves, one after another, unable to continue servicing their external debts.170 The prospect of 
mass defaults or debt write-downs across the region threatened to imperil not only the debtors but 
also their commercial creditors, particularly a handful of highly vulnerable and systemically important 
US banks. American officials worried that financial losses for these banks could precipitate their 
collapse, in turn generating massive financial instability and a broader economic downturn within the 
US. In this context, protecting the banks by preventing debtor states, especially large borrowers like 
Mexico and Brazil, from defaulting or writing-off significant portions of their debt became politically 
imperative for US policymakers.171 To protect its financial interests, the US government gave bridging 
loans to debtor states to prevent defaults while they worked out longer-term programs with the IMF.172 
But it was critically important for the US that these IMF programs also help to facilitate debt 
repayment to private creditors and avoid substantial restructuring.173  
                                                        
167 Eric Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Cornell University Press, 1996). 
168 David E. Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets (Cornell University 
Press, 1999). 
169 Miles Kahler, ‘Politics and international debt: explaining the crisis,’ International Organization 39(3)(1985): 357-382. 
170 Jeffrey D. Sachs (ed.), Developing Country Debt and the World Economy (University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
171 Jeffrey Sachs, ‘Managing the LDC Debt Crisis,’ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2(1986): 397-440. See also Stephen 
S. Golub, ‘The Political Economy of the Latin American Debt Crisis,’ Latin American Research Review 26(1)(1991): 175-215. 
172 McDowell, Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?  
173 As McDowell (Brother, Can You Spare a Billion?) has pointed out, the US state has often acted more like a true international 
lender of last resort than the IMF because the latter cannot always provide loans with sufficient speed and/or of sufficient 
size to protect US financial interests. This does not imply, however, that the IMF’s role in addressing sovereign debt crises 
is any less important in terms of influencing a country’s decision of whether and when to restructure its debt. Even when 
US loans have served as a bridge to longer-term IMF programs, it has been critically important to the US that these IMF 
programs remain aligned with core US interests. If, for example, the Fund insisted on deep debt relief at a time when US 
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The Fund prioritized core-country stability over the need for substantial debt relief in borrowing 
countries. It mobilized new financing that allowed debtors to continue servicing their interest 
payments but permitted only minimal debt relief through the rescheduling of principal payments. This 
approach helped protect American and other Western banks, but the debt relief provided by 
reschedulings was far too shallow to resolve the debt sustainability problems that countries faced, 
especially as new IMF loans were added to existing debt stocks. After years of repeated reschedulings, 
the resolution of the crisis finally came via the 1989 Brady Plan, which provided significant debt 
reduction only after the risk of financial instability in capital-exporting states had subsided. In the end, 
the IMF’s role in the 1980s helped safeguard the financial interests of its largest shareholders, but it 
damaged the organization’s image as a neutral and effective crisis manager. Critics accused the Fund 
of being an instrument of American power and serving as a “bill collector for the banks.” 174 
 
The 1980s debt crisis is an instructive episode, but it is not the only time that major capital-exporting 
states have sought to discourage or delay debt restructurings in foreign countries to safeguard their 
own financial stability. Most recently, France and Germany deemed it imperative that Greece not 
restructure its debt at the outset of its crisis, fearing that write-downs on Greek debt would endanger 
French and German banks and unleash financial mayhem in their domestic economies and throughout 
Europe more broadly. These episodes underscore the more general point: because the leading capital-
exporting states are home to many of the largest and most important banks and investors that provide 
credit to foreign governments, they are bound to face situations in which debt restructuring abroad 
threatens to trigger financial instability at home by inflicting losses on domestic firms.175  
 
To be sure, there are additional reasons why dominant states might want to spare a sovereign borrower 
from a restructuring. Debt write-downs act as a wealth transfer from creditors to debtors and thus 
                                                        
bank exposure to the debtor country in question remained high, it would present a challenge to the overall crisis 
management strategy designed to preserve US domestic financial stability. The US or other major capital-exporting states 
with such stability concerns could, in principle, seek to sideline the IMF altogether if the organization refused to 
accommodate their interests, but this would involve foregoing the benefits of ‘multilateralizing’ sovereign debt crisis 
management and the conditionalities that go along with it. Moreover, sidelining the Fund in this way has not been necessary 
for major capital-exporting states, for they have sufficient power to influence IMF decisions from inside the organization.   
174 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises, p. 23.  
175 IPE scholars have made similar points about the domestic financial stability implications of foreign financial crises. 
Focusing largely on large-scale liquidity crises, McDowell argues that domestic financial stability concerns have been the 
key motivating factor behind US emergency loans to foreign governments and central banks. See McDowell, Brother, Can 
You Spare a Billion?  
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have negative distributional consequences for lenders and the societies in which they are located. 
There might also be a geopolitical rationale for trying to avoid the financial turmoil associated with 
debt workouts. These factors likely influence responses to certain crises, but there is little reason to 
believe that distributional and geopolitical concerns systematically make restructuring unacceptable to 
capital-exporting states in the way that financial stability concerns do. Moreover, given the degree of 
economic interdependence among the major advanced economies, we would expect the preferences 
of capital exporters to more-consistently converge when it comes to issues of systemic stability, even 
if the stakes are higher for some than others. This convergence, in turn, raises the odds that dominant 
states will cooperate in shaping the terms of IMF lending in such critical cases. Although stability 
issues may arise less frequently than distributional or geopolitical ones, they provide a much stronger 
rationale and set of political pressures to avoid, delay, or minimize restructuring when they do spring 
up. For these reasons, I focus on the financial stability implications of the IMF’s trigger mechanism. 
 
How do the structural factors described above shape the preferences of capital-exporting states vis-à-
vis a trigger mechanism? Based on preceding discussion, we might expect all capital exporters to prefer 
a case-by-case approach to IMF lending, one that would allow the Fund to deploy resources in ways 
that helped protect their financial interests when needed. Indeed, the US has historically preferred this 
kind of discretionary approach. Yet as the debates of the 1990s showed, European officials have not 
always shared this preference. Moreover, American policymakers broke from their historical 
preference and moved toward the European position in favour of lending rules in 2002. Material 
positions in the global economy thus do not automatically translate into policy preferences that are 
fully consistent across all major capital-exporting states or across time. 
 
Nor do capital-exporting states look to prevent debt restructurings everywhere and always. In many 
cases, a debt workout poses little risk to financial stability in these states and is recognized as necessary 
for resolving otherwise intractable crises. Moreover, capital exporters are not all alike. They have 
different levels of exposure to different countries at different times, contributing to sometimes 
divergent conceptions of the costs and benefits of restructuring, whether at a particular moment or 
over a longer period of time. Their views on the desirability of debt restructuring can also be influenced 
by distinct ideational factors. For example, compared to other capital exporters, Germany has more 
consistently emphasized the costs of bailouts in terms of taxpayer resources and moral hazard and the 
benefits of making the private sector share the burden of crisis resolution through debt restructuring. 
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Material conditions do not directly map onto preferences because they are mediated by ideas that 
translate them into actionable policy positions.176 For example, US and European (especially German) 
support for firm lending rules in the early 2000s was motivated by causal convictions about how these 
rules would impact the likelihood of future crises. Officials believed that IMF bailouts had market-
distorting effects and that credible lending constraints could correct these distortions. If the new rules 
succeeded in introducing greater market discipline, they would help prevent financial crises from 
occurring in the first place and thus diminish demand for IMF bailouts.177 For Europeans, these beliefs 
dovetailed with perceptions of their interests vis-à-vis the US. From their perspective, IMF bailouts 
had primarily benefitted American financial interests and thus tying their hands through stricter 
lending rules would be worth it if it also meant constraining the US.178 European states had different 
domestic political economies and different levels of exposure to different countries compared to the 
US. Thus, despite being large capital exporters, they did not see themselves as susceptible to the same 
risks and destabilizing tendencies as American finance. 
 
However, how officials believe a given institutional arrangement will affect their interests and how it 
actually does or appears to at some future point in time can be very different. When such dissonance 
occurs, it can give rise to preferences that are inconsistent at different moments in time. This time-
inconsistency problem is a particularly acute feature of IMF lending rules because of the structural 
position of capital-exporting states and the intensity of their occasional short-term interests in averting 
or delaying foreign debt write-downs to preserve domestic financial stability.179 Lending rules are 
bound to sometimes prescribe restructurings in cases where dominant states would prefer to prevent 
or postpone them. When such cases arise, these states will seek to influence IMF lending in ways that 
accommodate their short-term interests.  
 
                                                        
176 Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons (eds.), Constructing the International Economy. 
177 See Taylor, Global Financial Warriors. 
178 Roubini and Setser, Bailouts or Bail-Ins? 
179 The concept of time inconsistency, sometimes called dynamic inconsistency, has been used to analyze various domains 
of social life but is best known in the field of economics, particularly as it relates to monetary policy debates. For the classic 
text on this issue, see Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott, ‘Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of 
Optimal Plans,’ Journal of Political Economy 85(3)(1977): 473-492. For a broader discussion of time inconsistency and its 
application to monetary policy, see Yves Mersch, ‘Monetary policy and time inconsistency in an uncertain environment.’ 
Speech given at the NOBELUX Seminar, Luxembourg, September 11, 2006. For an application of the concept to 
international politics, see Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Arild Underdal, ‘Implementing Long-Term Climate Policy: Time 
Inconsistency, Domestic Politics, International Anarchy,’ Global Environmental Politics 9(3)(2009): 20-39.  
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The issue of time inconsistency was recognized by policymakers involved in creating the 2002 rules. 
As John Taylor acknowledged after the 2002 framework had been established: 
 
applying the [IMF lending] limits in actual cases would be the most difficult part of all, 
for in reality policymakers would be under heavy pressure to provide a bailout in a given 
situation even if they had agreed earlier not to provide such a bailout in those same 
circumstances.180 
 
But policymakers like Taylor hoped that the constraint imposed by the 2002 lending rules would be 
made credible if they simultaneously improved the debt restructuring process. Their theory was that 
the pressure to avoid debt workouts came largely from the messy and unpredictable nature of the 
restructuring process, and that this pressure could be substantially mitigated by smoothing that process 
through a SDRM or CACs.181 While this thinking addressed one source of pressure, it ignored the less 
constant but much bigger source that came not from debtors and creditors wanting to avoid an unruly 
process but from capital-exporting states whose financial sectors could be put at risk from the very 
act of writing-down debt in the first place—no matter how quickly or smoothly the restructuring 
went.182 Without addressing the latter pressures, the 2002 mechanism and its commitment to trigger 
restructurings was bound to face strong political headwinds when it eventually ran up against the 
interests of dominant states. The 2002 rules thus faced what institutional theorists call a ‘credible 
commitment’ problem.183  
 
In 2010, the time-inconsistency problem materialized as powerful European states that had been 
strong proponents of the 2002 lending rules insisted on ignoring those rules to avoid/delay a Greek 
debt restructuring that threatened their domestic financial interests. In this context, the IMF created 
a loophole in the rules that allowed it to lend without requiring a debt restructuring in Greece. As 
Chapter 4 argues, this fateful episode significantly weakened the credibility of IMF lending rules and 
their capacity to trigger restructurings when powerful states oppose debt relief. It forcefully revealed 
                                                        
180 Taylor, Global Financial Warriors, pp. 106-107. 
181 Ibid. 
182 It is important to note that creating a more orderly restructuring process would not really quell pressures from debtors 
and creditors to avoid restructuring, which would remain costly even in the context of a smoother process.  
183 Eichengreen and Woods made this point in a recent article about the various challenges the Fund faces. See Eichengreen 
and Woods, ‘The IMF’s Unmet Challenges.’ For a more general discussion of credible commitment issues, see: Douglass 
C. North, ‘Institutions and Credible Commitment,’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149(1)(1993): 11-23; Brett 
Ashley Leeds, ‘Credible Commitments and International Cooperation: Guaranteeing Contracts Without External 
Enforcement,’ Conflict Management and Peace Science 18(1)(2000); Michael Breen and Iain McMenamin, ‘Political Institutions, 
Credible Commitment, and Sovereign Debt in Advanced Economies,’ International Studies Quarterly 57(4)(2013): 842-854. 
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that, based on their structural position in the global financial order, major capital-exporting states—
not only the US but also European powers—are occasionally exposed to spillovers from foreign debt 
workouts, and that when such moments arise, these states will look to shape Fund lending decisions 
in ways that discourage or delay debt restructuring, no matter how clear the restructuring rules or how 
desperate the crisis country’s need for debt relief. These structural realities and the pressures they 
sometimes generate imply that any commitment to a rules-based trigger mechanism will be subject to 
time-inconsistent preferences that undermine its credibility, especially after the 2010 reform episode.    
 
The 2010 clash between the IMF’s lending rules and the material interests of states that had previously 
advocated for those rules did not simply reflect time-inconsistent preferences that diverged from the 
rule-creation (2002) to the rule-implementation (2010) stage of the policy process; it also shifted state 
preferences in ways that came to inform subsequent IMF reform processes and outcomes. More 
specifically, I argue that experience with the IMF rules—including the 2010 decision to change those 
rules to avoid debt restructuring—in the context of unprecedented financial crises only reinforced the 
preference for a more flexible, case-by-case approach to lending among those who traditionally held 
that position (namely the US), and diminished the enthusiasm for re-introducing strict lending rules 
among those who had previously promoted them. Even the staunchest advocates of strong rules had 
gained a new appreciation for the value of assessing crises on a case-by-case basis. While some states 
and domestic factions within states remained stronger proponents of firm rules than others, the 
balance of forces had very much shifted in favour of greater flexibility and discretion. Thus, when the 
design of the IMF’s lending rules was revisited from 2013-2016, the end result of the reform process 
was to weaken the content of the trigger mechanism compared to its 2002 incarnation. New rules 
unveiled in 2016 provide enough room to maneuver that powerful states will be able to influence IMF 
lending in ways that protect their financial sectors and interests without formally breaking the rules.  
 
In sum, the potential for sovereign debt restructurings to generate financial instability in core capital-
exporting states has shaped the latter’s preferences toward IMF lending reforms in 2010 and 2016, 
underscoring the enormous political difficulties of institutionalizing an effective trigger mechanism.   
 
2.1.2 Preferences Toward Different Process Mechanisms 
The leading capital-exporting states have an interest not only in whether and when foreign states 
restructure their debts, but also in the legal-institutional arrangements that govern global investments 
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during normal times, including sovereign debt investments. Here, I follow in the footsteps of scholars 
who argue that the leading exporters of private capital—particularly the US and UK—have a 
longstanding interest in establishing and maintaining transnational contract law and private property 
rights. Charles Lipson demonstrated this in his study of British and American efforts in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries to forge international property rules to protect their overseas investments.184 
Jeffry Frieden put the point in more general terms, arguing that the main capital exporters have an 
interest in maintaining a financial order characterized by the free movement of capital across borders. 
To maintain confidence in the safety of overseas investments, capital-exporting states thus seek to 
ensure “the adjudication and enforcement of property rights across borders” and, as such, take the 
lead in “developing international contract law and a mechanism to enforce it.”185 Critical political 
economists make a similar but broader point. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, for example, showed how 
the US took the lead in creating the conditions for global capitalism in the post-World War Two era, 
including through the establishment of institutional frameworks to “maintain property rights, oversee 
contracts, stabilize currencies, reproduce class relations, and contain crises on a global scale.”186 
 
In sovereign debt relations, the leading capital-exporting states have not developed international 
contract law but rather made available, and thus internationalized, their own domestic contract laws 
and enforcement mechanisms. Today, roughly 96 percent of international sovereign bonds are issued 
in either New York or London and thus governed by American or English laws and courts.187 While 
the centrality of these jurisdictions is linked to their historical evolution as global financial centers, 
American and British governments have also cultivated the role of their legal systems in anchoring 
transnational property rights in the sovereign debt regime. In the late 1970s, both passed legislation—
the US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 and the United Kingdom State Immunity 
Act of 1978—that allowed foreign governments to be sued in their domestic courts when such 
governments had engaged in commercial transactions or waived their immunity in a contract. Mark 
Weidemaier shows that one of the main purposes of the FSIA was to depoliticize sovereign bond 
                                                        
184 Charles Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (University of California 
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185 Jeffry A. Frieden, ‘Capital Politics: Creditors and the International Political Economy’, Journal of Public Policy 8(3/4) 
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1. 
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disputes by channeling them into the courts.188 Debtors responded in a way that further depoliticized 
debt disputes: by waiving their sovereign immunity from lawsuit in virtually all new bonds issued in 
New York and thus agreeing to be treated like private commercial actors.189 
 
The resulting system was one in which New York and English laws and courts came to anchor 
transnational property rights in sovereign debt contracts. This situation benefits the US and UK in 
three ways. First, it attracts business to New York and London and thus provides economic benefits. 
EMDE governments issue debt and waive their immunity to be sued in these foreign jurisdictions 
because doing so bolsters their commitment to repay and allows investors to seek legal remedies in 
the event of a default.190 This makes sovereign bonds issued under New York or English law a safer 
and more attractive investment for global investors, which in turn lowers a sovereign’s borrowing 
costs compared to issuing debt under its own local laws.191 Issuing, paying, and rolling over bonds 
placed in New York or London then generates significant business for a number of actors in these 
financial centers, including the corporate law firms that write contracts and structure deals, the 
multinational banks that serve as underwriters and trustees/fiscal agents, and a variety of asset 
managers and institutional investors that buy and trade sovereign debt securities. In short, the legal 
and market configuration of the sovereign debt regime provides commercial gains for the US and UK.   
 
Second, existing legal structures provide a solid basis for cross-border contract rights and thus serve 
US and UK interests as leading exporters of private capital. While this legal regime does not guarantee 
the enforcement of sovereign debt contracts, it does help stabilize market expectations by embedding 
complex debt relations within clear and seemingly apolitical rights and obligations and providing 
predictable legal avenues for dispute settlement. The fact that “politics is barely visible in today’s 
sovereign debt restructuring regime” is important and largely intentional.192 The US government has 
long sought to remove politics from the SDRR, both to insulate politicians from having to deal with 
debt disputes and because, in the sovereign debt regime, “politics can be a source of uncertainty.”193 
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Of course, sovereign debt disputes and restructuring decisions are intensely political, but US and UK 
courts sweep politics under the rug by ruling according to a straightforward application of domestic 
contract law.194 A judge’s job here is not to adjudicate a sovereign bankruptcy process; it is simply to 
enforce the terms of the debt contract, typically ruling in favour of creditors who litigate for full 
repayment after a sovereign default or debt restructuring.195 In short, US and UK domestic laws and 
courts provide useful legal foundations for transnational property rights in the sovereign debt regime, 
giving investors a greater sense of predictability and protection vis-à-vis their cross-border bond 
investments. In providing a stable basis for profitable sovereign debt markets, existing legal structures 
benefit investors and the main capital-exporting states in which many of them are located. 
 
The third broad benefit that the US and UK derive from current legal and market arrangements is 
structural power over important developments in the SDRR. Susan Strange described this form of power 
as the capacity to shape the global structures within which other states and market actors have to 
operate.196 In sovereign debt, the centrality of New York and English law enables legislators in the US 
and UK to unilaterally shape the rules of the international sovereign debt regime by changing domestic 
laws. For example, in 2010 the UK parliament enacted a law that prohibited creditors from using 
British courts to sue states that had received debt relief via the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative.197 The US and the UK’s structural position also allows their policymakers to block 
unwanted initiatives aimed at governing international sovereign debt simply by refusing to participate 
in them. A regulatory agreement that did not include these two states would fail to cover the vast 
majority of internationally-issued sovereign bonds, making it a rather useless tool for governing these 
markets. While scholars have written about structural power in other areas of global money and 
finance, this dissertation is the first to highlight its foundations and implications in the SDRR.198 
 
These features of the current system shape US and UK preferences toward different process-oriented 
restructuring mechanisms. First consider hard-law arrangements such as the SDRM or the framework 
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recently proposed in the UN. By establishing international legal procedures for breaking or changing 
the original payment terms of debt contracts, these kinds of mechanisms would override the existing 
domestic legal foundations of the debt regime, thereby threatening the power and privileges that the 
US and UK derive from the current order. They would trump the sovereign authority of the states in 
which debt contracts are governed, but also the legal frameworks that anchor investor rights in the 
debt regime, introducing new sources of legal and political uncertainty in important financial markets.  
 
As discussed earlier, some scholars noted that the US opposed the SDRM because of its sovereignty 
implications.199 As Gelpern and colleagues note: “For most U.S. officials, the idea that a treaty could 
trump financial contracts under New York law or that an international body could trump U.S. courts 
was simply unacceptable.”200 But they did not elaborate on what sovereignty meant for the US in the 
context of the sovereign debt regime. Here, sovereignty is not about autonomy from international 
forces. It is instead about maintaining the dominant position of one’s national systems within broader 
global structures and processes. As globalization scholars have stressed, global processes are 
embedded and articulated within distinct national spaces, which act as nodes in broader transboundary 
networks.201 In globalized sovereign debt markets, sovereignty for the US and the UK is about 
defending the privileged position of the two most critical nodes: New York and London. 
 
But preserving the domestic legal foundations of the international debt regime is about more than 
sovereignty. It is also about maintaining a regime governed by commercial law and not politics—one 
that provided predictability about the legal status of cross-border investments and thus a stable 
backdrop of expectations against which US and other investors could transact. The leading capital-
exporting states—the US in particular—have worried that an international hard-law mechanism would 
overly politicize debt restructuring and create new legal uncertainty in sovereign bond markets because 
of its ability to trump private contracts and authorize debt write-downs based on a process that 
creditors had not directly consented to. For these states, treaties are a useful mechanism in other areas 
of investment and trade, where they help entrench investor rights in international law.202 But they are 
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inappropriate for sovereign debt restructuring, where they would provide an international legal basis 
for trumping those rights and the domestic legal systems that uphold them.203  
 
For the capital-exporting states that look to protect cross-border investor rights, the task of regulating 
the restructuring process presents a basic dilemma. By its nature, debt restructuring involves changing 
or breaking contract terms and challenging creditor property rights, so efforts to institutionalize this 
process through new legal mechanisms could contradict or supersede the sources of law that safeguard 
those contract terms and property rights in the first place. The problem is that of a clash between two 
separate legal systems with their own distinct objectives: a domestic/transnational contract law system, 
and an international debt restructuring system. A supranational sovereign bankruptcy process might 
improve the latter but at the expense of the former, which US and UK decision-makers are bound to 
prioritize due to the benefits they derive from the current order. These states are thus likely to oppose 
hard-law reforms to the SDRR—as seen during the UN initiative examined in Chapter 5. 
 
And yet, the US government and other capital exporters have long expressed an interest in improving 
the efficiency and predictability of the sovereign debt restructuring process.204 For American officials, 
dealing with deficiencies in the current system has become even more pressing in recent years, as some 
have grown concerned that recent holdout creditor litigation against Argentina could set destabilizing 
legal precedents that undermine New York’s central position in international sovereign debt 
markets.205 So how have capital exporters reconciled their interest in preserving existing legal structures 
with their objective of creating a more orderly and predictable debt restructuring process? They have 
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done so, I argue, through the use of private-law contract mechanisms such as CACs, which provide a 
politically useful tool for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt workouts. By embedding the 
ability to restructure debt into the existing system of contractual rights and obligations, they allow 
capital-exporting states to create more robust restructuring processes without undermining the 
authority of their own laws and courts or creating significant legal uncertainty in the system of 
transnational investor rights. The fact that contract reforms provide restructuring tools that are 
embedded within—not located above—existing legal structures is thus key to understanding the regulatory 
preferences of the US and other major capital-exporting states in the SDRR. This legally-embedded 
quality has been a necessary condition enabling the emergence of contract mechanisms in the various 
reform episodes. 
 
So far, analysis of capital exporters’ preferences vis-à-vis different process mechanisms has focused 
on the US and UK, the former of which remains particularly important for the Treasury-led contract 
reforms explored in Chapter 6. But it was a different set of capital-exporting states—namely France 
and Germany—that predominately shaped the Eurozone reform outcome (also examined in Chapter 
6). Because German and French laws and courts do not occupy the same central position within the 
international sovereign debt regime, their governments are not motivated by the same need to select 
restructuring mechanisms that protect their national power and sovereignty within this regime 
(although giving up control over questions related to national public debt can raise sensitive 
sovereignty issues for any country).  
 
These states continue, however, to have a stake in the creation and maintenance of clear and consistent 
cross-border property rights, especially within the context of European sovereign debt markets. Clear 
investor rights help to stabilize market expectations and calculations about risk, providing a degree of 
legal predictability around cross-border investments in the absence of a supranational authority to 
enforce payment obligations. For France and Germany, having well-functioning and highly-integrated 
financial markets in Europe is important to the regional integration project and to their interests as 
the Eurozone’s leading capital exporters. Both are home to a number of large banks with expansive 
financial interests and heavy involvement in European bond markets. We would thus expect French 
and German officials to seek legal-institutional arrangements whose anticipated effects are to stabilize 
and encourage, rather than destabilize and stifle, the profit-seeking activities of their financial firms. 
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What we see in Chapter 6 is that the legally-embedded nature of CACs was indeed crucial in shaping 
US, UK, and Eurozone preferences for contracts over alternative design options. But the role of 
France and Germany as capital exporters did not lead automatically and immediately to contracts. 
Germany initially flirted with the idea of a statutory regime while France remained more concerned 
about the market reaction to any new restructuring mechanism. What made a contract-based approach 
particularly useful in the end was the crisis context in which Eurozone reform efforts took place. This 
context further eroded political appetite for a hard-law mechanism that would sow substantial 
uncertainty in already-shaky European debt markets and bolstered the appeal of a contract mechanism 
that would rearticulate—rather than trump—private investor rights and thus generate less market 
turmoil. The European reform process was also complicated by the large number of diverse states—
both creditor and debtor states operating in the context of a live crisis—that had to agree upon any 
change to the Eurozone’s financial architecture. In the end, both the legally-embedded and process-
oriented nature of CACs were key to securing sufficient political support for this mechanism. 
 
For the leading capital-exporting states, the preference for contract mechanisms and against hard-law 
arrangements in recent reform initiatives was thus informed by their contrasting legal-institutional 
designs and how they either complemented or clashed with the existing legal foundations of sovereign 
debt markets. But the preferences of these states and the reform processes they impacted were also 
influenced by the historical legacy of the early 2000s. As a result of the debates and outcomes of that 
earlier episode, US officials knew their preferences toward specific legal-institutional designs as soon 
as reform discussions arose more recently. As such, they moved immediately to promote contract 
reforms and refused to even discuss the merits of a hard-law regime, mobilizing political capital in 
favour of the former and further stifling efforts to establish the latter. Existing CACs established in 
the early 2000s also provided both US and Eurozone officials with a regulatory model or blueprint 
they could quickly and easily adopt and adapt to their current challenges. For Eurozone reformers, the 
fact that CACs were already a well-known mechanism in EMDE debt and were thus less likely to roil 
already-turbulent European markets compared to more radical reform was also important. Finally, for 
both US and Eurozone officials, market familiarity with the original CACs increased the utility of 
further contract reforms as a tool for responding to the uncertainty generated by recent shocks. 
 
The preferences outlined above help to make sense of the weakening of the IMF’s trigger mechanism, 
the failure of the UN initiative to establish a hard-law debt restructuring process, and the success of 
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contract reforms in strengthening the process dimensions of the SDRR. But what about the soft-law 
principles that came out of the UN reform process? In Chapter 5, I argue that these principles are 
unlikely to have much impact because they face both political challenges related to their specific 
content and functional challenges related to the limitations of soft-law arrangements in the SDRR. 
The political impediments come from the opposition of powerful capital-exporting states, which have 
rejected the UN Principles because their normative content questions creditor rights and the authority 
of US and UK courts—even if only at a rhetorical rather than substantive level. The broader functional 
limitations of soft law in the SDRR has little to do with preferences and power capabilities and more 
to do with the specific characteristics of the issue area—a point to which I return in Chapter 5.      
     
2.2 Sovereign Debtors and Private Creditors 
Capital-exporting states are not the only actors that matter in the regulatory politics of the SDRR, even 
if they are the most consequential. Sovereign debtors and the international private creditor community 
have also impacted recent reform initiatives and outcomes in important ways. Both lobbied for and 
reinforced the strength of the policy position that ultimately prevailed in recent IMF reforms. Debtor 
states also played an important role in the UN initiative, leading the charge in favour of a more 
ambitious hard-law SDRR but also revealing important limitations in their willingness to pursue this 
kind of regulatory arrangement. Nowhere, however, were the preferences of debtors and creditors 
more critical than recent contract reforms. Eurozone reforms required the buy-in of the Eurozone’s 
debtor countries and were sensitive to the reaction of creditors, and the US Treasury-led initiative 
relied heavily upon the cooperation of EMDE debtors and private creditors to bring about contract 
change. For these reasons, it is important to understand the broad preferences of sovereign debtors 
and private creditors regarding trigger and process mechanisms for sovereign debt restructuring. 
  
2.2.1 Preferences Toward a Trigger Mechanism 
Debtor states have a strong incentive to avoid defaults and restructurings because of their enormous 
economic and political costs. This observation is supported by an extensive literature dating back to 
the early 1980s. Since then, the central question of sovereign debt research has been: in the absence 
of a formal global enforcement mechanism, why do sovereigns repay their external debts? Starting 
with Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz, a number of scholars argued that sovereigns repay in order 
to establish a good reputation with foreign creditors and thus maintain access to international capital 
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markets.206 An alternative explanation, articulated most notably by Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, 
holds that the threat of sanctions from powerful creditor-country governments is what gives debtors 
an incentive to repay.207 If sovereigns refuse to honour their debt obligations, it is not foreign private 
creditors but rather their governments that will retaliate, with costly sanctions such as the blockage of 
trade credit and international aid to the debtor country. Whether the mechanism is reputation or 
sanctions, the message is similar: sovereigns pay their debts because not doing so is extremely costly. 
 
This message is also supported by several empirical studies detailing the consequences of sovereign 
default, including restructuring, which this literature generally treats as a form of default since it entails 
not paying the full value of the original obligation. Here, scholars point to the high costs of default 
for the debtor country’s domestic banking system,208 its broader corporate sector,209 its productivity,210 
and its general economic output.211 Research also suggests that defaults have dire consequences for 
the political survival of incumbent politicians, especially finance ministers.212 Most of these costs stem 
from the financial losses and market reaction generated by default. But there is also evidence that the 
debt restructuring process itself can be inefficient and unpredictable, especially with the recent rise of 
holdout litigation. Because of these high costs and unpredictable consequences, scholars have argued 
that political elites in debtor countries will look to exhaust all possible options to avoid restructuring, 
even when debt relief seems all but inevitable to outside observers.213 The most promising option for 
debtor states in this situation is to ‘gamble for redemption’ by requesting an IMF loan and insisting 
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that restructuring is unnecessary and would do more harm than good. Due to the uncertainty of the 
liquidity-solvency distinction and the costly and potentially destabilizing effects of debt workouts, the 
IMF may be inclined to agree and go along with debtor efforts to avert restructuring. These debtor 
dynamics are a frequent source of pressure on the IMF to lend in ways that seek to avoid, but often 
end up delaying, debt restructurings.  
 
Debt restructuring is not, of course, all bad for debtors. Debt relief can benefit heavily indebted states 
because it acts as a one-time transfer of resources from creditors to debtors and, more importantly, 
can provide the fiscal space needed to jumpstart economic growth. But based on its significant 
downsides, debtors will want to retain flexibility to decide if and when restructuring should happen. 
And contrary to longstanding creditor concerns that debtors seek debt relief too much and too soon, 
recent research suggests that the opposite is true: debtors tend to put off dealing with unsustainable 
debt burdens and when they do restructure, it is often too little, too late.214       
 
Based on these factors, we would expect debtor states to oppose IMF lending rules that increased 
their odds of being forced to restructure their debts and decreased the Fund’s latitude to decide when 
special circumstances warranted a bailout sans restructuring. For example, although the IMF’s 2002 
framework prohibited lending to Greece in 2010 unless the country first restructured its debt, Greek 
authorities insisted at the time that debt restructuring was not necessary and that they could complete 
a successful adjustment program without debt relief.215 Debtors would also be expected to oppose 
rules that appear to make restructurings more likely because of the potential negative impact on their 
market access and borrowing costs. If the question is not about the existence but rather the strength 
and precision of such rules, we would likewise expect debtors to prefer weaker, more flexible, and 
more ambiguous rules. These expectations are reinforced by the revealed preferences of debtor states. 
In 2002, debtors argued against the creation of strict IMF lending rules, and as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, many supported the relaxation of lending rules in 2010 and pushed for greater flexibility in 
the Fund’s EA framework between 2013 and 2016. This is neither to suggest that debtor countries 
have identical preferences, nor that they will always look to avoid restructuring. Rather, the implication 
                                                        
214 IMF, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy 
Framework.’ See also Richard Gitlin and Brett House, ‘A Blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Forum,’ CIGI Papers No. 27 
(March 2014). 
215 See IMF, Minutes of Executive Board Meeting 10/45-1. Greece – Request for Stand-By Arrangement; Rule K-1 Report 
on Breach of Obligations Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Articles of Agreement. May 9, 2010. 
 76 
is that, as a general rule, debtor states will want to retain a significant degree of discretion over whether 
and when they restructure, given the stakes for them and their populations.   
 
Private creditors have even clearer reasons to avoid debt restructuring. They invariably suffer financial 
losses from write-downs on sovereign bond or bank debt and therefore have a strong group interest 
in avoiding restructurings in as many cases as possible. To this end, IMF lending has generally 
benefitted private creditors by providing crisis-stricken governments with the resources they need to 
continue servicing their debts. Before the Fund came to play this role, there were few reliable 
mechanisms to shield transnational creditors from losses when foreign financial crises arose. The 
change in global financial relations brought about by the creation of the IMF as a permanent rescue 
Fund led Christian Suter to observe: “institutionalization enhances the resilience of the international 
financial system against the outbreak of open debt crises [i.e., uncontained crises in which debtors 
default and shift the burden onto their creditors] and favors the bargaining power of creditors vis-à-
vis debtor countries. As a consequence, an open crisis may be averted or postponed, and the burden 
of debt crisis has to be carried mainly by the debtors.”216 Because creditors often benefit from bailouts, 
they often seek to influence IMF lending in ways that are favourable to their interests.217 
 
We would therefore expect private creditors to oppose lending rules that limit the number of cases in 
which the IMF can provide bailouts without conditioning its assistance on upfront debt restructuring. 
When the question is about the strength and precision, rather than existence, of lending constraints, 
creditors should also prefer looser, more ambiguous rules that give the Fund more latitude. As with 
debtors, what we would expect creditors to want is broadly supported by their revealed preferences 
in this domain. Time and again, the private creditor community has articulated its support for a 
flexible, case-by-case approach to sovereign debt restructuring rather than a rules-based approach that 
outlines in advance how particular types of debt crises will be dealt with.218 
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These claims do not imply that private creditors have identical interests in how specific crises are 
resolved. Far from it. For example, when debt relief cannot be avoided, the specific terms and timing 
of IMF lending can have sharply uneven impacts on differently positioned creditors, with some taking 
large losses and others escaping unscathed. Yet it remains true that when it comes to the question of 
crises in general, creditors have a common interest in avoiding defaults and debt workouts if possible. 
This group interest translates into a general preference for the IMF to take a flexible, case-by-case 
approach to debt crises—one that preserves the Fund’s capacity to avert restructurings, or minimize 
their impact on private creditors, in a wide range of circumstances. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, sovereign debtors and private creditors should oppose international 
rules that make debt restructurings more likely and/or diminish their capacity to influence whether 
and when a given restructuring happens in the first place. In other words, we would expect debtors 
and creditors to encourage a case-by-case approach to IMF lending and oppose a formal mechanism 
designed to trigger restructurings according to pre-defined rules—an expectation borne out by the 
evidence provided in Chapter 4. But how do these actors feel about various mechanisms that aim to 
govern the debt renegotiation process?  
 
2.2.2 Preferences Toward Different Process Mechanisms 
Although debtors and private creditors want to maintain control over their fate and often have an 
incentive to avoid debt restructuring if possible, once they have accepted that a debt workout is 
necessary or inevitable, both have an interest in a smooth and speedy restructuring process. The longer 
a debtor spends in the financial limbo of a restructuring negotiation—without access to international 
capital markets—the more its growth prospects suffer and the harder it becomes to generate the fiscal 
surpluses from which to repay creditors. Like divorce negotiations, restructurings that drag on or are 
marred by conflict tend to drain the collective pool of resources available to be divided up among the 
parties, representing a potentially large efficiency loss.219 While there is also always a distributional 
bargaining game that determines how the gains/losses of a debt renegotiation are shared between the 
debtor and its creditors and among different types of creditors, the potential for joint efficiency gains 
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for these actors as a whole provides a reason for debtors and creditors to support mechanisms aimed 
at creating a more timely and orderly restructuring process.220 
 
The prospect of mutual gains has only become more apparent in the last several years with the rise of 
increasingly disruptive holdout creditors who can hijack restructuring negotiations and drag debtors 
through years of costly litigation. Not only do these minority creditors exacerbate the efficiency 
problems mentioned above; they also gain at the expense of the majority of creditors, generating 
distributional discontent among the wider creditor community.221 As chapters 5 and 6 show, the recent 
quest for stronger institutional arrangements to govern the debt restructuring process—whether in 
the context of the UN initiative or bond contract reforms—has been motivated largely by a desire to 
neutralize holdout creditors to the broad and joint benefit of debtors and creditors as a whole.  
 
The positive-sum potential of an improved debt restructuring process does not mean that all process-
oriented mechanisms will be equally attractive to debtors and private creditors. Different mechanisms 
can have different distributional and power implications that outweigh potential efficiency gains and 
make them unacceptable to these actors. What matters in shaping debtor and creditor preferences 
toward different process mechanisms is the legal-institutional design of a given arrangement, as well 
as the ways in which historical experience and context shape understandings of these mechanisms.  
 
Before moving on to discuss these factors, it is worth asking whether an IMF trigger mechanism could 
also provide joint gains to debtors and creditors. Indeed, we could imagine scenarios where rules that 
triggered early debt relief produced such benefits. As described in Section 2.1 of Chapter 2, when IMF 
lending delays rather than triggers a necessary restructuring, it often leaves the debtor and a portion of 
its creditors (those with claims maturing in the medium to long term) worse off. However, a significant 
segment of creditors (those with claims maturing in the short term) will likely be paid in full and on 
time and thus benefit from the bailout, adding a distributional dynamic that exists in every ‘bail-in or 
bailout’ decision and complicates the efficiency payoffs of a trigger. Moreover, it is not clear to debtors 
and private creditors that a trigger mechanism would provide mutual gains more often than it would 
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result in otherwise avoidable losses. These actors—especially private creditors— are likely to worry 
that trigger rules would result in restructurings that may have been avoidable, or in larger losses than 
may have been necessary (if the IMF conditions its support on a certain level of debt relief). Finally, 
because the stakes are so high, debtors and creditors will generally want to maintain as much control 
and influence as possible over decisions of whether and when to restructure—an element of agency 
that is bound to be diminished by strong trigger rules. For debtors and private creditors, the clear risks 
of a trigger mechanism are not worth the unclear rewards. Process mechanisms, by contrast, can offer 
clearer rewards and smaller risks, depending on their design features—a topic to which we now turn. 
 
Although trigger and process mechanisms seek to govern different elements of debt restructuring, 
debtors and creditors may not always distinguish between the two and their distinct implications—as 
seen in the early 2000s when trigger and process reforms were deeply intertwined. In that earlier era, 
private creditors and EMDE debtors initially opposed both hard-law and contractual process reforms 
for fear that they would lead to more restructurings and thus higher borrowing costs—outcomes more 
aptly associated with a trigger arrangement. However, the fact that they saw CACs as a lesser evil 
compared to the SDRM was nonetheless based on the different legal-institutional designs of the two 
alternatives. Creditors preferred CACs over a SDRM because the latter threatened to institutionalize 
a process through which their contracts could be trumped and their ability to seek legal remedy 
curtailed.222 The result, from their perspective, would be a gross violation of creditor rights and greater 
investment uncertainty in sovereign debt markets.223 As voluntary contract terms, CACs also had the 
advantage of being open to re-negotiation if creditors became displeased with them. Because contract 
change was preferred by creditors and seen as a move that would generate less policy uncertainty than 
a SDRM, debtors also saw it as being less likely to substantially raise their borrowing costs.  
 
But while debtor states are borrowers that have an interest in maintaining access to cross-border finance 
at the lowest possible cost, they are also occasionally debt restructurers that might benefit from a more 
robust and comprehensive international legal framework to govern the restructuring process. These 
competing incentives have led to the observation that debtors face a collective action problem: even 
though it is collectively optimal for them to band together to establish a stronger sovereign bankruptcy 
process, individual debtors will defect as they come to fear the financial market reaction to their reform 
                                                        
222 Gelpern and Gulati, ‘Public Symbol in Private Contract.’ Also, interview 138785. 
223 Lavelle, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring.’ 
 80 
initiative.224 But this pattern of behaviour did not hold during the recent UN initiative. A broad 
coalition of debtor states articulated an ambitious hard-law reform agenda and showed no signs of 
wavering because of credit-related concerns.225 These states did, however, hesitate to follow their 
proposal to its logical conclusion for a different reason: concern about how an international hard-law 
mechanism might curtail their sovereignty. In the debt regime, sovereignty means something different 
to debtors than it does to capital exporters. For the former, it is about maintaining policy autonomy 
in the event of debt crisis. As highlighted in Chapter 5, these sovereignty concerns represent an 
additional barrier to a statutory regime—one that previous analyses failed to appreciate.226  
 
Creditors thus oppose hard-law designs because of their anticipated impact on investor rights and 
market uncertainty, while debtors oppose them—or at least fail to fully support them—because of 
their anticipated effect on borrowing costs and/or policy autonomy. While debtor concerns over 
sovereignty were evident during the later stages of the recent UN reform efforts, private creditors 
remained relatively silent in response to the UN initiative, perhaps relying on their home governments 
to quash its ambitious agenda. Since the early 2000s, it had become even clearer that the US and other 
major capital exporters were not interested in a statutory framework for sovereign debt restructuring. 
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While a hard-law restructuring arrangement remains objectionable due to its design features, debtor 
and creditor preferences toward contract mechanisms have changed rather dramatically since the early 
2000s. Debtors and private creditors went from accepting contract change as a lesser evil in the early 
2000s to embracing it as desirable in its own right more recently, laying the groundwork for the rapid 
emergence of robust contract reforms. Particularly apparent and important in the context of the recent 
Treasury-led initiative, this change in preferences owes primarily to the historical legacy of the original 
CACs and the changed political context of regulatory reform in recent years.  
 
As a result of their experience with CACs since 2003, debtors and creditors went from seeing contract 
change in the early 2000s as something that could disrupt the distributional status quo to seeing recent 
bond reforms largely as efficiency-enhancing, Pareto-improving moves. Experience taught creditors 
that CACs were a process mechanism that did nothing to trigger or make debt restructurings more 
likely in the first place, and it taught debtors that the borrowing-cost concerns associated with contract 
reform had been overblown. Moreover, in the recent reform context, capital-exporting states were no 
longer framing trigger and process mechanisms as an inseparable package deal. In fact, their actions 
suggested that trigger and process mechanisms were distinct, separable, and capable of being driven 
in opposite directions, with the trigger being weakened and the process being strengthened. The 
context therefore reinforced what had been learned over time: that contract reforms were strictly about 
improving the restructuring process, but in a relatively limited way that did not substantially alter the 
distributional bargaining game between debtors and creditors.  
 
The fact that recent contract reforms were understood purely as a process-oriented change, that their 
effects were relatively predictable due to experience with the original CACs, and that they had less 
intrusive design features than hard-law alternatives all contributed to debtor and creditor preferences 
in favour of recent contract reforms capable of significantly neutralizing holdout creditors. Aided by 
history and context, sovereign issuers and their private lenders came to embrace contract-based 
restructuring mechanisms because of their process orientation and legal-institutional design.           
 
2.3 IMF Staff Preferences Toward a Trigger Mechanism 
IMF staff preferences toward an IMF trigger mechanism are also worth briefly reviewing because they 
play a role in the next chapter. An important strand of IMF literature emphasizes that the organization 
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is a bureaucratic technocracy populated by a large and technically-savvy staff, which carries out all the 
economic analysis, surveillance, and program design.227 Although IMF employees work for the 
organization’s member states and have little formal decision-making power, the bureaucracy does have 
considerable influence through the authority it wields. As Barnett and Finnemore note, international 
organizations (IOs) often possess forms of authority that go beyond what is delegated to them by 
their member states.228 As bureaucracies, IOs have a certain rational-legal authority. They also have 
moral and expert authority, which derive from the perception that IOs pursue socially-valued goals 
“by means that are mostly rational, technocratic, impartial.”229 “To be authoritative, ergo powerful,” 
note Barnett and Finnemore, bureaucracies “must be seen to serve some valued and legitimate social 
purpose […] in an impartial and technocratic way using their impersonal rules.”230 And as Best notes, 
“The IMF is in many ways an archetypal bureaucratic international organization in Michael Barnett 
and Martha Finnemore’s terms: Its authority depends in considerable measure on its claims to neutral 
economic expertise.”231 These insights suggest that the means (expertise, impartial rules) and goals 
(global public goods) that animate IO activities are key to their legitimacy and authority. But so too 
are the outcomes they deliver. Scholars have shown that the effectiveness of IMF lending is crucial to 
the organization’s legitimacy and the career advancement prospects of individual staff members.232 
 
We would therefore expect IMF staff to prefer policies and programs that enhance the organization’s 
legitimacy and effectiveness and thus their own expert authority and career prospects. When it comes 
to the Fund’s lending framework, I argue that staff prefer well-defined lending rules that are rational, 
technical, and seemingly immune to political interference for three reasons. First, rules add legitimacy 
to IMF lending by conveying that key decisions which can trigger or avoid debt restructuring will be 
made according to objective criteria and expertise rather than powerful political interests. Second, 
such rules give staff more influence over lending, since technical rules require technical measurements 
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and assessments to determine their applicability, and the Fund’s staff are uniquely qualified to provide 
such measurements and assessments, such as the DSAs that determine whether or not a country’s 
debt is deemed sustainable. Third, insofar as lending large sums to countries that are insolvent often 
results in program failure, rules that insulate the Fund from political pressures to lend in such 
circumstances can also enhance the IMF’s effectiveness. For these reasons, we would expect staff to 
prefer relatively precise and objective lending rules that insulate decision-making from political 
pressures to avoid, postpone, or minimize debt restructurings.  
    
3. Power Within the SDRR 
Having laid out the preferences of the key players in the SDRR, we now turn to the question of power. 
What capabilities do these actors have to promote their preferred outcomes within different venues? 
As noted in Chapter 1, the venue in which reform efforts take place matters insofar as it can determine 
who has a seat at the table, who gets to set agendas and veto proposals, and whose cooperation is 
needed for a given initiative to succeed. The following discussion is thus organized around the 
institutional forums in which the reform initiatives analyzed in this dissertation played out. I focus on 
the dimensions of power that are most relevant to understanding the case studies featured in chapters 
4, 5, and 6. Not all are linked to specific venues. Some, for example, are broader forms of structural 
power that actually underscore how little decision-making forums matter to certain outcomes. In the 
end, it is the capacity of key capital-exporting states—especially the US—to influence outcomes within 
and across the various venues and reform initiatives that makes them particularly powerful in shaping 
the overall contours and trajectory of the SDRR.      
 
3.1 Power Within and Over the IMF 
Who has the power to shape IMF lending decisions and policies? This question has been the subject 
of extensive debate among IPE scholars. One prominent view is that the Fund’s member states—
especially the most powerful of them—determine the contours of lending, particularly when their vital 
economic and/or geopolitical interests are on the line.233 Another perspective points to the influential 
role of the Fund’s technocratic staff, whose authority and influence over lending decisions stem from 
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their expert ideas and ability to operate through informal channels of governance.234 A third view sees 
private transnational creditors as having influence over key aspects of IMF lending.235  
 
The question is not whether but when and how much these different actors matter. Some scholars suggest 
that IMF staff control a wide range of issues and activities because member states have little interest 
in governing these aspects of Fund life. As Stone observes, “In ordinary times, the United States and 
other shareholders have no compelling interest in intervening in the details of conditionality.”236 The 
implication is that powerful states assert themselves when they care about an issue. As highlighted 
above, the US and other powerful states have crucial interests in whether and when certain countries 
restructure their external debts, and we would therefore expect them to care a great deal about rules 
designed to trigger restructurings. We would also anticipate, for reasons outlined earlier, that sovereign 
debtors and private creditors would have strong views about the development of a trigger mechanism. 
Finally, there are good reasons to believe that IMF staff have much at stake in the Fund’s lending 
framework and its impact on how large-scale sovereign debt crises are resolved.  
 
If all actors want a say in shaping outcomes, whose preferences will prevail in the institutional context 
of the IMF? I argue that the major capital-exporting states—the US and the European powers—are 
best positioned to shape the IMF’s lending framework in line with their preferences.237 Based on the 
Fund’s organizational structure, these states have enormous control over organizational policies. IMF 
staff are also uniquely placed to shape the details and initial direction of policy reforms, since they 
write the technical papers that define problems and propose solutions. However, when dominant 
states reject these solutions and articulate alternative preferences, it forces staff to change course and 
adapt their proposals in ways that are acceptable to the Fund’s largest shareholders. Staff operate 
largely within the parameters set by powerful states.238 
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The capacity of these states to set the parameters of staff influence and approve or reject organizational 
policy changes stems directly from the Fund’s governance structure. Formally, power within the IMF 
rests with its 189 member states, each of which appoints a representative to the Board of Governors. 
Although it is the top decision-making body, this Board meets only twice a year to make decisions on 
issues such as quota increases, the admittance and expulsion of members, and amendments to the 
Articles of Agreement and By-Laws. Power over day-to-day operations is delegated to the 24-member 
Executive Board. Representation and voting shares on the EB have changed over time. The IMF 
reforms explored in Chapter 4 were put in place just before the most recent change in January 2016, 
which shifted some power to previously underrepresented countries like China. The figures presented 
below reflect the current configuration of the EB, which continues to favour the US and Europe. Of 
the 24 Executive Directors that sit on the EB, seven represent individual countries (the US, Japan, 
China, Germany, France, the UK, and Saudi Arabia each have their own director) and the remaining 
19 represent broader constituencies. The EB is de facto the Fund’s governing body, as it meets daily to 
decide on the organization’s main operations regarding program approval, lending and conditionality, 
surveillance, technical assistance, and policy frameworks such as the IMF’s lending rules.  
 
The EB often makes decisions by consensus, but when universal agreement cannot be reached, it 
votes. Here, the US remains in a dominant position to influence Fund policy, holding 16.52 percent 
of the total voting share. Germany, France, and the UK also have significant power, with a combined 
voting share of 13.38 percent. Japan and China each hold roughly 6 percent of the total vote. But the 
reforms examined in Chapter 4 took place before China was given considerable voting power, and, in 
any case, Chinese officials have remained relatively silent on sovereign debt debates within the Fund. 
Moreover, scholars suggest that the US, the three leading European powers, and Japan—a bloc some 
refer to as the G5—tend to cooperate on the EB when their interests do not clash.239 Because Japanese 
officials have been less concerned about debt restructuring and IMF lending rules than their American 
and European counterparts, they have generally let the latter take the lead on these issues. 
 
Since the most consequential decisions, such as those involving amendment of the Fund’s Articles of 
Agreement, require the approval of an 85 percent supermajority, the US is in a position to unilaterally 
veto any major proposal it does not like. Other crucial but less weighty decisions—including those 
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related to lending—require 50 percent approval. If the US, the major European powers, and Japan 
vote together, they hold roughly 35 percent (40 percent before 2016) of the total vote and need 
support from a mere 15 percent of the remaining votes to win such approval. If a lending decision 
goes to a vote, these states are often able to forge a 50 percent coalition by obtaining the support of 
the potential loan recipient and any others that would be negatively affected by an economic crisis in 
that country.240 Given the Fund’s formal decision-making structure, it is not surprising that many 
observers argue that the most powerful member states—particularly the US—determine IMF lending 
decisions.241 However, it is important to recognize that the power of dominant states over EB 
decisions typically does not need to be formally exercised through a vote. As Michael Breen explains, 
powerful states prefer “informal decision-making procedures, leading to the appearance of consensus. 
That the organization proceeds by consensus gives the other member-states an incentive to participate, 
as long as they do not form coalitions to block programs that are favourable to G5 interests.”242 Most 
EB decisions are thus made via consensus, yet one that is forged in the shadows of power.243     
  
To be sure, private creditors can also influence Fund lending decisions, as the success of its programs 
often hinges on how they are seen and acted upon by private international financiers.244 Because 
creditor behaviour is crucial to Fund effectiveness, the IMF carefully considers private-sector views 
when formulating policies such as its formal lending framework.245 But private power over the Fund’s 
policy frameworks is more indirect and circumscribed than that of dominant states. Debtor states 
arguably have even less influence over IMF policy frameworks. While they have formal representation 
within the EB, it is through larger constituencies that have little voting power. Debtor voices should 
not be completely overlooked though. As the main recipients of IMF loans, debtors are the ones that 
have to accept and take ‘ownership’ of Fund programs. If debtor states disagree with the parameters 
of IMF lending, they might turn away from the Fund, especially if alternative sources of emergency 
financing are available. Although many debtor governments may continue to see the Fund as the most 
viable or desirable option, the point is that their response to changes in the Fund’s lending framework 
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can matter. IMF staff are thus likely to take debtor concerns into account when formulating policy 
proposals, but at the margins. When debtor preferences over Fund policies clash with those of capital-
exporting states, the latter will prevail—as seen during the creation of the 2002 lending rules. 
 
This assessment of power suggests that when it comes to IMF lending practices and policies, we 
should pay most attention to the preferences of the US and the leading European states—particularly 
the former if the preferences of powerful states diverge. When the preferences of dominant states 
clash with those of debtors, creditors, or IMF staff, we should expect the former to prevail. However, 
coalitions with other actors could be expected to further strengthen the position of these states. When, 
for example, their preferences broadly align with those of IMF staff (e.g., 2002) or transnational private 
creditors and debtor governments (e.g., 2013-2016), it only reinforces the strength of their particular 
policy position and the likelihood that their collective preference will be realized. 
 
3.2 Power Within and Over the UN 
Because of the enormous institutional power of the US and the leading European states within the IMF, 
less privileged actors might choose to pursue preferences that diverge from those of dominant states 
within alternative venues where power disparities are less pronounced. This type of ‘forum shopping’ 
or ‘regime shifting’ strategy was indeed evident during the recent UN initiative. Before the initiative 
took off in 2014, the US had already insisted that a SDRM-style arrangement should not be pursued 
or even discussed within the IMF or the working group it organized to promote contract reform. In 
this context, developing-country debtors who were interested in exploring the idea of a more formal, 
hard-law restructuring regime decided to shift reform debates into the UN General Assembly, where 
the ‘one country, one vote’ organizational structure prevented capital-exporting states from vetoing 
their proposals. Debtor states from the global South could also benefit from the institutional support 
that debtor-friendly UN agencies such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) could provide within the UN context. 
 
Although capital-exporting states had no veto power or special institutional clout within the General 
Assembly, the US and UK were still able to effectively undermine the hard-law ambitions of the UN 
initiative via their structural power within the SDRR—the source and nature of which was described 
above. In the UN context, it allowed the US and UK to block the creation of a viable hard-law 
framework simply by refusing to participate in it. Due to the centrality of New York and London in 
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the international sovereign debt regime, any restructuring mechanism that did not apply to these two 
countries would fail to cover 96 percent of international sovereign bonds, making it a rather useless 
tool for governing these markets. Because the main problems that motivated the UN initiative—
namely those related to Argentina’s recent restructuring difficulties and prolonged legal battle within 
US courts—originated in US markets under US laws and courts, the importance of American actions 
to the success or failure of reform efforts was particularly apparent. In the end, American and British 
structural power within the debt regime nullified the effects of the institutional strategy aimed at 
moving reform debates away from US and European-dominated international forums. 
 
While the decision to pursue reform within the UN allowed debtors to set the agenda and later adopt 
a set of soft-law restructuring principles that were opposed by the US and other key capital exporters, 
their power to achieve meaningful change to the SDRR was clearly circumscribed by the structural 
capabilities of the US and UK. But the ambitions of debtor countries were also limited by their own 
contradictory preferences. Although they called for a multilateral sovereign bankruptcy regime, debtor 
states showed little willingness in the end to make the kind of commitments that such a regime would 
entail, owing mostly to the sovereignty-related concerns. While US and UK power was thus sufficient 
to prevent the emergence of a hard-law restructuring framework, it may not have been fully necessary. 
The potential power of private lenders within or over the UN is not considered in any depth because 
of their general lack of engagement with the recent UN initiative. Moreover, their preferences toward 
a hard-law restructuring regime point in the same direction as those of the US and UK, making their 
power superfluous even if it had been exercised in the UN context.  
 
3.3 Power Within and Over Bond Reform Initiatives 
The two bond reform initiatives examined in Chapter 6 took place within very different institutional 
settings. One played out within the institutional context of the European Union (EU) and Eurozone, 
while the other occurred within and around an informal public-private working group organized by 
US Treasury officials. In both cases, dominant states clearly enjoyed a high degree of agenda-setting 
power, with France and Germany spearheading the reform agenda in Europe and the US doing so for 
international sovereign bonds. But in neither case could these states achieve their policy objectives 
without the support of others. While disproportionately shaped by Germany and France, European 
bond reforms had to be agreed upon and ratified by every member of the Eurozone, a number of 
which were peripheral debtor states whose interests differed from their capital-exporting counterparts 
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in appreciable ways. Eurozone reformers were also sensitive to how their policy designs would be seen 
and responded to by international financial markets, suggesting that reform decisions were made in 
light of the perceived structural or disciplinary power of private investors. Meanwhile, the success of 
the US Treasury-led initiative depended on the active cooperation of EMDE debtors and private 
creditors, who had to accept and adopt the new bond contract terms for them to become the voluntary 
market standard US policymakers envisioned. Opposite the UN initiative, US power was necessary 
but not sufficient to bring about its regulatory preference. Since these reforms were purely voluntary, 
debtors and creditors had the ability to make or break contract change. 
 
The capacity of the US to steer successful contract reform processes might be thought about through 
the lens of what some have called compulsory power—though others have used the terms ‘relational 
power’ and ‘instrumental power’ to describe a similar concept. 246 The classic definition of compulsory 
power is the ability of A to get B to do what B would otherwise not do.247 States that exercise this 
form of power can do so through a variety of means, including the provision of material incentives or 
deployment of “normative resources.”248 Deirdre Kamlani argues that, in the history of sovereign debt 
restructurings, compulsory power has been utilized often by “creditor country governments”—the 
same actors I refer to as capital-exporting states.249 But while Kamlani points to instances in which 
great powers seized political or economic control over debtor countries, the focus here is on the power 
of the US to get private creditors and EMDE debtor governments to adopt regulatory changes in the 
SDRR that they otherwise would not. In the early 2000s, the US capacity to persuade hinged on the 
looming SDRM threat, which American officials did not formally quash until contract reforms had 
been rolled out. By contrast, debtors and creditors needed little persuasion to see the merits of recent 
contract reforms. While this indicates a more muted role for US power, it is difficult to imagine debtors 
and creditors pursuing contract reform in the absence of American leadership, suggesting that a non-
coercive form of compulsory power remains important in producing the outcomes we observe.  
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4. Engagements with Broader IPE and Global Governance Literatures 
Beyond the main contribution of better illuminating the politics of regulatory reform and variation in 
the SDRR, the arguments outlined above draw upon and contribute to broader IPE and global 
governance literatures. This section highlights these engagements.   
 
The discussion of power and preferences within the IMF draws on a rich IPE literature focused on 
this particular international organization, but it also sheds light on neglected aspects of the Fund’s role 
in global financial governance. Specifically, the role of Fund’s lending framework in triggering 
restructurings have received very little scholarly attention in general. The vast literature on IMF lending 
tends to focus on variation in the size or conditionality of IMF loans rather than the broader policy 
frameworks that govern lending decisions. Research on the global governance of sovereign debt 
restructuring is equally neglectful of IMF lending rules and fails to appreciate their role as an integral 
part of the SDRR. Most of the literature in this area is concerned with ex post mechanisms designed to 
facilitate the debt restructuring process rather than ex ante mechanisms designed to trigger restructurings 
in the first place. This study calls attention to the Fund’s central role in the SDRR, filling gaps in the 
respective literatures on IMF lending and sovereign debt governance and bringing these two related 
but separate strands of research into closer conversation. In doing so, it also reinforces a particular 
interpretation of IMF behaviour by showing how dominant states disproportionately shape the 
organization’s approach to debt restructuring.250 
 
The analysis of IMF lending reforms also speaks to broader scholarly discussions about international 
institutional design and development. It suggests that rational choice approaches offer useful insights 
into some areas of institutional life but remain unable to explain other fundamental features of 
institutional design and change. For example, rationalists have argued that states often prefer softer 
and/or less precise rules to deal with issues characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, such as those 
related to global financial crisis management. 251 In this sense, the preference for greater flexibility in 
the IMF’s lending rules can be understood within a rational design framework. But if flexibility was 
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rational for major capital-exporting states, why did they not retain a case-by-case approach or adopt a 
sufficiently flexible lending framework in the first place? And why did state preferences toward IMF 
lending rules change over time? While rationalist perspectives can help us understand part of the 
answer by focusing on changes in the material circumstances facing particular states, a fuller 
understanding of recent IMF reform outcomes requires an appreciation of the role of timing and 
sequencing in politics—specifically the way in which past institutional developments and experiences 
feed into subsequent rule-making preferences and processes.252 Moreover, rational institutionalist 
approaches to IPE—including the long-dominant neoliberal institutionalist perspective—often pay 
insufficient attention to the power-laden and sometimes perverse implications of the institutional 
arrangements produced by international cooperation.253 As the Greek crisis and previous episodes 
such as the 1980s debt crisis showed, attempts to avoid or delay necessary debt relief generate a range 
of dysfunctional outcomes and often produce distinct winners (dominant states and their financial 
institutions) and losers (debtor countries and their populations). Perspectives that call attention to the 
power and interests of dominant states are thus needed.254    
 
Moving from trigger to process mechanisms, the discussion of different legal-institutional designs and 
their political economy implications speaks to broader literature on legalization and institutional choice 
in global governance. For students of global governance, it may not be surprising that hard-law 
mechanisms have not emerged in the SDRR. One of the key impediments to a treaty-based SDRR is 
the sovereignty cost to which scholars of institutional design point.255 Because hard-law arrangements 
can infringe upon sovereign autonomy and authority in sensitive areas, the inter-state bargaining 
process to establish this sort of arrangement is likely to be hard-fought and time-consuming, leading 
scholars to argue that these high negotiation costs can also deter states from pursuing international 
treaties.256 Finally, analysts have noted that treaty-based agreements tend to be rigid and difficult to 
adapt, and that issue areas characterized by high levels of change and uncertainty, such as global 
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finance, call for more flexible arrangements.257 But this study highlights other important barriers that 
differ from the more generic factors these scholars identify. Most notably, an important objection to 
hard-law solutions among key capital-exporting states relates not to their sovereignty, negotiation, or 
flexibility costs but to their potential to erode certain transnational legal and market structures, which 
in turn uphold particular forms of power, privilege, and market governance. Among other things, 
these structures sustain the structural power of the US and UK in the SDRR—an important dimension 
of power that scholars have identified in other domains but not yet in sovereign debt politics.  
 
When scholars write about the pros and cons of international hard law, it is almost always in 
comparison to soft law, such that the weakness of harder forms of governance are seen as the strengths 
of softer forms. For example, authors point out that soft-law arrangements have lower sovereignty 
and negotiation costs and are more flexible than their hard-law counterparts, making them easier to 
agree upon and more desirable in certain policy domains or for certain regulatory purposes. It is 
certainly true that the UN Principles examined in Chapter 5 were able to emerge because of their soft-
law status and the fewer veto points for powerful oppositional actors to block soft-law agreements. 
But much of the existing literature suggests that hard-law and soft-law tools are selected from a 
broader governance toolkit based on the functional needs of a given problem or issue area, and that 
when soft law is selected, it is often because it provides a more effective option for dealing with the 
issue in question.258 In the UN case, hard law was not rejected and soft law was not chosen primarily 
for these functional reasons. Although the sovereignty concerns of debtor states could be interpreted 
more from this functionalist perspective, regulatory outcomes were shaped, first and foremost, by a 
political contest between two coalitions with divergent preferences and power capabilities. Moreover, 
the UN Principles were not adopted because of their anticipated functional superiority to the hard-
law alternative. As Chapter 5 suggests, there are few reasons to expect these non-binding principles, 
or any other purely soft-law arrangement, to be a very effective functional mechanism in the SDRR. 
 
Because of these limitations, the main regulatory alternative to a hard-law framework in the SDRR 
has not been soft law—as the literature would predict—but rather private-law contracts, the subject 
of Chapter 6. This dissertation thus challenges the dominant view that global governance tools exist 
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along a spectrum of international hard and soft law, and that soft law is the only feasible option for 
governing global finance.259 It highlights the political utility of an alternative—private-law contracts—
that does not fit into the hard law-soft law dichotomy. How does the analysis of contract reforms 
presented in this thesis fit within and contribute to broader theoretical debates about institutional 
design and development and the role of contracts in global governance? An important part of the 
contract reform story, particularly in the Treasury-led case, can be understood through the lens of 
what Alexander Cooley calls rational contractualist approaches.260 These approaches view contracts 
and other institutions as coordinating devices used by rational actors to solve collective action 
problems in ways that advance their mutual interests. CACs can be seen, from this perspective, as a 
functional solution to creditor coordination problems—particularly those that arise when free-riding 
holdouts are able to defect from and spoil cooperative solutions. They can also be viewed as a response 
to the ‘incomplete contracts’ that governed previous sovereign bond debt. Writing new clauses that 
better deal with future contingencies is, in a sense, an effort to make contracts more ‘complete.’ 
 
Seeing contracts as optimal solutions to collective action problems resonates with the official narrative 
promoted by contract reformers, and, as I show in Chapter 6, the fact that debtors and creditors saw 
Treasury-led reforms as Pareto-improving was key to their success. But these actors viewed contract 
change as a distributional issue in the early 2000s and only recently came to see it in more positive-
sum terms. The role of prior institutional developments is critical to understanding this shift in 
preferences and its impact of recent policy processes. Over time, the nature of a previously unknown 
contract mechanism was revealed in a way that rendered the further strengthening of that mechanism 
Pareto-improving for important actors in the reform process.  
 
There is therefore a role for functionalist explanations, when combined with historical institutionalist 
insights, in explaining certain aspects of recent contract reforms, particularly sovereign debtor and 
private creditor preferences in favour of strengthening a positive-sum collective action device. But 
these perspectives, which tend to see contracts as generic agreements, cannot explain why contract 
tools rather than other institutional designs, equally justified on functional grounds, emerged as the 
preferred approach to debt restructuring, especially among powerful capital-exporting states. To solve 
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this puzzle, contracts have to be understood as private-law tools in specific jurisdictions rather than 
generic coordination devices. After all, it is the legally-embedded character of contracts that make 
them a particularly useful mechanism for regulating the restructuring process. By showing that CACs 
are preferred not because their design characteristics are more functional but rather because they allow 
important actors to improve the restructuring process while maintaining certain structures of power 
and privilege, my argument resonates with certain critical theory approaches that treat private contracts 
as embodiments of power relations.261 However, I build on this literature by demonstrating that 
contracts can be useful not simply as instruments of private power and order, as the literature on 
contracts as power relations suggests, but also as tools of international public policy and public-private 
hybrid governance.  
 
My argument also resonates with and contributes to constructivist-oriented analyses that treat 
contracts as ‘legal fictions’ that spell out how contingencies will be dealt with and thus “enable 
transacting parties to act “as if” the ambiguity about what will happen in the (unknowable) future has 
been mapped out so that the deal can be completed.”262 These fictions are particularly useful in 
environments characterized by deep uncertainty, such as global finance, where they provide the 
foundations for relatively stable and routine global market transactions. The notion of legal fictions 
resonates with the view advanced in this thesis that clear and consistent property rights are valued in 
the debt regime for their ability to stabilize market expectations regarding cross-border bond 
investments. But scholars largely expect these fictions to persist because of their stabilizing nature. 
Chapter 6 shows that the ability of contract terms to serve as stabilizing fictions is not dependent on 
their unchanging persistence; changes in contract terms can also stabilize expectations when older 
clauses have themselves become sources of uncertainty. 
 
In addition to highlighting the importance of the trigger-process distinction and the legal-institutional 
design of process mechanisms in determining the prospects for success of different reform initiatives, 
this dissertation also argues that historical legacies and policy sequencing played an important role in 
shaping recent reform preferences and processes. This resonates with historical institutionalist 
perspectives, which emphasize the importance of prior institutional developments in shaping 
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subsequent preferences and political processes.263 The legacy of previous reform initiatives in the early 
2000s both diminished (in the UN case) and enhanced (in the contract cases) the prospects of 
mechanisms whose politically palatability and utility had been determined by their underlying legal-
institutional design. Similarly, in the IMF case I highlight the ways in which, given the underlying 
limitations of the mechanism in question, policy sequencing and feedback can lead to institutional 
weakening over time. Although the role of prior policy developments is not the primary explanatory 
factor in these cases, it provides additional analytical leverage not available to scholars who may have 
studied earlier reform efforts in the SDRR but have not examined the more recent initiatives detailed 
in this dissertation. 
 
Historical institutionalist insights can also help to make sense of US and UK preferences for regulatory 
arrangements that are compatible with the existing legal foundations of the sovereign debt regime. As 
Orfeo Fioretos points out, rational choice scholars think of institutional preferences as the product of 
‘end-point’ comparisons—that is, if reforms can improve upon the status quo, actors adjust their 
preferences in favour of reform.264 Since a SDRM-style arrangement could improve debt restructuring 
outcomes compared to current arrangements, we might expect actors to shift their preferences in 
favour of hard-law reform from a rational choice perspective. Historical institutionalists take a 
different approach. According to Fioretos, many such scholars see preferences as being informed by 
‘point-to-point’ comparisons, meaning that actors judge the costs and benefits of change in terms of 
the costs and benefits of retaining or losing their investments in past institutional arrangements.265 
From this perspective, we can see that US (and UK) policymakers judge hard-law institutional 
arrangements not in terms of how much they might improve the restructuring regime, but rather in 
terms of how they might jeopardize the domestically-rooted institutional arrangements that govern 
cross-border sovereign debt obligations.   
 
While drawing on this important tradition of institutional thought, I also suggest that the significance 
of historical institutionalist insights should not be overstated, nor should the direction of change 
promoted by historical forces be assumed—a tendency of IPE scholarship focused on the 
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incremental, rather than transformative, bolstering of global financial governance after 2008.266 In the 
cases that animate this project, historical factors play an important but decidedly supplementary role 
in explaining outcomes, which themselves display both incremental strengthening (contract reforms) 
and incremental weakening (IMF reforms) as a result of policy sequencing and feedback over time. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The power and preferences of the key players discussed in this chapter—especially the leading capital-
exporting states—provide the theoretical basis for understanding variation in recent reform outcomes 
in the SDRR. They help to explain the weakening of the IMF trigger mechanism, the failure of the 
UN initiative to produce meaningful change, and the successful strengthening of the debt restructuring 
process through bond contract reforms.  
 
The potential for foreign debt restructurings to generate financial instability in core capital-exporting 
states is the biggest political obstacle to institutionalizing an effective trigger mechanism. When such 
financial interests are at stake, these states will use their institutional power within the Fund to shape 
lending decisions in ways that discourage or delay debt restructurings, no matter how clear the trigger 
rules or the crisis country’s need for debt relief—as seen in 2010. But the 2010 episode did not simply 
indicate the weakness of the Fund’s trigger mechanism. For dominant states, it also underscored the 
benefits of a more discretionary rather than rules-based approach to debt restructuring and shifted 
their preferences in favour of looser and more flexible lending rules going forward. This paved the 
way for a further weakening of the trigger mechanism, watering down its content through reforms 
unveiled in 2016. The push for a more flexible and ambiguous framework was led by the US but also 
supported by private creditors, debtor states, and other key capital exporters. While the US likely had 
sufficient power obtain its preferences despite pushback from IMF staff, the strength of its policy 
position was only reinforced by this broader group of like-minded actors.   
 
Compared to the trigger, the debt restructuring process is subject to a different set of governance 
challenges but also a different and less constraining set of political considerations that make possible 
the establishment of more effective regulatory mechanisms to deal with these challenges. The stakes 
for powerful capital-exporting states are lower at the process stage, particularly when it comes to 
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concerns about financial stability. These concerns can be acute during the initial phase of a debt crisis 
when decisions are being made about whether a country should be given a bailout or first restructure 
its debt. But because powerful states can and do effectively postpone debt restructurings that threaten 
their financial interests, by the time the debt renegotiation process gets underway, even in these high-
stakes cases, steps have usually been taken to contain or mitigate the cross-border spillover effects of 
debt write-downs. There is therefore less risk that institutionalized rules and procedures at the process 
stage will jeopardize these key financial interests of capital-exporting states. Creating a smoother and 
more orderly debt restructuring process can also deliver joint efficiency gains to debtors and private 
creditors. And for debtors, the majority of their creditors, and key capital-exporting states, the costs 
of not doing something to improve the restructuring process have only grown in recent years because 
of the rise of increasingly disruptive holdout creditors.  
 
Muted financial stability concerns, the prospect of mutually-beneficial efficiency gains, and the 
collective interest in dealing with holdout creditors all combine to make the process stage of 
restructuring more amenable to effective governance mechanisms than the trigger stage. But this does 
not mean that any kind of institutional arrangement focused on this aspect of debt restructuring will 
provide a politically feasible or functionally effective governance solution. The preferences of the key 
actors toward different process mechanisms depends largely on their legal-institutional design features, 
which have different distributional and power implications.  
 
For the leading capital-exporting states—particularly the US and UK—hard-law mechanisms are 
politically unacceptable because they would override the existing legal foundations of the sovereign 
debt regime, thereby threatening the power and privileges that these states derive from the current 
order. By contrast, contract mechanisms such as CACs provide politically useful tools for navigating 
the trade-offs of regulating restructuring. By embedding the ability to restructure debt into the existing 
system of contractual rights and obligations, they allow capital-exporting states to create more robust 
restructuring processes without undermining the authority of their own laws and courts or creating 
significant legal uncertainty in the system of transnational investor rights. Moreover, the historical 
legacy of the original CACs has only made further contract reforms a more attractive and useful option 
for capital-exporting states, both in the context of the recent Eurozone and Treasury-led initiatives. 
These preferences are backed up by impressive power capabilities. The US and UK have the structural 
power to block the creation of a hard-law mechanism that could govern the international sovereign 
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bond markets anchored in New York and London, and the US has demonstrated its capacity to lead 
and promote successful contract reforms in those markets. In the Eurozone context, Germany and 
France have significant power to set reform agendas and influence outcomes.  
 
Sovereign debtors and private creditors also have significant misgivings about an international hard-
law approach to governing debt restructuring processes, further reinforcing the barriers to establishing 
this kind of regulatory arrangement. For creditors, a treaty-based mechanism would threaten their 
property rights and introduce greater uncertainty in sovereign debt markets. Debtors have expressed 
concern that such a mechanism lead to higher borrowing costs, but they also worry that it would 
curtail their sovereign policy autonomy in the event of a debt crisis. By contrast, both debtors and 
creditors have embraced the less intrusive contractual approach as a way of enhancing the efficiency 
of debt restructuring processes without decisively altering the distributional status quo for the majority 
of actors. Although both worried about contract reform when it was originally pressed upon them 
over a decade ago, their historical experience with CACs and the more recent reform context shifted 
their perceptions of and preferences toward contract mechanisms, paving the way for a significant 
strengthening of the restructuring process. Among other things, history and context taught debtors 
and creditors that contract change was a process-oriented reform with minimal distributional effects. 
 
The dissertation now turns to the IMF, UN, and contract reform cases, which substantiate the power 
and preferences discussed in this chapter and ground their theoretical implications for regulatory 
variation in the SDRR. 
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  CHAPTER 4 
 
IMF Reform 
The Limitations of a Trigger Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
 
1. Introduction  
The IMF plays a central role in the SDRR. As the gatekeeper of emergency financing for most 
countries experiencing balance of payments problems, the Fund’s lending decisions have a large, often 
determinative impact on whether and when a crisis-stricken country restructures its debt. If the IMF 
provides a financial bailout at the outset of a crisis, the recipient government will have the resources 
to continue making short-term payments to its creditors, which could resolve the crisis and forestall 
debt restructuring if the problem is a temporary liquidity shortage, or it could exacerbate the crisis and 
delay restructuring if the sovereign is effectively insolvent. But if the Fund believes a debtor state is 
insolvent and refuses to lend unless and until it has reduced its debt, that state will lack the resources 
to meet its financial obligations and will have little choice but to restructure its debt at an earlier 
stage—that is, if it wants to avoid the more disruptive option of an unmitigated default. It is for this 
reason that IMF staff members Ross Leckow and Julianne Ams note: “the IMF makes financing 
decisions that, in practice, act as the trigger for many debt restructurings.”267 
 
For most of its history, the IMF has made these decisions on a case-by-case basis, giving it substantial 
discretion in choosing how to respond to crises.268 But as discussed in Chapter 2, this approach came 
under scrutiny in the 1990s, as financial crises and international rescue loans grew larger and more 
frequent and the negative impacts of IMF bailouts became more visible. In this context, officials from 
G7 countries began to debate the need for explicit rules to constrain IMF lending and encourage early 
debt restructurings in more cases.269 These debates culminated in 2002 with the establishment of a 
rules-based framework designed to regulate the IMF’s use of large-scale, exceptional access (or EA) 
loans. The framework permitted the Fund to provide EA financing only when there was a high 
probability that the recipient country’s debt burden would remain sustainable.270 Otherwise, the 
                                                        
267 Leckow and Ams, ‘Sovereign debt restructuring in the IMF experience,’ p. 15.  
268 James M. Boughton, Skylar Brooks, and Domenico Lombardi, ‘IMF Lending Practices and Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring,’ CIGI Policy Brief No. 41 (June 2014).  
269 Roubini and Setser, Bailouts or Bail-Ins?  
270 IMF, ‘Access Policy in Capital Account Crises’, 2002, p. 13. 
 100 
organization would be prohibited from lending unless the country first underwent a restructuring that 
was substantial enough to restore its debt sustainability. While the Fund’s lending decisions had always 
had the potential to trigger restructurings, the 2002 framework sought to institutionalize this trigger 
function according to a pre-defined set of rules. 
 
The new lending rules faced their first real test in 2010 when the Fund was called upon to help save 
the ailing Greek economy. IMF staff could not declare that Greece’s debt would remain sustainable, 
implying the country would have to first restructure if it wanted the Fund’s financial support. But key 
European states—notably France and Germany—vehemently opposed debt restructuring, fearing it 
would generate financial instability in their own banking systems. The Fund succumbed to pressures 
to lend in the absence of a restructuring and created a loophole in its lending framework that 
sanctioned this move. Known as the ‘systemic exemption,’ this loophole permitted the Fund to waive 
its debt sustainability rule and lend large sums without a restructuring in cases where debt write-downs 
posed systemic spillover risks. This 2010 episode underscored the impotence of a trigger mechanism 
in the face of powerful political interests. Facing criticism over its decision, the Fund launched a 
reform process in 2013 aimed at re-establishing a more coherent and credible lending framework. In 
2016, it unveiled two changes: the first was to remove the systemic exemption, but the second gave 
the Fund considerable new flexibility in responding to cases where the sustainability of a country’s 
debt is unclear. Taken together, reforms to the IMF’s framework in 2010 and 2016 weakened both 
the credibility and content of the international rules designed to trigger necessary debt restructurings. 
 
What explains this outcome? Why did recent reforms weaken the trigger mechanism for sovereign 
debt restructuring? These questions have not yet been addressed by IPE scholars. As noted in Chapter 
3, the Fund’s lending framework and its role in triggering restructurings have received little scholarly 
attention. The vast literature on IMF lending tends to focus on variation in the size or conditionality 
of IMF loans rather than the broader policy frameworks that govern lending decisions. Research on 
the global governance of sovereign debt restructuring, for its part, also neglects IMF lending rules and 
fails to appreciate their role as an integral part of the SDRR. Most of the literature in this area is 
concerned with mechanisms designed to facilitate the debt restructuring process rather than those 
designed to trigger restructurings in the first place. By answering the questions posed above, this chapter 
helps fill these gaps in the respective literatures on IMF lending and sovereign debt governance, as 
well as bring these two related but separate strands of research into closer conversation.  
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This chapter argues that the 2010 and 2016 reforms reflect deeper political realities that make it 
extremely difficult to institutionalize an effective trigger mechanism for debt restructuring. The biggest 
obstacle stems from the power and preferences of the leading capital-exporting states—the US and 
the major European powers. While these states do not always and everywhere have a uniform set of 
preferences regarding a trigger mechanism, they do sometimes have a strong interest in avoiding, 
postponing, or minimizing sovereign debt restructurings in foreign countries because of the costly 
geopolitical, distributional, and financial stability implications of such events. In key cases, these states 
will want the Fund to lend without conditioning its support on a large upfront debt write-down. For 
reasons noted in Chapter 3, I focus on the interests and governance challenges that stem from the 
financial spillover risks of restructuring. For capital-exporting states, the nature of their position within 
the global financial order means that, at certain critical moments, decisions of whether and when a 
particular country restructures its debt can threaten to generate financial instability domestically. When 
such moments arise, these states will use their institutional power within the Fund to shape lending 
decisions in ways that discourage or delay debt restructuring, no matter how clear the restructuring 
rules or the crisis country’s need for debt relief. This is the key lesson of the IMF’s 2010 reform. States 
that had been strong proponents of the 2002 lending rules insisted on ignoring those rules once they 
became a constraint on protecting their national financial interests—a time-inconsistency problem 
that undermines the credibility of the Fund’s commitment not to lend.  
 
The 2010 clash between the IMF’s lending rules and the material interests of states that had previously 
advocated for those rules did not simply reflect time-inconsistent preferences that diverged from the 
rule-creation (2002) to the rule-implementation (2010) stage of the policy process; it also shifted state 
preferences in ways that came to inform subsequent IMF reform processes and outcomes. Specifically, 
I argue that experience with the IMF rules—including the 2010 decision to change those rules to avoid 
a Greek restructuring—in the context of unprecedented financial crises only reinforced the preference 
for a more flexible, case-by-case approach to lending among those who traditionally held that position 
(namely the US), and diminished enthusiasm for re-introducing strict lending rules among the 
European states that had previously promoted them. While some states and domestic factions within 
states remained stronger proponents of firm rules than others, the balance of forces had shifted in 
favour of greater flexibility and discretion when IMF lending rules came up for reconsideration in 
2013. Led by US officials but supported by a wider range of state and market actors, the pro-flexibility 
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camp managed to override key IMF staff proposals and promote a more open-ended approach that 
weakened the content of the trigger mechanism compared to its 2002 incarnation. The new rules 
unveiled in 2016 provide enough room to maneuver that powerful states will be able to influence IMF 
lending in ways that protect their financial interests without having to change or break the rules. 
 
In terms of how this chapter fits with the broader argument, it addresses the lone left-hand branch of 
the feasibility tree presented in chapters 1 and 3. Figure 2 highlights the reproduces this tree with the 
relevant box (“Trigger”) in bold.    
 














This chapter contributes to debates on sovereign debt governance by analyzing a neglected aspect of 
restructuring—the factors that encourage or discourage debt workouts in the first place—and 
highlighting the political limitations of efforts to establish an effective mechanism to trigger debt write-
downs. It also contributes to debates on IMF lending, shedding light on an overlooked element of 
Fund policy and reinforcing perspectives that see the power and preferences of dominant states as the 
driving forces behind crucial IMF financing decisions. Moreover, the chapter speaks to broader 
discussions about institutional design and development. It suggests that rational choice approaches 
are useful but incomplete, and that a fuller understanding of the reforms in question requires 















political processes. But unlike many of the historical institutionalist thinkers who stress the role of 
positive feedback in gradually strengthening institutional arrangements, I show how—given the 
underlying limitations of the mechanism in question—policy sequencing and feedback can also lead 
to institutional weakening over time. Empirically, these contributions are supported by extensive new 
archival and primary document evidence used to trace the IMF reform processes in significant detail.    
 
Chapter 3 provided a detailed analysis of preferences toward a trigger mechanism and power within 
and over the IMF. Building on this foundation, the remainder of the current chapter shows how the 
power and preferences of key actors played out and shaped the outcomes of the 2010 and 2013-2016 
reform episodes. Section 2 takes us inside the decision to amend the lending rules in 2010 to permit a 
Greek bailout, which I argue reflected the time-inconsistent preferences of capital-exporting states 
looking to protect national financial interests. After that, Section 3 documents the 2013-2016 reform 
process that resulted in a watering down of the Fund’s lending rules as a result of, first and foremost, 
shifts in state preferences compared to 2002. The final section offers conclusions and sums up the 
chapter’s research contributions. 
  
2. The Greek Crisis and the 2010 Amendment to the Fund’s Lending Framework 
For the first half decade of their existence, the IMF’s 2002 lending rules were relatively uncontroversial 
and uncontested. But those were calm years in the world of global finance, and so the EA framework 
was never really put to the test. The first major challenge to the IMF’s lending rules emerged with the 
onset of the Greek debt crisis. With the country headed toward a default in early 2010, the Fund was 
called upon to participate in an unprecedentedly large rescue program, and to do so through an 
unorthodox arrangement in which it would join the European Central Bank and the European 
Commission as a junior partner in a three-way creditor group referred to as the Troika.  
 
Initially, the Europeans had rejected the idea of IMF involvement in responding to the Greek crisis. 
But their position quickly changed, as the German government in particular came to insist on IMF 
participation and its European partners acquiesced.271 By the time the Europeans invited the Fund 
into their broader rescue operation, however, they had already decided that debt restructuring should 
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not be an option for Greece. Germany and France were strongly opposed to debt restructuring, which 
they worried could have massive, destabilizing spillover effects throughout Europe. The risk of 
systemic spillovers also had adverse distributional implications for these core states. French and 
German banks were highly exposed to Greek debt and would likely suffer large losses in the event of 
a restructuring.272 As Thompson confirms, “German banks were structurally hugely vulnerable to crisis 
once the financial boom ended because of their funding models and high leverage.”273 French banks 
were in a similar position, heavily exposed to Greek government bonds and highly vulnerable to even 
small losses due to their high leverage ratios.274 And these banks were not small players in European 
and global finance. A number were systemically important institutions whose collapse could trigger a 
full-blown financial and economic meltdown in their home countries and beyond.275 It was in this 
context that the major European powers—notably France and Germany—came to fear the 
implications of a Greek restructuring, particularly for their own financial systems. As then German 
finance minister Wolfgang Schauble put it in the lead up to the Greek rescue: “We cannot allow the 
bankruptcy of a euro member state like Greece to turn into a second Lehman Brothers.”276 
   
The European insistence on avoiding debt restructuring in Greece put the Fund in an awkward 
position. Staff had run various DSAs and were unable to state that Greek debt was sustainable with a 
high probability, which meant that, according to the 2002 rules, the IMF would be prohibited from 
lending to the country unless it also undertook a debt restructuring sufficiently large to restore 
sustainability. Fund management stood little chance of convincing their European shareholders that 
upfront restructuring was the correct approach. “The train had already left the station,” said one IMF 
staff member reflecting on Europe’s early commitment to avoid restructuring.277 The Fund was thus 
confronted with the choice of either refusing to lend to Greece and honouring the rules designed to 
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constrain it from piling more debt on top of already bankrupt countries, or breaking/changing those 
rules and going ahead with a bailout that did not include debt relief. With IMF management eager to 
get involved and demonstrate the organization’s relevance at a time when few countries were asking 
for its help, the Fund opted for the latter.278 At the end of the day, however, member states had the 
power to rewrite Fund rules and approve lending programs, which implied that IMF agency was 
severely circumscribed in a context where powerful state interests were at stake. 
  
While an internal debate had divided staff members over how to address the situation, the compromise 
that emerged from within the organization was to declare Greek debt sustainable but not with a high 
probability, and create an exemption in the 2002 rules that allowed the second criterion of the Fund’s 
lending framework to be waived in cases where debt restructuring posed “a high risk of international 
systemic spillovers.”279 The second criterion, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 3.2), stated that the 
IMF could provide large-scale loans only if there was a high probability that the recipient country’s debt 
would remain sustainable. If a rigorous and systematic DSA said otherwise, the country would have 
to restructure its debt first before it could receive the Fund’s financial support. Waiving this criterion 
thus allowed the Fund to accommodate the interests and dictates of two of its most powerful 
shareholders (France and Germany) by creating a convenient loophole in its lending rules. Contrary 
to virtually all significant changes to IMF legal and policy frameworks, this amendment to the Fund’s 
lending rules was not discussed as a stand-alone issue but rather wrapped-up with the decision to lend 
to Greece, such that approving the Greek program would also trigger the introduction of what came 
to be called the “systemic exemption” in the Fund’s EA framework. While IMF staff involved in 
designing the Greek program helped to engineer this loophole, they did so to justify a bailout program 
whose broad terms and conditions had already been decided by powerful European states determined 
to protect their national and regional financial interests.   
 
Going along with the European directive that debt restructuring was not to be contemplated, the staff 
paper outlining the proposed Greek program did not even discuss restructuring. Instead, it skirted the 
issue and invoked the idea of the systemic exemption. When the EB met on May 9, 2010, to decide 
on whether or not to approve the program, many Directors were both alarmed by the omission of 
debt restructuring in a case where debt sustainability appeared doubtful, and surprised by the hasty 
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attempt to change IMF rules to avoid a restructuring that to many seemed necessary. Several Directors 
openly doubted the sustainability of Greek debt and argued that restructuring would thus be an 
appropriate option or, at least, consideration.280 As the ED representing Switzerland and its 
constituency noted, “serious consideration should be given to debt restructuring as a means to achieve 
fiscal sustainability and make private creditors shoulder some of the adjustment burden.”281 Drawing 
on his own country’s experiences, the Argentinian ED added, “we know all too well what the real 
consequences are of making believe that solvency crises are liquidity crises.” 282 The risk, he noted, was 
that IMF lending would be “postponing, and maybe, worsening the inevitable.”283 Criticizing the 
distributional implications of the proposed bailout, the Brazilian Director stated bluntly: the program 
“may be seen not as a rescue of Greece, which will have to undergo a wrenching adjustment, but as a 
bailout of Greece’s private debt holders, mainly European financial institutions.”284  
 
European states, staff from the IMF’s European Department, and the Fund’s senior management all 
defended the program. Responding to the chorus of voices calling for greater consideration of debt 
restructuring, Poul Thomsen, deputy director of the European Department, underscored that Greek 
authorities were “firmly of the view that debt restructuring is not on the table”—as if the preferences 
of borrowing countries had ever determined Fund policy.285 A joint statement from the EDs of 
Germany, France, Sweden, Spain, and the Netherlands expressed their strong support for the Greek 
government and its commitment to implement the tough adjustment measures laid out in the program, 
adding that “the current situation makes hardship unavoidable and this program is the only alternative 
left to prevent a significantly worse scenario from happening.”286 Importantly, the US also supported 
a Greek bailout that avoided upfront debt restructuring. As a then Treasury official later put it: “We 
clearly took the view that had there been haircuts at the time there would have been tremendous 
contagion in global financial markets, and this is just as we were getting our heads above water from 
the crisis of Lehman Brothers.”287 British officials also supported the program, noting the potential 
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for contagion within but also, due to financial linkages, well beyond the Eurozone.288 The 
interconnectedness of global financial markets thus made the prospect of Greek restructuring a 
financial stability risk not only for the French and Germans but also, to a lesser degree, for the British 
and Americans as well.  
 
While European and US EDs declared their support for the Greek bailout, less enthusiastic Directors 
continued to question whether restructuring might be the right approach. Several argued that markets 
remained unconvinced that Greek debt was sustainable and therefore would not be surprised by the 
announcement of debt relief. But the avoidance of debt restructuring was not the only controversy of 
the May 2010 Board meeting. A number of Directors also took issue with the unorthodox and less 
than transparent process for changing the Fund’s EA lending rules. As Blustein put it: 
 
Normally, a policy change of this sort would be subject to careful deliberation, as it had been 
in 2003, perhaps over the course of several board meetings. Instead, it had been inserted into 
a jargon-filled passage of the staff report [on the Greek program], apparently without 
providing directors with advance briefing.289 
 
Most Board members did not even realize they were being asked to approve a permanent change in 
Fund lending policy until the Swiss ED raised a question about the issue. The US Director, among 
others, admitted that she had not been aware of this, and the Brazilian ED complained that the Board 
would not have even known it was changing the EA framework if the Swiss Director had not asked 
about it. “Should we not have had a separate decision altering the exceptional access criteria, instead 
of just a sentence on page 19 of the staff report, which would then be used as a precedent?” he asked. 
A number of other EDs agreed that it would be appropriate to make an exception to the rules for 
Greece but did not see the need to change the rules themselves, especially in such a hasty fashion. 
Sean Hagan, the Fund’s general counsel, explained that this was not possible. Because of the IMF’s 
“uniformity of treatment” principle, the general policies like the EA lending rules had to apply to all 
members equally. The rules were a formal constraint and the Board did not have the authority to make 
an ad hoc exception to them. As Hagan explained, the Board had two choices if it wanted to grant 
EA financing to Greece in the absence of a debt restructuring: it could either determine that the debt 
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sustainability criterion has been met, or it could change the rules to allow for the ‘systemic exemption’, 
which would then apply to all future cases.290  
 
Despite significant misgivings about the substantive and procedural aspects of the decision, in the end 
all EDs agreed to approve the Greek program and, by extension, the introduction of the systemic 
exemption as a new feature of the EA lending framework. With the US and most of Europe (including 
Greece) united in favour of the program, other EDs would not have been able to block approval even 
if they had wanted to. In this context, it is likely that even skeptical Directors went along and adhered 
to the EB’s social custom of voting by consensus. As noted in Section 3.1 of Chapter 3, consensus 
within the IMF Executive Board is often forged in the context of clear power relations. In the case at 
hand, those relations were defined by the interests and agenda-setting power of the Fund’s largest 
European shareholders, with the explicit backing of the US. Many EDs may have also felt conflicted 
between concerns about the need for debt restructuring and concerns about the potential effects of a 
French and German financial meltdown on the world economy. These dueling concerns were well 
captured by India’s Director who said: “There is concern that default/restructuring is inevitable” and 
“that trying to avoid default with the program simply increases the debt load and actually increases 
the probability of default. On the other hand, it is argued that Greece is the sovereign version of 
Lehman Brothers and, therefore, it is advisable to put off restructuring for some time.”291   
 
With the Board’s approval and the old rules out of the way, the IMF and its European partners initiated 
a €110 billion program for Greece, with the IMF’s contribution equalling €30 billion (more than 3,200 
percent of Greece’s quota)—the largest program in Fund history.292 The IMF’s bailout was 
enormously controversial not just because it broke the 2002 lending rules, and did so under pressure 
from European governments, but also because it produced disastrous outcomes. The initial program 
did little to alleviate the crisis. As many at the May 2010 IMF Board meeting had feared, it simply 
delayed restructuring and made debt relief less effective when it finally did occur. In March and April 
2012, Greece restructured roughly €200 billion worth of bonds in what amounted to the largest ever 
debt write-down in terms of volume and aggregate creditor losses.293  
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Conveniently for creditors with short-term claims (many of whom were French and German banks), 
the two-year delay between the 2010 program and the 2012 restructuring provided enough time for 
the IMF and its European partners to bailout Greek bondholders to the tune of $150 billion.294 But 
the replacing of private-sector claims with official-sector debt between 2010 and 2012 had left Greece 
in a situation where a growing portion of its debt could not be restructured for political reasons. The 
IMF enjoyed its super-senior ‘preferred creditor status’ and the European governments claimed their 
debts to be senior to private claims, refusing to accept write-downs on the bailout funds they had 
provided. This meant that the terms and timing of 2012 debt workout, which excluded Greece’s now 
substantial official-sector liabilities, did little to reduce the country’s overall debt level and improve its 
sustainability. In the end, the restructuring was, as the IMF later put it, “too little and too late.”295 
 
The 2010 Greek bailout was about, in the words of former Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl, 
“protecting the German banks, but especially the French banks, from debt write offs.”296 But while 
the banks clearly benefitted from the bailout, their governments were motivated by the need to protect 
a critical public interest: national financial stability. As noted in Chapter 1, capital-exporting states—
especially the finance officials responsible for safeguarding their country’s financial interests—are 
likely to see the health of their financial markets and firms as tightly linked to the strength and stability 
of the country as a whole. When financial crises—including foreign debt crises—loom large, a by-
product of protecting national public interests can be to also protect the private interests of banks and 
bondholders.297 But efforts to protect national interests in this way still generated highly-dysfunctional 
outcomes in the case at hand. In a candid evaluation of its 2010 bailout, the IMF admitted: 
 
An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece although it was not 
acceptable to the euro partners. A delayed debt restructuring also provided a window 
for private creditors to reduce their exposures and shift debt into official hands […] 
this shift occurred on a significant scale and limited the bail-in of creditors when PSI 
eventually took place, leaving taxpayers and the official sector on the hook.298  
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This quote describes the exact outcome the IMF’s 2002 framework was designed to avoid. While the 
framework was supposed to insulate lending decisions from political pressures in order to avoid such 
outcomes, when the vital economic interests of powerful European states were on the line, the rules 
were simply changed to accommodate their concerns. As Susan Schadler, former deputy director of 
the Fund’s European Department, concludes: “the criteria for exceptional access did not hold up 
under political pressure: the criteria were adjusted and weakened.”299 A report from the IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) concurred that IMF policy decisions were constrained by 
political pressures to avoid debt restructuring.300 Political interference to change the Fund’s lending 
rules might have looked more justified if the 2010 bailout had not simply saved German and French 
banks at the expense of Greek citizens, and if more had been done to substantiate the claim that an 
upfront restructuring would have resulted in calamitous contagion. However, as another IEO report 
points out, claims about systemic spillovers were not supported by rigorous analysis seeking to define 
and identify the potential sources of contagion, or even examine the counterfactual scenarios whereby 
contagion might stem from delaying restructuring rather than dealing with it up front.301 With the 
benefit of hindsight, some analysts believe that the contagion risks may have been overstated.302          
 
The 2010 decision to lend to Greece resulted in a significant weakening of the Fund’s lending rules 
and their ability to trigger necessary sovereign debt restructurings. Not only did the systemic 
exemption represent “a major softening of the lending framework.”303 By disregarding the 2002 rules 
when they became inconvenient for powerful states, the 2010 decision dealt a much bigger and more 
lasting blow to the credibility of IMF lending rules to constrain political discretion and thus serve as 
an effective and consistent trigger mechanism. As comments from scholars, market participants, and 
Fund staff themselves reveal, there is a general belief after the Greek episode that if the IMF’s lending 
rules—as technically sound and appropriate as they might be—ever again present an obstacle to the 
organization’s most powerful members, they can and will simply be changed.304  
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In sum, with the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis in 2010, European preferences articulated in the 
1990s and early 2000s for a rules-based framework to trigger restructurings ran up against the reality 
of what following that framework would mean for their material interests—the financial losses their 
banks would have to incur and the consequent potential for domestic and regional instability. In this 
new crisis context, European powers—namely France and Germany—set the parameters for Fund 
involvement and pressured for IMF lending to Greece without an upfront debt restructuring. This 
move was supported by US officials who also worried about instability in Europe. Unwilling to 
blatantly flout the rules, Fund staff proposed changing the lending framework to accommodate the 
Greek program, resulting in the systemic exemption reform.  
 
The 2010 episode revealed the enormous political difficulties of trying to uphold a credible trigger 
mechanism in light of the power and structural position of the leading capital-exporting states in the 
global financial order. Although their structural position did not automatically lead to a uniform set 
of preferences over the creation of an IMF trigger mechanism in 2002, it did eventually lead to a clash 
between the Fund’s lending rules and the material interests of states that had previously advocated for 
those rules. The fact that state preferences were different at the rule-creation (2002) and the rule-
implementation (2010) stage of the policy process largely reflected the time-inconsistency problem 
discussed in Chapter 3, which plagues the credibility of a rules-based trigger mechanism in the SDRR.   
 
Some will argue that the Eurozone crisis was unique and that such conditions are unlikely to arise 
again. But financial crises, aside from being “a hardy perennial,” are unpredictable, and unless global 
financial linkages dissipate or the financial sectors of dominant states become much more resilient to 
cross-border shocks, it is difficult to imagine that pressures from powerful states to avert or delay 
foreign debt restructurings will no longer arise.305 So long as IMF lending remains a convenient tool 
for averting or delaying debt workouts, capital-exporting states will continue to use their leverage 
within the organization to do just that. Moreover, the 2010 episode itself dealt a massive blow to the 
credibility of the Fund’s framework, suggesting that creditors and debtors will not take the trigger 
commitment seriously—if they ever did before—and it is therefore unlikely to have any impact on 
reducing moral hazard and preventing future crises. Lastly, the fallout from the 2010 decision led to a 
further re-evaluation and eventually a watering down of the Fund’s framework, making it easier to 
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sidestep restructuring in a wider range of cases without having to formally break or change the rules. 
It is this latter reform process and outcome to which the chapter now turns. 
 
3. Reforming the Lending Rules After Greece: 2013-2016 
In response to mounting concerns about its effectiveness and legitimacy, the Fund launched a formal 
review process aimed at strengthening its approach to sovereign debt restructuring. The reform 
process played out between April 2013 and January 2016, with proposals and discussions centering 
around a series of IMF staff papers. This section analyzes this process. It shows how, in the wake of 
the 2010 reform discussed above and the most intense years of the Eurozone crisis, the preferences 
of the leading capital-exporting states had, as a whole, shifted toward endorsing a more flexible and 
discretionary lending framework than was established in 2002. The US was the most vocal and also 
the most powerful proponent of greater flexibility, but key European states were also either strongly 
in favour of flexibility or less enthusiastic about firm rules than they had been in the 1990s and early 
2000s. For the US, the desire for a more flexible framework represented a return to the historical 
norm, but it was also bolstered by recent experience with extraordinary crises. The shift in preferences 
among European powers also reflected recent experiences. Among other things, the Eurozone and 
specifically Greek crisis forced France and Germany to come to terms with their structural position 
and exposure to foreign debt restructurings, impacting their policy views on subsequent reforms to 
Fund lending rules. Private creditors and sovereign debtors also lobbied in favour of a more flexible 
and case-by-case approach to debt restructuring. Although these actors lack the power to shape IMF 
lending rules against the wishes of dominant states, the fact that their preferences aligned with those 
of the US and other key states only reinforced the strength of their collective position. 
 
Not all actors involved in the reform process agreed that the Fund’s framework should be as flexible 
and discretionary as the US and others preferred. IMF staff wanted to establish a more credible and 
precise set of rules that, while being more nuanced than the 2002 framework, would still serve as a 
restructuring trigger when a country’s debt was not clearly sustainable. US Congress also managed to 
intervene in the reform process and force the IMF to remove the systemic exemption introduced in 
2010, which US and French officials in particular wanted to keep as a source of flexibility. But IMF 
staff could only do so much within the parameters set by their political masters, and the elimination 
of the systemic exemption simply led US representatives within the Fund to push for greater flexibility 
in other areas and aspects of the rules, offsetting Congress’s attempt to introduce more discipline to 
 113 
the EA framework. In the end, the power of the pro-flexibility camp—led by US officials—and the 
lack of a sufficiently strong counterweight led to the introduction of a new lending framework in 2016 
that weakened the content of the international rules designed to trigger sovereign debt restructurings.        
 
3.1 The 2013 Staff Paper and the Response 
The first staff paper to kick-off reform discussions was released in April 2013. It outlined the existing 
problems with sovereign debt restructurings and the Fund’s tools for addressing them, and established 
a reform agenda for resolving these problems. The first and most crucial shortcoming that staff 
identified was the fact that “debt restructurings have often been too little, too late, thus failing to re-
establish debt sustainability and market access in a durable way.”306 For staff, this concern called for a 
rethinking of the EA lending framework in light of the Greek experience, which highlighted the 
importance of again “exploring ways to prevent the use of Fund resources to simply bail out private 
creditors.”307 The paper reiterated the consensus view held in 2002: that debt sustainability should be 
a precondition for large-scale IMF lending in the absence of a debt restructuring, and that concerns 
about contagion, while important to the design of a Fund program, should not trump sustainability 
considerations and their role in triggering necessary restructurings. As staff noted, “when a member’s 
sovereign debt is unsustainable and there are concerns regarding the contagion effects of a 
restructuring, providing large-scale financing without debt relief would only postpone the need to 
address the debt problem.”308 For this reason, the paper encouraged the EB to consider removing the 
‘systemic exemption’ created in 2010. 
 
But the 2013 paper was also aware of the strong political pressures to avoid or delay restructurings, 
regardless of IMF rules designed to trigger them (pressures described in Chapter 3 and seen in the 
context of the Greek bailout discussed in the previous section). Describing the incentives that debtor 
governments, official creditors, and private creditors all have to put off a restructuring, staff wrote: 
 
Authorities [in debtor countries] are also concerned with a restructuring’s impact on 
market reaccess and spillover effects on the private sector. In addition, official creditors 
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have sometimes contributed to delays, out of concern that a restructuring would reduce 
incentives for the debtor country to adjust, force banks located in the official lenders’ 
countries to recognize losses, and trigger market turmoil in similarly-situated countries 
[…] Private creditors will also naturally wish to avoid a debt restructuring if at all possible, 
and will therefore press for a bailout by the official sector.309  
   
Removing the systemic exemption would restore the EA framework of 2002. Clearly, however, that 
version of the rules failed to withstand political pressures in 2010, and there was little reason to believe 
it would fare better when confronted with similar situations in the future. For reasons outlined in 
Section 2.3 of Chapter 3, Fund staff had an interest in re-establishing a tighter and more credible set 
of lending rules, but ones that could withstand a challenge of the sort thrown up by Greece. For them, 
there was thus a need to go beyond the 2002 framework by considering a wider range of policy 
responses to different debt sustainability scenarios. Staff continued to believe that clear-cut cases 
where debt was sustainable justified EA financing, while clear-cut cases where it was unsustainable 
required restructuring. But they began to consider whether there should be a third option for dealing 
with the more uncertain cases where debt was deemed sustainable but not with a high probability. The 
2013 paper suggested that this third option might take the form of a lighter restructuring involving 
debt rescheduling rather than debt reduction. A key excerpt from the paper reads:  
 
There may be a case for exploring additional ways to limit the risk that Fund resources 
will simply be used to bail out private creditors. For example, a presumption could be established 
that some form of creditor bail-in measure would be implemented as a condition for Fund lending in cases 
where, although no clear-cut determination has been made that the debt is unsustainable, the member has 
lost market access and prospects for regaining market access are uncertain. In such cases, the primary 
objective of creditor bail-in would be designed to ensure that creditors would not exit 
during the period while the Fund is providing financial assistance. This would also give 
more time for the Fund to determine whether the problem is one of liquidity or solvency. 
Accordingly, the measures would typically involve a rescheduling of debt, rather than the 
type of debt stock reduction that is normally required in circumstances where debt is 
judged to be unsustainable.310            
 
The staff’s suggestion of conditioning IMF financing on a debt rescheduling when the sustainability 
of a country’s debt is uncertain can be read as an attempt to re-establish clear and credible lending 
rules that would prevent private-creditor bailouts without necessarily requiring the type of substantial 
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restructurings that would be more likely to raise financial stability concerns among capital exporters. 
If such concerns could be muted, staff might succeed in restoring a rules-based trigger mechanism 
that was less likely to be broken or abandoned the next time fears of systemic contagion flared up. 
This, in turn, could help to rehabilitate the Fund’s image as an impartial, technocratic organization 
whose lending decisions are based on rules and expert analysis rather than the political interests of its 
most powerful members. In short, the staff’s ideas for reforming the lending framework can be viewed 
through the prism of their own interests in preserving the Fund’s legitimacy and expert authority.   
 
But when the Board met in May 2013 to discuss the first paper, representatives of the most powerful 
states were less supportive of the staff’s early ideas than they had been back in 2002. Indeed, the tone 
of the debate over rules versus discretion had seemingly swung back in favour of the latter, particularly 
for the US but also among major European powers. American representatives appreciated the 
flexibility provided by the systemic exemption and were unconvinced of the need to remove it. They 
were also extremely skeptical of the staff’s suggestion of conditioning IMF lending on even a relatively 
soft creditor bail-in, such as a rescheduling, in cases where the sustainability of a country’s debt was 
unclear. Voicing their concerns with the idea of “a presumption that financing should be conditioned 
on creditor bail-ins when market access is not certain,” US representatives stated: 
 
the paper’s recommendations would make sovereign debt reschedulings and 
restructurings a much more central feature of crisis management, including in cases where 
debt levels are not obviously unsustainable but prospects for returning to market access 
are uncertain. We would strongly caution against moving towards a more prescriptive and 
centralized crisis management regime based on a limited set of cases.311 
  
The contrast between this view and the one advocated by the US in the early 2000s could not have 
been starker. In 2002, the very purpose of creating a more formal EA framework was to create a more 
prescriptive, rules-based regime that would make debt restructurings a more central feature of crisis 
management. The comments from 2013 suggest that rules resulting in more restructurings, even 
relatively light forms of rescheduling, would be extremely undesirable and should not be pursued.  
 
The shift in US preferences relative to 2002 partly reflected an ideological chasm between recent 
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Republican and Democratic US Treasury teams. The Bush-era officials who helped establish the 2002 
EA framework were intellectually committed to rules-based approaches, whereas the Obama-era 
officials—many of whom had also served in the Clinton Administration—preferred discretion and 
case-by-case crisis management. But the shift also represented a return to the historical norm for the 
US.312 As a former senior IMF official put it: “As a general rule, the US tends to favour flexibility and 
case-by-case discretion, at least in this area.”313 The desire not to be bound by rules that specify in 
advance how certain crises should be resolved, including when debt restructuring should take place, 
makes sense given the centrality of the US in the global financial system. The extensive global activities 
and connections of American financial firms had exposed the country to situations in which foreign 
defaults and restructurings threatened to damage and destabilize US firms and markets, underpinning 
the preference for a case-by-case crisis management regime that could help to avoid or delay debt 
write-downs when vital American interests were at stake. But the recent US return to promoting a 
more discretionary approach to lending and debt restructuring was about more than just snapping 
back to normal. The preference for greater flexibility was, in fact, reinforced by recent experience and 
the crisis context in which US policymakers found themselves. With reform discussions taking place 
on the heels of extraordinary and unforeseen financial meltdowns in the US and Europe, and with 
massive uncertainty remaining about the prospect of financial shocks in the Eurozone, the broad view 
among Treasury decision-makers was that “you don’t tie your hands down in the middle of a crisis.”314    
 
Board members from powerful European states expressed similar, though somewhat less strong, 
reservations about the staff paper and the idea of a clear trigger mechanism for restructurings more 
generally. French officials came out strongly in favour of considerable flexibility and discretion in the 
Fund’s approach to debt restructuring. The French representative on the EB expressed skepticism 
that IMF debt sustainability assessments could be an appropriate trigger for restructuring, arguing that 
“the DSA tool cannot be considered as the only signal for any situation at any time, systematically 
triggering the final assessment for policy action.”315 He also noted that the French were inclined to 
keep the systemic exemption introduced in 2010, noting “the potential for damaging spillovers.”316  
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The Germans, who had been the most ardent supporters of firm restructuring rules in the early 2000s, 
took a somewhat mixed position on the subject, reflecting both their longstanding ideological 
concerns about moral hazard and their recent interests in postponing debt restructuring in Greece and 
avoiding it elsewhere in the Eurozone. In a sharp break from their conviction at the September 2002 
Board meeting that “Capital Account Crisis plus Uncertain Debt Sustainability requires Debt 
Restructuring,”317 German representatives took a more nuanced approach at the May 2013 meeting, 
noting that “the desirability of an early and large upfront debt restructuring is seldom a clear-cut 
decision and must factor in a number of delicate trade-offs,” including “consideration of country-
specific circumstances.”318 At the same time, however, German officials signaled their support for 
further exploration of creditor bail-in options as well as a review of the 2010 systemic exemption.  
 
UK officials were not outwardly opposed to the staff’s ideas but wondered whether changing the 
exceptional access criteria would matter if expectations of IMF bailouts were left unchanged. Here, 
they were referring to the fact that, after the Greek bailout shattered the 2002 lending rules, further 
changes to the EA framework would not be seen as a credible constraint on the Fund. In this vein, 
they added: “we look forward to hearing staff’s view, in due course, on ideas that could help provide 
credible commitments for the official sector not to err on the side of bailing out, rather than 
restructuring sovereign debt.”319 Japanese representatives, for their part, encouraged staff to continue 
thinking about these issues but cautioned that removing the systemic exemption could make it more 
difficult for the Fund to fight systemic crises. 
 
As a whole, the Europeans were less hostile to the staff’s suggestions and less adamant about the need 
for greater flexibility than the Americans. But, compared to 2002, they were no longer united around 
the need for hard lending constraints that could trigger restructurings when a country’s debt was not 
clearly sustainable. The French were closest to the Americans in their support for greater flexibility, 
the British were somewhat indifferent, and the Germans, while still stronger proponents of rules than 
their counterparts, were less enthusiastic about IMF lending reform than they had been in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. In a relatively short period of time, the direction and/or intensity of European 
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preferences had shifted in a significant way. 
 
The change in European preferences largely reflected the recent experience of the Eurozone crisis in 
general, and the controversial decision to break with existing IMF rules to facilitate the Greek bailout 
in 2010 in particular. For France and Germany, the crisis exposed their vulnerability and fragility to 
events previously considered a material concern only for emerging markets and, occasionally, the US. 
It made their own national interests in avoiding/delaying foreign restructurings impossible to ignore, 
leading them to contradict previous policy positions and push for a bailout of Greece and its private 
creditors. For the French, this difficult episode showed that “it is and will generally prove difficult to 
establish in a clear-cut way the necessity of debt restructuring and its “optimal” timing” before the 
fact, thus underscoring the need for case-by-case assessments to make such tricky judgments.320 
German preferences did not change direction in this way, but they seemed to soften as a result of the 
crisis and the reconciling of long-held ideological commitments with recent existential experiences.  
 
Moreover, neither Germany nor France wanted to re-live the experience of pressuring the IMF to 
break its lending rules—rules they had previously endorsed—in order to approve a controversial 
program that benefitted their financial interests at the expense of the debtor country. One way to 
avoid ending up in a similar situation again would be to strengthen the crisis prevention regime. 
Another, however, would be to avoid setting up rigid crisis management rules that might need be 
broken the next time an unpredictable ‘tail risk’ materializes. To some extent, diminished support for 
strong and precise lending rules may have also reflected this desire—among France and Germany but 
also other capital-exporting states that learned from the Greek episode—to avoid having to break or 
amend the rules in the future. 
 
The political difficulties of sustaining strict lending rules—crystalized by the Greek episode—also 
affected the strength of British preferences. British officials saw the 2010 systemic exemption, rightly 
so, as a massive blow to the credibility of the commitment not to lend under certain conditions. They 
wondered, after 2010, if re-establishing firm restructuring rules would really matter if such rules could 
simply be rewritten when they became inconvenient. Somewhat disillusioned, the British went from 
being strong proponents of a trigger mechanism in the 1990s and early 2000s to being less willing to 
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champion this cause in 2013. While the effects of recent events varied across states, the aggregate 
impact of the European crisis and the 2010 episode was to diminish the previously strong European 
support for hard lending constraints to limit IMF bailouts and trigger more debt restructurings.       
 
With powerful states—especially the US but also the Europeans—either strongly against or less 
committed to a robust trigger mechanism, the balance of power had swung in favour of more flexible 
rules open to wider interpretation and application. This preference for looser rules was then reinforced 
by the transnational private creditor community, who also voiced strong concerns with staff’s ideas 
regarding the Fund’s framework and its role in encouraging debt restructurings. This was in contrast 
to the early 2000s, when private creditor groups lobbied against the SDRM (and CACs at first) but 
were relatively silent on the issue of IMF reform (likely owing to the fuzziness of the trigger-process 
distinction at that time and the fact that the SDRM and CACs were much higher-profile initiatives 
than the Fund’s behind-the-scenes reform to its own internal rules).  
 
In response to the staff’s 2013 paper, the IIF released a document in January 2014 outlining the views 
of its “Special Committee on Financial Crisis Prevention and Resolution”—a group comprising high-
level representatives from leading global banks, investment funds, and corporate law firms. Their 
reaction to the paper was hostile. Echoing the US ED, they took particular issue with the idea of any 
“presumption” of a creditor bail-in. In their words:  
 
we are concerned that adoption of the “presumption” of creditor involvement at the 
outset of new IMF programs would signal a new, more demanding and rigid policy rule. 
Such a perception, would present the Fund as henceforth more likely to ask for debt 
restructuring (maturity extensions), or not to be sufficiently objective in coming to 
judgments about the outlook for debt sustainability, erring on the side of asking for 
private sector involvement.321  
 
Such staunch opposition seemed to suggest that this kind of presumption did not already exist, when 
in fact it did and was the central premise of the 2002 framework, which established a much more 
“rigid policy rule” than the more nuanced approach staff were now suggesting. Moreover, the 2002 
rules had not resulted in larger losses for creditors. As Gelpern noted, “[t]here is no evidence that the 
2002 policy made large programs any more exceptional, nor that it made debt restructuring more 
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common.”322 When the rules met their first major challenge, they were changed to enable a bailout 
that allowed multinational creditor banks to avoid losses and quietly exit from the crisis. Yet the IIF 
committee’s feedback suggested that the IMF’s proposal, which in many cases would presume less or 
lighter restructuring than the 2002 framework, would be disastrous:   
 
The private creditor and investor community is concerned about the potential adverse 
implications if the IMF staff suggestions were to be adopted. Acceptance of these 
suggestions could seriously jeopardize the current contractual, market-based approach. 
Such an outcome would undermine creditor property rights and lead to a confrontational 
rather than a cooperative approach to addressing legitimate concerns about debt 
sustainability, with far-reaching adverse consequences for all stakeholders, thus potentially 
posing systemic risks.323  
 
Despite its hyperbolic language about the dire consequences of the 2013 paper’s proposed rule 
changes, the IIF committee simultaneously suggested that new IMF rules would not matter, arguing 
that “[f]irm rules would also not be credible, as the IMF Executive Board would retain the right to 
modify IMF policies if it deems it necessary.”324 In a final move to convince IMF staff to drop the 
idea of a rules-based trigger for debt restructuring, the committee made clear that its preferences were 
fully aligned with those of the US and other large shareholders, stating: “Major IMF shareholders have 
frequently expressed strong preference for a pragmatic case-by-case approach with adequate flexibility 
to accommodate the diversity of country circumstances. We share fully this preference.”325  
 
Private creditor preferences toward IMF lending rules reflected their opposition to any policy that 
might make debt restructuring more likely and/or diminish their capacity to influence restructuring 
decisions, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.1). Assessing the influence of creditor views on IMF 
deliberations is somewhat difficult, especially because their preferences were aligned with those of the 
US. Some might wonder whether US views on this issue were themselves a product of IIF lobbying. 
But as discussed above, the US stance reflected longstanding and recently reinforced preferences for 
case-by-case crisis management, related to America’s structural position in global finance and its 
national interests in safeguarding financial stability. When asked about the influence of the IIF on US 
preferences, a former Treasury official responded: “Nothing we did had anything to do with the 
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IIF.”326 Although the IIF’s strong views on IMF staff’s reform ideas had little impact on US thinking, 
there are good reasons to believe that they further strengthened the pro-flexibility message that was 
already being sent to Fund staff. As a former senior IMF employee remarked: “clearly, we listen to 
the private sector and consult with the private sector, and it’s important because what we don’t want 
to do is have a [lending] framework which ends up, you know, scaring the markets.”327 Judging by the 
IIF’s reaction, market representatives had been sufficiently scared by the Fund’s early reform ideas. 
 
A number of debtor states also took issue with staff’s ideas. Responding to the idea of a presumed 
creditor bail-in, representatives of the constituency that spoke for Spain, Mexico, and several other 
debtors warned, “[c]areful attention should be paid to possible consequences of this measure, such as 
a substantial increase in debt restructurings and an intensification of the stigma associated to Fund’s 
programs.”328 Their concern as debtors was that if they ever had to borrow from the Fund, they might 
be forced into a debt restructuring. The timing of reform discussions also raised sensitivities for 
Europe’s Southern debtors who remained at risk of debt distress. According to a then senior IMF 
official, Southern European officials felt “that they were still vulnerable, and they were worried that 
the removal of systemic exemption could signal that their debt is going to be restructured.”329 Like the 
IIF’s views, debtor preferences to avoid a strict restructuring rule and preserve the flexibility inherent 
in the systemic exemption reflected the considerations outlined in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 3, and they 
only reinforced the chorus of powerful voices already calling for a more case-by-case approach.    
 
Despite reservations about the desirability and effectiveness of stronger IMF lending rules, private 
creditors and the EDs from capital-exporting and debtor states alike strongly endorsed further efforts 
to improve the contractual approach to debt restructuring via strengthened CACs. Thus, unlike the 
early 2000s when many viewed lending rules and an improved restructuring process as inseparably 
linked, many now saw the restructuring trigger and process as very separable.330 Rejecting the idea of 
an institutionalized trigger but embracing the need for a more robust process, the US ED remarked: 
“We continue to see merit in a case-by-case approach, allowing for appropriate flexibility, and have 
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concerns with some of the staff’s suggestions. Separately, the paper raises important issues about 
refining the contractual approach to orderly sovereign debt restructuring, and we strongly support the 
staff’s proposals for further work on aggregation clauses.”331 Echoing this sentiment, the IIF sought 
to further divorce the process from the trigger by stating: “we believe that the nature and extent of 
private sector involvement can best be considered in the context of a cooperative process under the 
contractual approach rather than be triggered through either unilateral or prescribed procedures.”332 
 
3.2 The 2014 Staff Paper and the Response 
IMF staff did not abandon their efforts to strengthen the EA framework, but the reaction of the US, 
other shareholders, and the private financial community to the 2013 paper had a clear impact on the 
subsequent development of staff proposals. In June 2014, staff released a second paper that revised 
and elaborated upon their earlier proposals. Responding to US and IIF criticism, the paper walked 
back the language used in 2013, noting that “[t]here should be no “presumption” that any Fund 
assistance will be made conditional on any form of debt restructuring.”333 Staff maintained, however, 
that situations in which a country’s debt is neither sustainable nor unsustainable with high 
probability—that is, cases of genuine uncertainty—should be treated differently from the binary 
solutions currently available: large-scale financing or deep debt restructuring. For cases in this unclear 
‘gray zone,’ the paper recommends making Fund financing conditional upon a ‘debt reprofiling’—a 
relatively short extension of maturities without any reduction in principal or coupon payments. This 
option would minimize the risk that large and costly debt reductions were imposed in cases where, in 
the end, they may not have been necessary, but it would also reduce the risk that large-scale financing 
was provided in cases where debt relief was in fact needed, leading to costly delays in debt restructuring 
and unjustified bailouts of private creditors. Debt reprofiling was a compromise designed to lower the 
prospects of arriving at either one of two bad outcomes.  
 
But debt reprofiling was simply another term for debt rescheduling, which is a form of restructuring. 
And in advocating for reprofiling in gray zone cases, staff continued to push for an approach that 
would make Fund financing conditional on some form of restructuring when debt sustainability was 
anything other than highly probable, even as they tried to combat the criticism levelled by shareholders 
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and the private sector. In what amounted to a semantic maneuver to distance staff’s preferred option 
from the word “presumption,” the 2014 paper argued: 
 
there would be no “presumption” that a member who approaches the Fund for a program 
after having lost market access would need to undertake any form of debt restructuring, 
including a reprofiling. Rather, even when a member has lost market access, the Fund 
would be able to rely on its traditional catalytic approach if it can make the determination 
that there is a high probability that debt is sustainable and that, accordingly, the loss of 
market access is very likely to be temporary. Only if the Fund cannot make this 
determination would some form of debt restructuring be expected, the nature of which 
would depend on the circumstances.334 
 
Staff went on to argue that it would be appropriate to require two criteria to be met before the IMF 
determined that reprofiling would be a condition of exceptional access financing: (1) the member must 
have already lost market access, and (2) a rigorous DSA suggests that there is considerable uncertainty 
regarding the sustainability of the member’s debt situation. In addition to advocating debt reprofiling 
as a third option for the EA framework, the 2014 paper also argued for an elimination of the systemic 
exemption, which staff continued to see as an arbitrary loophole that could be invoked to avoid or 
delay necessary restructurings regardless of sustainability considerations. In adding reprofiling and 
removing the exemption, staff’s proposal was designed to make IMF lending rules more coherent than 
the 2010 framework but more resilient than the 2002 version, allowing them to bend and flex without 
breaking under pressure. Reprofiling would not trigger steep creditor losses and would therefore be 
less likely to have major systemic spillover effects, making it an easier pill to swallow for powerful 
political and financial actors.  
 
Despite staff’s best efforts to convince them, important EDs remained skeptical of the merits of 
making EA financing conditional on reprofiling in gray zone cases. After the EB met in June 2014 to 
discuss staff’s newest paper, the acting Chairman of the meeting noted: “A few Directors, noting the 
operational difficulty in judging if both conditions for reprofiling have been met and the risk that the 
reprofiling option could trigger market volatility, preferred to maintain the current framework, which 
they considered more pragmatic and flexible.”335 The summary statements also revealed that while 
some Board members supported eliminating the systemic exemption, others—including the US—
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preferred to retain it as a flexible and “pragmatic way to safeguard financial stability in an increasingly 
integrated world.”336 
 
This back and forth between the Fund’s staff and its most powerful states between 2013 and 2014 
represented a struggle between competing interests and conceptions of appropriate governance. As 
noted in Chapter 3, staff had an interest in restoring coherent rules that would still be capable of 
triggering restructurings according to objective criteria. Such rules, if credible and seemingly free from 
political interference, would help to enhance the legitimacy and authority of the Fund as a technocratic 
body driven by impartial expertise. At the same time, well-constructed rules could improve program 
outcomes by constraining the IMF from bailing out private creditors, from contributing to moral 
hazard, and from delaying necessary restructurings. More successful programs would also translate 
into greater legitimacy, authority, and prestige for the IMF and its staff. Lastly, precise technical rules 
whose application relied on expert rather than broad political judgments would also shift some 
decision-making power over debt restructuring away from states and into the hands of Fund staff.  
 
Although the IMF’s largest shareholders also have a stake in the organization’s legitimacy, they value 
the political discretion to shape IMF crisis responses in ways that avoid or delay debt write-downs 
when doing so protects their core interests, for reasons detailed in Chapter 3. Even states that have 
professed their desire for stricter rules have revealed the time inconsistency of their preferences when 
their financial stability was at stake. In the aftermath of the 2010 Greek crisis, dominant states have 
seen it as even less desirable to paint themselves into a corner from which they might again choose to 
step out. Given the power of the EB to approve or reject staff’s proposals, the Fund’s largest 
shareholders, particularly the US, clearly had the upper hand in this struggle over the shape of reforms.  
  
3.3 The 2015 Staff Paper and the Intervention of US Congress 
The next step for staff was to take the Board’s feedback on the first two papers and translate it into 
concrete proposals that could command the support of shareholders, especially the US, which had 
outlined and maintained its opposition to staff’s earlier ideas. In April 2015, staff released a third paper 
with updated proposals.337 Its proposed reforms watered-down their preferred approach of making 
Fund support conditional on debt reprofiling in gray zone cases. While the paper presented debt 
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reprofiling as an attractive option in such cases, it also allowed for other responses that did not involve 
debt restructuring at all. The key proposed passage on uncertain cases in the 2015 paper reads: 
 
Where a member’s debt is considered sustainable but not with a high probability, 
exceptional access would be justified if financing provided from sources other than the 
Fund, although it may not restore sustainability with high probability, improves debt 
sustainability and sufficiently enhances safeguards for Fund resources. For purposes of 
this criterion, financing provided from sources other than the Fund may include, inter 
alia, financing obtained through any intended restructuring.338 
 
Under this approach, debt reprofiling would become just one potential option, rather than a necessary 
condition, for dealing with cases where debt was not clearly sustainable. As staff reiterate throughout 
the paper, “it is possible [under the new approach] that external financing in uncertain cases will not 
always involve a debt restructuring.”339 The other main option would be to provide an indebted 
country with financing from sources other than the Fund—mainly bilateral creditors—on terms that 
were concessional enough to improve the country’s debt sustainability. The problem with this 
approach, as staff had noted back in their 2014 paper, was that “while it addresses the problem of 
sustainability, the use of official sector financing to bail out the private sector will exacerbate the moral 
hazard problem that the possible reform considered in this paper is trying to address.”340 The revised 
framework would thus fail to mitigate the tendency to bail out creditors and delay debt restructurings, 
leaving unaddressed the ‘too little, too late’ problem that motivated staff proposals in the first place. 
 
As for the systemic exemption, the 2015 paper proposed removing it from the EA framework. In fact, 
staff made clear that, from their perspective, “the proposals to (i) increase the flexibility of the general 
framework, and (ii) remove the systemic exemption should be seen as a ‘package.’”341 To support this 
recommendation, staff drew on their consultations with market participants, emphasizing that several 
market actors supported this aspect of their proposal. While staff listed several reasons for this, their 
comments also suggested—somewhat problematically—that markets did not view removal of the 
exemption as a credible commitment in any case. Reflecting on their market outreach, staff noted: 
some market participants “observed that, even if the systemic exemption is removed, the Executive 
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Board can, by a majority of votes, re-introduce the escape clause, if it deems it necessary.”342      
 
But the more important source of support for removing the exemption came from the US Congress. 
While officials in the Obama Administration remained reluctant to remove the exemption, voices 
within the then Republican majority Congress began to insist on its elimination.343 Congress also had 
a key source of leverage over the US Treasury and its representatives at the IMF. For years, it had 
refused to ratify the ‘governance reforms’ to increase and redistribute IMF quotas and voting shares, 
which had been agreed at the G20’s Seoul Summit in 2010. In 2015, Congress began to signal that it 
would finally approve these reforms, but only if the Fund eliminated the systemic exemption. The 
importance of removing the exemption was given intellectual support by John Taylor, the former 
Treasury undersecretary for international affairs and one of the leading US proponents of the EA 
framework back in 2002. Taylor saw the 2002 rules as responsible for much of the global financial 
stability of the 2000s, and blamed the depth and length of the Greek crisis on the Fund’s decision to 
break those rules in 2010. As he wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed on July 9, 2015: 
 
Though the IMF’s loan to Greece in 2010 was presumably made under political pressure 
from the banks and other private holders of Greek debt, the purported reason was a high 
risk of international spillover. But systemic risk is often in the eye of the beholder. If that 
standard holds, IMF loan decisions will continue to be largely discretionary. More bailouts 
and instability remain likely.344 
 
In Taylor’s view, restoring the integrity and effectiveness of the IMF’s lending framework required 
removing the systemic exemption. Invited to testify on this issue before the US House of 
Representatives’ Subcommittee on Monetary Policy and Trade, Taylor expounded on the merits of 
the 2002 framework, arguing that “[w]ithout such a framework decisions become highly uncertain—
influenced more by politics than economics—and create perverse incentives, including moral hazard 
[…] For institutions like the IMF that can lend exceptionally large amounts supported by taxpayer 
funds, such a framework is essential for transparency, accountability, and preventing public bailouts 
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of the private sector.”345 He then argued that Congress should pass legislation approving the Fund’s 
governance reforms in exchange for an elimination of the systemic exemption.346 
 
When Congress began to signal that they would force the removal of the exemption in this way, US 
representatives within the Fund started to push for even greater flexibility in other areas of the Fund’s 
framework—principally for more options for addressing gray zone cases—in order to offset the 
diminished discretion brought about by the loss of the systemic exemption. While Congress had thus 
gained leverage over the process and was one of the few voices still pushing for stricter lending limits, 
Treasury officials had a more direct line into the Fund and were able to use this privileged position to 
ensure that, despite the elimination of the systemic exemption, the final policy framework would be 
sufficiently flexible to satisfy their preferences. A Treasury official at the time described in the 
following way the US Treasury’s view on accepting the removal of the systemic exemption in exchange 
for US Congressional approval of the IMF quota reform:  
 
For us, getting the quota legislation was far more important than our position on the 
sovereign debt lending framework. Further, in the course of the discussions, the Fund 
staff had worked to make their sovereign debt lending framework proposal more 
flexible, and the international community has always been willing to break rules when 
needed in times of exigency.347 
 
In other words, removing the systemic exemption was a price worth paying for IMF quota reform, 
especially because other aspects of the Fund’s lending framework (those related to the treatment of 
gray zone cases) were being adjusted to allow for a more flexible approach to lending and debt 
restructuring decisions, and because the new rules could also always be broken if need be. 
 
3.4 The Final Framework and Its Diminished Capacity to Trigger Debt Restructurings 
On January 20, 2016, the EB approved the final reforms to the IMF’s EA framework. These reforms 
comprised two important changes. First, the systemic exemption was repealed, as US Congress—
heeding Taylor’s advice—passed legislation making this change conditional upon their approval of the 
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Fund’s governance reforms.348 Second, more flexibility was introduced for dealing with ‘gray zone’ 
cases. The new framework outlined three possible approaches each linked to a different assessment 
of debt sustainability. When the Fund was confident that debt was sustainable with a high probability, 
it would continue to rely on catalytic financing. When debt was clearly unsustainable, EA financing 
would continue to be conditional on a debt restructuring sufficiently deep to restore sustainability with 
a high probability. However, when debt was assessed to be sustainable but not with a high probability, 
the new framework would provide a more flexible range of options for dealing with the situation. 
Debt reprofiling would be one option, but the Fund could also grant financing without requiring debt 
restructuring of any kind, as long as the member receives financing from other creditors (official or 
private), and this financing helps to improve its debt sustainability prospects—without necessarily 
restoring debt sustainability with a high probability—and sufficiently safeguards IMF resources. Figure 
4 depicts the key differences between the Fund’s 2002, 2010, and 2016 EA frameworks. 
 
Figure 4: The Fund’s Exceptional Access Lending Frameworks349 
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While the Fund boasts that the new policy “gives the IMF appropriate flexibility to make its financing 
conditional on a broader range of debt operations, including the less disruptive option of a “debt 
reprofiling,” it also makes abundantly clear that “[t]he new policy does not automatically presume that 
a reprofiling or any other particular option would be implemented at the outset when debt is in the 
gray zone,”350 and that “the reformed framework creates the flexibility for the Fund to approve 
exceptional access to Fund resources without such a restructuring.”351 In gray zone cases where the 
reprofiling option is rejected, the new framework makes Fund financing conditional on the provision 
of funds from other creditors. In such situations, it is thus likely that IMF lending will simply be 
supplemented by contributions from other official-sector creditors—individual governments but also, 
increasingly, regional financial arrangements such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—with 
the greatest stake in avoiding or delaying sovereign debt restructuring. This does little to encourage 
early restructurings, prevent the bailout of private interests, or discourage moral hazard—the core 
goals the EA lending framework was designed to achieve.    
 
In the end, the EA framework reforms fell short of staff’s hopes for a credible and consistent 
framework that could serve as a trigger for necessary restructurings and thus address the incentives 
and expectations that lead to costly delays in debt restructuring, unjustified bailouts of private 
creditors, and moral hazard. The new rules provide an enormous amount of flexibility and discretion 
in deciding how to respond to uncertain, gray zone cases, which are arguably the majority of cases. 
Greece was about as clear-cut an example of unsustainable debt as one could imagine, yet, under 
pressure to support the 2010 bailout plan, staff determined that its debt was sustainable but not with 
a high probability. If Greece was a gray zone case, what would it take to actually declare a country’s 
debt clearly unsustainable? If political pressures were strong to avoid restructuring, it seems likely that 
unsustainable debt burdens would simply be deemed sustainable without high probability, giving the 
Fund the green light to lend in the absence of a debt restructuring. How would this new framework 
have changed the way the Fund dealt with Greece? The answer is, not much. Greece would have been 
declared a gray zone case and private creditors would have been promptly bailed out, buying time for 
them to exit, as they did, before restructuring commenced in 2012. 
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Since its creation in 2016, the new EA framework has had one significant test case. In June 2018, the 
Fund approved a three-year Stand-By Arrangement for Argentina worth $50 billion (equivalent to 
about 1,110 percent of Argentina’s quota), making it the new largest loan in IMF history.352 According 
to staff analysis, Argentina’s debt was deemed sustainable but not with a high probability—it was in 
the gray zone. But rather than require the country to re-profile its private-sector debt, the program 
was approved without any condition of upfront restructuring.  
 
The Fund defended its decision by arguing that the long maturity of Argentina’s privately-held foreign 
currency-denominated debt could be considered a non-IMF source of financing that improved the 
country’s debt sustainability prospects—a necessary condition for avoiding debt restructuring in 
unclear cases under the new rules.353 It is difficult, however, to see how existing debt obligations 
serviced at market interest rates—rather than new financing on concessional terms—could improve 
a sovereign’s debt sustainability. Sources of financing that improve sustainability are those that make a 
country’s long-term debt outlook better than when it arrived at the Fund for help. Argentina’s existing 
obligations were part of the problem that led it to seek IMF assistance, not some new source of 
support that helped it solve that problem. Moreover, if the country’s debt burden was not a concern 
it would have been deemed sustainable in the first place, rather than put in the more questionable gray 
zone. IMF staff justified their argument by pointing out that only a quarter of Argentina’s roughly 
$150 billion worth of privately-held external debt was expected to mature by the end of the Fund’s 
program in 2020.354 The implication is that Fund resources can only be used to bailout creditors whose 
claims mature during the program period. But that still means IMF funding will be available to help 
repay the roughly $40 billion in private-sector claims that are set to mature before the program ends.   
 
While the decision to lend to Argentina without any kind of debt restructuring does not mean that the 
program is destined to fail, it does highlight just how ambiguous and flexible the Fund’s new lending 
rules have become. As one US Treasury official put it, “if you look at the Argentine program, where 
the Fund said the exceptional access criteria are met, I could have made the case that they were met, 
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I could have made the case that they weren’t met.”355 This type of ambiguity is not necessarily a bad 
thing in and of itself, but it does allow the Fund to circumvent the very outcomes that the 2002 
framework was designed to promote: a more constrained use of large loans, greater private-sector 
burden-sharing in crisis resolution, and reduced moral hazard. It is also important to note that the 
room to maneuver built into the new rules can be used to avert or delay debt restructuring not only 
when the financial interests of dominant states are on the line, but in all future gray zone cases, making 
the Fund more susceptible to pressures from debtor governments and their private creditors, who will 
look to persuade the organization that debt write-downs are not necessary in their particular case.356 
 
One sovereign debt expert interviewed for this project aptly described the development of the EA 
lending framework since 2010 as a series of policy blunders, stating: 
  
The [systemic] exemption is just a complete fricking travesty…totally like the 80s 
where, you know, we’re going to screw the debtors to avoid a banking crisis in London, 
New York, and Frankfurt. So it’s exactly sort of the burden shifting move. How do 
they get rid of it? They get rid of it with this completely, in my view, non-credible, you 
know you replace a two-part framework with a three-part framework. And then your 
defense is, when you’re being challenged on it in the latest Argentina program, is like: 
‘oh well, you know, debt sustainability is an art not a science.’357 
 
4. Conclusion 
IMF lending decisions play a crucial role in determining whether and when a sovereign borrower 
restructures its debt. The Fund’s EA lending framework—established in 2002 and amended in 2010 
and 2016—promised to institutionalize this role by establishing clear rules that specified when Fund 
financing had to be conditioned upon upfront debt restructuring. To date, this framework and its 
function within the SDRR have received very little scholarly attention. It has been overlooked by IMF 
scholars who focus on patterns of lending rather than the policy frameworks designed to shape loan 
decisions, and ignored by sovereign debt analysts preoccupied by higher-profile initiatives aimed at 
reforming the debt workout process (e.g., the SDRM and CACs). In this chapter, I fill this gap by 
analyzing two recent sets of reforms to the Fund’s lending rules, one of which created a loophole in 
2010 to avoid having to implement the original rules, the other of which eliminated that loophole but 
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also revamped the original rules in 2016. Taken together, I argue that these changes have weakened 
both the credibility and the content of the IMF’s lending framework, undermining its ability to serve 
as an effective and consistent trigger mechanism for necessary debt restructurings. The implications 
of this argument for understanding the politics and policy possibilities of the SDRR are significant. In 
a sentence, it suggests that attempts to institutionalize an effective trigger mechanism face unforgiving 
political realities that render this type of governance arrangements a technocratic fantasy. 
 
Building on the foundations laid down in Chapter 3, the current chapter showed how the biggest 
obstacle to a credible trigger mechanism stems from the power and preferences of the leading capital-
exporting states. These states do not always and everywhere have a uniform set of preferences toward 
this type of mechanism, but the nature of their position within the global financial order means that, 
at certain critical moments, decisions of whether and when a particular country restructures its debt 
can destabilize their domestic financial systems. When such moments arise, they will use their 
institutional power within the Fund to shape lending decisions in ways that discourage or delay debt 
restructuring, no matter how clear the restructuring rules or the crisis country’s need for debt relief. 
In short, while the structural position of capital exporters does not automatically determine their 
preferences over the creation of an IMF trigger mechanism, it does eventually lead to time-inconsistent 
preferences that diverge from the rule-creation to the rule-implementation stage of the policy process. 
This is the key lesson of the IMF’s impromptu 2010 reform, as states that had been strong proponents 
of the 2002 lending rules insisted on ignoring those rules once they became a constraint on protecting 
national interests—a move that undermined the credibility of the Fund’s commitment not to lend.   
 
The chapter also argued that experience related to rule implementation can change the direction 
and/or intensity of state preferences in ways that feed back into subsequent rule-creation processes. 
Here, experience with extraordinary financial crises and the controversial decision to change IMF rules 
to bail-out Greece only reinforced the preference for a more flexible, case-by-case approach to lending 
among those who traditionally held that position, and diminished the enthusiasm for re-introducing 
strict lending rules among those who had previously promoted them. While some states (e.g., 
Germany) and factions within states (e.g., Congressional Republicans in the US) remained stronger 
proponents of firm rules than others, the balance of forces had shifted in favour of greater flexibility 
and discretion by the time the IMF’s lending rules came up for reconsideration in 2013. Led by US 
officials but supported by private creditors and several debtor and capital-exporting governments, the 
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pro-flexibility camp managed to bulldoze key IMF staff proposals and promote a more open-ended 
approach that weakens the content of the trigger mechanism compared to its 2002 incarnation. The 
new rules unveiled in 2016 are much looser and more ambiguous about when debt restructuring will 
be a necessary condition of Fund financing. Given the strong pressures to avoid or delay debt write-
downs, it is unlikely that the 2016 rules will have the desired effect of protecting public resources, 
promoting more public-private burden-sharing, and reigning in moral hazard. This is not to say that 
IMF lending decisions will no longer trigger restructurings, but rather that they will continue to do so 
on the more discretionary, politically-suffused basis that has historically guided such decisions. 
 
This chapter contributes to debates on sovereign debt governance by analyzing a neglected aspect of 
restructuring—the factors that encourage or discourage debt workouts in the first place—and 
highlighting the political limitations of efforts to establish an effective mechanism to trigger necessary 
debt write-downs. It also speaks to debates on IMF lending, shedding light on an overlooked element 
of Fund policy and reinforcing perspectives that see the power and preferences of dominant states as 
the driving forces behind crucial IMF financing decisions. While private creditors and debtor states 
have much less influence than the leading capital exporters over the Fund’s framework, the fact that 
their preferences point largely in the same direction as those of dominant states only reinforces the 
political obstacles to institutionalizing an effective trigger mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring. 
IMF staff preferences have little impact when they diverge from the dictates of their political masters, 
especially when the latter is backed by a wider coalition of influential actors. Empirically, this chapter 
and its contributions to IMF and sovereign debt debates are supported by extensive new archival and 
primary document evidence used to trace the process of IMF lending reform in significant detail.    
 
The chapter also speaks to broader scholarly discussions about international institutional design and 
development. It suggests that rational choice approaches offer useful insights into some areas of 
institutional life but remain unable to explain other fundamental features of institutional design and 
change. For example, rationalists have argued that states often prefer softer and/or less precise rules 
to deal with issues characterized by high degrees of uncertainty, such as those related to global financial 
crisis management. 358 In this sense, the preference for greater flexibility in the IMF’s lending rules can 
be understood within a rational design framework. But this kind of perspective would assume that if 
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flexibility was rational for states with significantly internationalized financial sectors, they would have 
retained a case-by-case approach or adopted a sufficiently flexible lending framework in the first place. 
Moreover, mainstream liberal versions of institutionalist thought pay insufficient attention to the 
perverse and power-laden implications of the institutional arrangements produced by international 
cooperation.359 For example, neoliberal institutionalist scholars might treat recent reforms to the IMF’s 
lending framework as instances of mutually-beneficial cooperation aimed at averting disruptive debt 
restructurings. However, as the Greek debacle and previous episodes such as 1980s debt crisis showed, 
attempts to avoid or delay necessary debt relief generate a range of dysfunctional outcomes and often 
produce distinct winners (dominant states and their financial institutions) and losers (debtor countries 
and their populations). A power-oriented perspective more attuned to these dynamics is thus needed.    
 
An area where both rational institutionalist and power-oriented perspectives struggle is in making 
sense of shifts in state preferences, particularly the dramatic change in preferences over the design of 
the IMF’s lending framework between 2002 and the 2013-2016 period. To be sure, these shifts came 
about partly because of changes in the material circumstances facing key capital-exporting states. But 
they were also heavily influenced by experience with the challenges and limitations of the Fund’s 
lending framework in the context of large-scale sovereign debt crises. The leading proponent of a 
more flexible set of rules—the US—was no more susceptible to the spillovers generated by debt 
restructurings than it had been in the past, including when the original lending rules were introduced 
in 2002. A fuller understanding of recent IMF reform outcomes requires an appreciation of the role 
of timing and sequencing in politics—specifically the way in which past institutional developments 
and experiences feed into subsequent rule-making preferences and processes (a point highlighted in 
Section 3).360 This point resonates with historical institutionalist accounts of IPE, but scholars working 
in this tradition tend to highlight the incremental strengthening of global financial governance 
arrangements after 2008—often in contrast to expectations of more rapid or radical change—whereas 
I highlight the ways in which, given the underlying political limitations of the mechanism in question, 
policy sequencing and feedback can also lead to institutional weakening over time.361 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
UN Reform 
The Restructuring Process and The Pitfalls of Public International Law 
 
1. Introduction 
On 9 September 2014, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution calling for 
“the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes.”362 
The initiative sought to create a more robust international mechanism not to trigger debt workouts, 
but rather to facilitate the sovereign debt restructuring process once it was underway. The lack of a 
formal bankruptcy process for sovereign debtors had long been considered a “gaping hole” in global 
financial governance.363 And for many observers, this governance gap had only grown larger in the 
wake of the 2012 Greek debt restructuring and a controversial New York-court ruling against 
Argentina that same year, both of which highlighted the growing capacity of holdout creditors to 
obstruct orderly debt restructuring processes. To fill this gap, the UNGA resolution launched a reform 
process to create an international treaty-based sovereign bankruptcy regime. But after a year of 
discussions, UN members had abandoned all talk of a hard-law regime and chosen instead to adopt a 
set of soft-law debt restructuring principles. Despite its lofty ambition, the initiative flamed out. 
 
This UN initiative was fundamentally different from the IMF reforms discussed in Chapter 4 because, 
as mentioned above, it focused on the debt restructuring process and not the trigger. One of the key 
ideas advanced in this dissertation is that the restructuring process is distinct from the trigger in ways that 
make the former more amenable to effective regulation. Why, then, did the UN reform initiative fail? 
In this chapter and the next, I show that even if the process is easier to institutionalize than the trigger, 
different types of process mechanisms face different prospects for success based on their specific legal-
institutional design. I examine three broad design types: international hard law, international soft law, 
and domestic private-law contracts. The first two, which together can be called ‘public international 
law,’ are the subject of the current chapter, while contract mechanisms take center stage in Chapter 6.  
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In this chapter, I argue that international hard-law mechanisms face enormous political obstacles that 
make their realization unlikely, and that the fate of the 2014 UN reform proposal can be understood 
as a product of its hard-law design. The most important obstacles stem from the preferences and 
power of the leading capital-exporting states—principally the US and the UK—which used their 
capabilities to thwart the UN proposal because of its anticipated impact on their national sovereignty 
and power but also, importantly, on the transnational property rights regime as it pertains to sovereign 
debt. In short, the fact that a hard-law mechanism could contradict and supersede the existing legal 
foundations of international sovereign debt markets made it politically unacceptable to the states that 
primarily benefit from the current order and that have the structural power to block this kind of 
regulatory change. Their emphatic rejection of a formal multilateral framework in the UN case was 
only strengthened by the historical legacy of reform debates in the early 2000s. Beyond these dominant 
states, I argue that debtor governments are also unlikely to commit to an international mechanism that 
could impinge upon their ability to determine their own debt repayment and restructuring decisions. 
Despite the fact that debtors spearheaded the UN initiative, many were unprepared to relinquish 
sovereignty for the sake of a stronger SDRR. Private creditors also tend to oppose hard-law initiatives 
but receive little attention in this chapter because they played little role in the UN case, and because 
they are neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent the emergence of a treaty-based SDRR.    
 
While the UN initiative failed to deliver on its original ambition, it did generate a set of non-binding 
principles designed to guide debt restructuring processes. Some have suggested that these principles 
can serve as an important soft-law governance tool. At a broader theoretical level, many scholars point 
to the advantages of soft law, especially in global financial governance, and argue that softer forms of 
legalization often provide a better or second-best alternative to more binding forms of global 
regulation.364 My analysis of the UN’s new debt restructuring principles is less optimistic. I argue that 
they are unlikely to have much concrete impact due to both political challenges related to their specific 
content and functional challenges related to the general limitations of soft-law tools in the SDRR. It 
is somewhat telling that the main alternative to hard law in the SDRR has not been soft law but rather 
the type of contract mechanisms examined in Chapter 6, which actors have gravitated toward because 
of their ability to provide functions that soft law cannot without incurring the steep political costs of 
a hard-law framework. Through an analysis of the recent UN initiative, this chapter illuminates the 
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political and functional limitations of hard- and soft-law arrangements for governing the sovereign 
debt restructuring process. It thus addresses the emboldened boxes within the feasibility tree presented 
below, particularly the lower left box entitled “Public International Law.”  
 














Explanations of previous reform initiatives point to key factors that also played a role in the UN case. 
As noted in Chapter 2, scholars emphasized the role of US power and preferences in constraining the 
hard-law SDRM initiative of the early 2000s.365 Some also identified sovereignty concerns as an 
important reason for US opposition to the SDRM.366 Moreover, analysts pointed out that even debtor 
states had either opposed or failed to collectively support previous initiatives to construct a formal 
sovereign bankruptcy regime.367 But existing analyses are also limited in their ability to explain key 
aspects of the UN initiative. Building upon existing contributions, this chapter highlights additional 
barriers to hard-law reform that earlier studies failed to identify or appreciate: notably, overlooked 
sources of US and UK preferences, the structural power of these states within the SDRR, and the 
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sovereignty-related concerns of debtor governments—all of which were discussed in Chapter 3. It 
also advances new arguments about the limitations of the UN principles and soft-law arrangements 
in the SDRR more generally, expanding upon earlier discussions that emerged around the IIF’s 2004 
principles.368 Taken together, the limits of hard- and soft-law techniques suggest that public 
international law mechanisms are unlikely to succeed in this policy domain.  
 
This chapter makes important contributions to IPE and global governance literatures. It fills an 
empirical gap in our understanding of sovereign debt governance by describing and analyzing a 
significant reform initiative that has not yet received detailed scholarly attention. In explaining this 
initiative and its outcomes, the chapter also provides another puzzle piece in the framework used to 
understand regulatory variation in the SDRR, thus contributing to the theoretical advancement of an 
important but overlooked area of interest in global financial governance. In addition, the argument 
developed here has important implications for broader global governance debates that focus on 
institutional design along a spectrum of international hard and soft law, and that see the latter as the 
natural option for governing global finance.369 
 
After describing the Greek and Argentine episodes that prompted recent initiatives to improve the 
sovereign debt restructuring process, the chapter proceeds to analyze the UN initiative in two sections. 
The first of which, Section 3, focuses on the politics of its international hard-law component. Section 
4 then examines the political and functional facets of its soft-law component. A final section concludes 
and briefly discusses the implications of the chapter for broader IPE and global governance literature. 
 
2. Greece, Argentina, and Renewed Demand for a Better Restructuring Process  
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, new sovereign debt difficulties emerged, as did renewed 
debates about how to improve the SDRR. The Greek debt crisis catalyzed these debates, 
demonstrating the need for better mechanisms to facilitate sovereign debt workouts. As Chapter 4 
detailed, the Greek case exposed a fatal flaw in the IMF’s lending rules and their role as a trigger 
mechanism. But when the Greek government eventually did restructure its debt in 2012, it also 
highlighted significant weaknesses in the restructuring process. Most of the country’s bonds were 
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governed by its own domestic law and contained no legal mechanism to facilitate a restructuring of 
sovereign liabilities. Another portion of its debt had been issued under foreign jurisdictions, primarily 
under English law where CACs were commonplace. But even these contract features failed to shield 
the restructuring of foreign bonds from the disruptive actions of determined holdout creditors. Only 
17 of Greece’s 36 English-law bonds were successfully renegotiated, with holdouts managing to block 
restructuring of the remaining 19.370 Some creditors thus escaped unscathed while others took deep 
haircuts on their claims, raising concerns about inter-creditor equity and the potential impact of this 
lopsided outcome on creditor incentives to participate in future write-downs. Observers predicted 
that the success of Greek holdouts would encourage similar behaviour going forward—among both 
predatory investors and creditors who did not wish to be taken advantage of—further complicating 
future debt workouts.371 This partial restructuring also meant less debt relief for Greece. An additional 
€3 billion would have been written-off if holdouts could have been forced to participate.372 
 
Months after the Greek restructuring, a controversial New York-court ruling revealed further pitfalls 
in the restructuring process. The case involved a small group of holdout creditors—referred to 
pejoratively as ‘vulture funds’—who held bonds that Argentina defaulted on in 2001 and, having 
refused to participate in either of the country’s 2005 or 2010 restructurings, were suing for full 
repayment in New York, where the bonds were issued. In November 2012, US District Judge Thomas 
P. Griesa ordered Argentina to pay these holdouts, claiming it had violated the pari passu clause in its 
bonds by paying bondholders who participated in restructuring but not those who held out—a ‘ratable 
payments’ interpretation that critics argued was misguided, as most took pari passu to mean equal 
treatment of, rather than equal payments to, creditors.373 To enforce this ruling, the judge issued an 
injunction prohibiting Argentina from making payments to those with restructured claims (93 percent 
of all bondholders) unless it also paid the holdouts the full value of their claims, estimated to be around 
$4.65 billion.374 He also threatened to hold in contempt of court third-parties that assisted Argentina 
in violating the injunction. (The injunction was later upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
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Circuit). This prevented Argentina’s trustee from disbursing payments on the restructured bonds, 
causing the country to default in July 2014.375 
 
Arcane as it seemed, the ruling had implications that went far beyond the case at hand. While it 
benefited vulture investors, others in the private creditor community worried that the ruling set a legal 
precedent that subordinated the interests of majority creditors to those of minority holdouts, 
undermining inter-creditor equity and creating uncertainty around sovereign debt investments. US 
Treasury officials were also concerned that this ruling and any precedent it set could diminish the 
attractiveness of New York as a place to issue sovereign bonds, causing business to move elsewhere 
and eroding the economic and political benefits the US derives from its central role in the international 
debt regime (described in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 3).376 At the IMF, Blustein notes that “anguish was 
profound” at the implications of the ruling for future efforts to foster orderly debt restructurings.377  
 
For debtors who issued bonds under New York law, the ruling also threatened to make future 
restructurings vastly more challenging. In Blustein’s words, the “pro-creditor fundamentalism” of the 
judge’s ruling “handed a resounding victory to vulture investors, transforming the balance of power 
between sovereign governments and the creditors. For the first time since the era of gunboat 
diplomacy, when militaries were dispatched to enforce financial claims abroad, lenders were getting a 
useful remedy against the traditional rights of sovereigns to protect their assets from seizure.”378 In 
setting a legal precedent under New York law—the law governing a vast portion of developing country 
and emerging market sovereign bonds—the court’s decision created both an incentive and strategy 
for creditors to hold out from future restructurings and litigate for full repayment. As Blustein puts it, 
“What sane bondholder would go along with a debt-restructuring offer in the future, given the risk 
that a single holdout might be able to block payments under the new terms?”379  
 
In response to the Greek crisis and the challenges it flagged for Eurozone governments that might 
need to reorganize their debts in the future, European officials agreed to introduce standardized CACs 
into the sovereign bonds of  all Eurozone states starting in 2013. Responding to both the Greek and 
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Argentine episodes, US Treasury officials launched a separate reform effort in 2013 aimed at 
strengthening the contractual approach to debt restructuring for EMDEs. (These contract reform 
initiatives are the focus of  the next chapter).  
 
Determined not to re-live the debates of  the early 2000s, US policymakers explicitly rejected re-
opening discussions of  a SDRM-style arrangement at the outset of  their contract reform initiative. As 
a senior US Treasury official put it, they had “no appetite for pursuing an international agreement that 
could result in a supranational authority to supplant core US sovereign decision making or judicial 
authority.”380 Despite the fact that US domestic judges have neither the specific mandate nor the 
expertise to deal with complex sovereign debt cases, US authorities remained firmly opposed to the 
creation of a specialized international bankruptcy court that could replace or trump their own courts 
vis-à-vis sovereign debt disputes and restructuring decisions, regardless of the functional merits of a 
supranational regime. The IMF, which had begun its own lending reform process in 2013 and was 
participating in the Treasury-led initiative, also made clear that it had no interest in pursuing another 
SDRM, which in any event would have been pointless given the clear opposition of its largest and 
only veto-wielding shareholder.381 It too would support the development of new contractual 
mechanisms as the main approach to strengthening the restructuring process.382 
 
A number of  outside observers saw contract reforms as a positive step, but one that was insufficient 
to solve the underlying problems plaguing the restructuring process. Leading this camp were debtor 
states from the global South, many of whom had become increasingly concerned and outspoken about 
the need for reform. Their general sentiment was well summarized by Axel Kicillof, Argentina’s then 
finance minister, who said in 2015: “We know that many hope that contract clauses will resolve the 
issue of sovereign debt restructuring. However, we believe that the international financial structure 
and architecture have to be changed.”383 
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3. The UN Initiative: The Political Limits of Hard Law 
With the US and the IMF having rejected the idea of such transformative change, dissatisfied debtors 
had to find an alternative venue in which to pursue reform. The clear choice was the UN, where 
sovereign debt debates were already taking place. As early as 2008, the UNGA had sponsored the 
creation of the Stiglitz Commission, whose 2009 report recommended the establishment of an 
“International Debt Restructuring Court.”384 The idea was similar to the earlier SDRM proposal. In 
terms of the court’s legal design, the report called for a “single statutory framework for debt relief”—
that is, a hard-law agreement brought into force through the establishment of an international treaty.385 
It also discussed a number of functions the court could perform. While the Commission stopped 
short of enumerating a detailed set of prescriptions, it noted that an international debt restructuring 
court would ensure that agreed international principles regarding the amount of necessary debt relief, 
the sharing of losses among creditors, and the priority of different creditor claims were followed. The 
Commission also envisioned a role for the court in authorizing debtor-in-possession financing and 
possibly even in determining what debts might be considered “odious.” While the remaining details 
were somewhat vague, it was clear that the proposed court was to have significant powers under 
international law, with the report stating: “National courts would have to recognize the legitimacy of 
the international court, and both creditors and debtors will therefore follow its rulings.”386  
 
Around the same time as the release of the Stiglitz Commission’s report, the developing-country 
coalition known as the Group of 77 (G77) was encouraging the UNCTAD (which has long served as 
a de facto secretariat for the G77) to expand its role in sovereign debt governance.387 In 2009, the 
UNCTAD launched a project to establish new principles for sovereign lending and borrowing, and in 
2013 it created a working group tasked with designing a sovereign debt workout mechanism. At its 
inaugural meeting, the working group considered the priorities and legal options for a workout 
mechanism. It discussed, among other things, the idea of establishing a statutory sovereign debt 
tribunal with various capacities, including a wide purview to oversee comprehensive restructurings 
involving multiple types of creditors, as well as the power to authorize debt standstills to facilitate a 
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less chaotic negotiation process among this wider collection of actors.388 To guide its subsequent 
meetings and discussions, the group commissioned a number of technical papers from sovereign debt 
experts, the first of which addressed the necessity and feasibility of a standstill rule for debt 
restructuring processes.389 The active workstream on sovereign debt restructuring meant that, when 
debtors became frustrated with the SDRR and the limitations of Western efforts to improve it, the 
foundations on which to launch a more ambitious initiative already existed within the UN. Because of 
the asymmetric power relations within the IMF, where far-reaching reforms had already been rejected, 
it also made sense for debtors to operate within the UNGA’s ‘one country, one vote’ system.    
 
In pursuing reform within the UN, debtor states—operating under the G77 moniker—found a 
powerful creditor ally in China. In the short time since the SDRM initiative, China had become a 
leading lender to developing countries, transforming itself since the mid-2000s “from a marginal 
presence to the dominant player in international development finance.”390 China’s support meant that 
debtor states and their vision for a more robust sovereign bankruptcy regime had the backing of the 
single largest creditor to sovereign states. Ostensibly, Chinese support would bolster the strength of a 
debtor-driven initiative that the US and Europe were sure to oppose. Chinese officials also had their 
own concerns with the SDRR. In their view, the Argentine situation highlighted the weakness of a 
market-based system for restructuring, while management of the Greek crisis exposed inter-creditor 
equity problems that affected China directly.391 Regarding the latter, Chinese officials were frustrated 
that while Greek bonds held by Eurozone central banks were excluded from the 2012 restructuring, 
all other central banks—including the People’s Bank of China—had been forced to accept the same 
haircut inflicted on private bondholders.392 This concern about unfair treatment was only amplified by 
China’s ongoing frustrations with the IMF’s Western-dominated governance structure. 
 
Chinese endorsement of the UN reform initiative may also have been motivated by China’s interests 
as a creditor and its desire to establish a debt restructuring framework to rival or create strategic 
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ambiguity vis-à-vis the Western-dominated SDRR. To the extent that American opposition to a hard-
law mechanism was informed by a desire to preserve the central position of US laws and courts in the 
debt regime, Chinese support for more transformative change might have been driven by an interest 
in disrupting existing structures of US power and privilege. The country’s support also fit a more 
generic pattern whereby China sides with developing countries in multilateral political arenas as a show 
of South-South solidarity.393 The degree to which China’s actions were motivated by symbolic versus 
substantive or strategic considerations is difficult to know due to the opacity of Chinese policy 
processes.394 But the idea that China’s rise might bolster the strength of  debtor states in international 
debt politics fits with broader theories about the influence of  the international balance-of-power on 
sovereign debt relations. As Christian Suter and Hanspeter Stamm argued: 
 
the existence of  several leading powers improves the bargaining position of  
individual debtor countries at the periphery. Therefore, the situation most 
favourable for debtors is during the transition phase from an old and decaying 
hegemonic power […] to a new and rising world leading power trying to integrate 
debtor countries at the periphery into its own newly emerging power system at the 
expense of  the old hegemonic power.395 
 
On 9 September 2014, the G77 and China introduced a resolution into the UNGA calling for “the 
establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes.”396 What 
exactly a ‘multilateral legal framework’ entailed was not entirely evident, partly because the aim of the 
resolution was to initiate a reform process through which UN member states would negotiate the 
precise “modalities” of the new international legal arrangement.397 But the call for a multilateral legal 
approach was widely interpreted as promoting a statutory (i.e., hard law) framework along the lines of 
the SDRM or the Stiglitz Commission’s International Debt Restructuring Court proposal—ideas that 
attracted growing attention and support in the wake of the Greek and Argentine episodes. The 
language of the UNGA’s resolution largely supported this interpretation. It acknowledged “the work 
carried out by the International Monetary Fund in 2003 […] to formulate a proposal for a sovereign 
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debt restructuring mechanism,” and noted its “concern that the international financial system does 
not have a sound legal framework for the orderly and predictable restructuring of sovereign debt.”398 
It also stated that “in the restructuring of sovereign debt, the progressive development and 
codification of international law are necessary.”399 For these reasons, the resolution concluded, the 
UNGA has decided “to elaborate and adopt through a process of intergovernmental negotiations […] 
a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view, inter alia, to 
increasing the efficiency, stability and predictability of the international financial system.”400 In short, 
while the G77 and China’s exact vision for reform was somewhat fuzzy, it clearly implied a shift in 
the locus of authority over restructuring processes to the international or supranational level.   
 
The resolution received widespread support, with 124 countries voting in favour, 11 against, and 41 
abstaining.401 But the detractors included the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, and a handful of others.402 
Predictably, American and British (and other European) delegates objected to the idea of a multilateral 
framework because it sounded too much like a hard-law SDRM-style arrangement. US delegates were 
particularly hostile. As a close observer of the events remarked, the US was the only country that 
“explicitly rejected the very prospect of negotiating for a multilateral legal framework.”403 When the 
US representative in the UNGA explained her government’s position, she emphasized the anticipated 
effects of a hard-law mechanism on international debt markets, stating: “The establishment of a 
statutory mechanism for debt restructurings would create uncertainty in financial markets. If lenders 
face higher uncertainty regarding repayment, they may be less likely to provide financing and will likely 
charge higher risk premiums, potentially stifling financing to developing countries.”404 These concerns 
reflected not the sovereignty but rather the market implications of a hard-law mechanism that could 
trump debt contracts and the legal systems within which they are embedded, and that US officials 
worried would therefore generate uncertainty and disrupt cross-border financial flows.  
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A pressing issue for American decision-makers was thus the lack of compatibility between a hard-law 
mechanism and the (American and British) domestic legal foundations of international sovereign debt 
markets—an important factor discussed in Chapter 3 but overlooked in the existing literature. Among 
other things, US and UK contract law provided a degree of predictability and legal certainty for cross-
border sovereign debt investments that are, by nature, characterized by considerable risk and 
uncertainty. A supranational bankruptcy court would move beyond the narrow purview of contract 
law and make decisions according to a wider range of economic and political considerations. Even if 
this type of institution could improve the debt restructuring process, US officials were concerned that 
it would come at too high a cost in terms of politicizing and creating uncertainty in debt markets 
themselves.405 As went their thinking: if investors knew their contractual agreements could be 
overridden by a higher authority making decisions according to various factors they had not directly 
agreed to, they might be more reluctant to lend to foreign governments—at least at manageable 
interest rates. Underscoring that US views on this issue had not changed from where they had been a 
decade earlier, the American delegate to the UNGA noted: “Experience from the debate on the 
SDRM in the early-2000s reflected these concerns and concluded that the creation of such a 
mechanism would have highly uncertain results.”406 In referencing the early 2000s, this statement 
alluded to the fact that the earlier SDRM debate had helped crystallize US views on a hard-law debt 
restructuring mechanism.  
 
US and European officials opposed not only the legal-institutional design of the proposed multilateral 
framework, but also the very idea of discussing sovereign debt issues within the UN, insisting that 
such technical matters were better left to the IMF or the Treasury-led working group on contract 
reform.407 The private creditors who weighed in on this issue agreed. In the words of one sovereign 
debt investor: “I don’t see how the UN thought it had any perspective on this.”408 Officials from 
several G77 countries pushed back, arguing that the UNGA’s more democratic voting system made 
it a legitimate forum in which to discuss issues of global significance such as sovereign debt.409 Various 
debt relief NGOs and individual ‘policy entrepreneurs’ also defended the choice of the UN over the 
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IMF.410 In addition to the more open and inclusive nature of the UN system, G77 states and their 
supporters argued that the IMF had a conflict of interest over the rules of sovereign debt restructuring, 
since the organization was itself a creditor and thus had a stake in how its members solved their debt 
crises—a point that had also been made about the SDRM proposal a decade earlier.411 
 
But conflict over the choice between the UN and the IMF or the Treasury working group was about 
more than finding the ‘optimal’ institutional venue. It reflected a deeper struggle over who gets to 
write the rules of debt restructuring. As Hector Timerman, Argentina’s then minister of foreign affairs, 
observed: “the United States and the UK wanted to move the issue of the debt away from the only 
place where they could not impose an undemocratic right: the General Assembly.”412 When asked 
about why these countries rejected the UN initiative and sought to shift debt discussions into the IMF, 
Timerman alluded to their interests as capital exporters, noting: “Countries that export capital are the 
ones voting against it.”413 Robert Wade argued that these core capital exporters did not want the UN 
to become a relevant forum for discussing any major financial governance issues after the 2008 global 
financial crisis, noting that “western states, with the UK and the US in the lead, tried hard to ensure 
that the UN did not become a forum for discussion on the crisis,” and documenting the strategic 
moves that US and UK officials made to obstruct the Stiglitz Commission and present UN regulatory 
efforts as a “farce” in the mainstream media.414  
 
Seen in this light, the UN initiative reflected the type of strategic ‘chessboard politics’ that often arise 
in complex and/or fragmented international regimes characterized by divergent preferences and 
highly asymmetric power relations.415 More specifically, pursuing reform within the UN can be viewed 
as an attempt at what Julia Morse and Robert Keohane call regime shifting, “which occurs when 
challengers to a set of rules or practices shift to an alternative multilateral forum with a more favorable 
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mandate and decision rules, and then use this new forum to challenge standards in the original 
institution or reduce the authority of that institution.”416 The position of the US and Europe as ‘veto 
players’ within the IMF had made it impossible for G77 states to pursue their more ambitious agenda 
in that forum. Regime shifting into the UN was thus a strategic move to bypass Western power. This 
strategy was bolstered by the fact that the UNGA proposal was backed by the majority of the world’s 
countries, including China and the other BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa).  
 
In the end, however, the structural power of the US and the UK within the sovereign debt regime 
imposed hard limitations on the effectiveness of this strategy. At the time, roughly 50 percent of the 
total outstanding stock of international sovereign bonds were governed by New York law and around 
46 percent were governed by English law.417 Any restructuring mechanism that did not apply to these 
jurisdictions would thus fail to govern 96 percent of international sovereign bonds. Indeed, the main 
problems that catalyzed the UNGA and Treasury initiatives originated under US and English laws—
Argentina’s battle with holdouts in New York and Greece’s failure to restructure many of its English-
law bonds—further underscoring the futility of pursuing a framework that failed to incorporate these 
jurisdictions. The US and the UK thus had the structural power to block the creation of a viable hard-
law framework simply by refusing to participate in it. In the early 2000s, when the SDRM’s prospects 
depended on IMF approval, scholars focused on American institutional power within the Fund as a 
major obstacle to reform. But they failed to consider the deeper sources of structural power in this 
arena of global finance—power that persists even after institutional roadblocks have be cleared.  
 
US officials were aware of the power their market position gave them over the fate of the UN 
initiative.418 Others also had a sense of this power, even if they could not always put their finger on its 
exact workings. Asked about how the US and other Western states were able to undercut the UN 
proposal, Timerman replied: “What I am going to say will sound too simple, but there is no other 
answer: when creditor countries do not want something, that is it.”419 Although US policymakers were 
thus confident in their ability to block the initiative at the end of the day, they were eager to get rid of 
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it as soon as possible. US officials disliked not only the prospect of a hard-law framework that could 
destabilize debt markets, but also the idea of a high-profile reform initiative that could send confusing 
signals to markets about the international political appetite for this kind of framework. As a then US 
Treasury official put it, the UN initiative was “[market] noise and we could have done without 
it…there was no reason for us to like having this work go forward in the UN because we didn’t 
support the initiative and moreover, the IMF is the competent body for international finance.”420  
 
The September 2014 UNGA resolution established an Ad Hoc Committee on Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Processes to guide the creation of a multilateral legal framework. While the Committee 
was open to all UN members and observers, a number of the states that voted against the initial 
resolution—including the US, the UK, Japan, and Canada—refused to participate, as did the rest of 
the European Union and the IMF observers. One month after the September 2014 resolution, before 
the Ad Hoc Committee had held its first meeting, the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
organized a special event that brought together several UN and IMF officials, among others, to discuss 
the ongoing work on sovereign debt restructuring reform. Reza Baqir, then chief of the IMF’s Debt 
Policies Division, took the opportunity to remind participants of the futility of going forward with a 
hard-law approach to debt restructuring. As the summary document from the event notes: “Mr. Baqir 
made it clear that the majority of the IMF board does not support a treaty approach going forward 
and that a treaty approach that does not include issue law countries (US/UK) would not address the 
collective action or holdout creditor problems.”421 Despite the opposition of key capital-exporting 
states and what it meant for the prospects of a statutory framework, G77 countries and their 
supporters within the UN did not immediately or fully abandon their reform initiative. 
 
The reform process unfolded via three Ad Hoc Committee meetings throughout 2015. The first 
meeting featured presentations from outside experts and statements from participating states. Many 
of the most vocal participants—including Argentina, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa—reaffirmed 
their support for a debt restructuring framework that would, in the words of Brazil’s delegate, “better 
safeguard the interest of debtor countries and the social and economic development needs and 
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priorities of their populations.”422 As the country that had spearheaded the UN initiative, Argentina 
used the first Committee meeting to take the lead in outlining its vision for a multilateral mechanism 
and a set of legal principles to guide it. 
 
A key theme emanating from these principles was the importance of sovereignty. The first principle 
stated that “sovereign debt restructuring is a right of a State and a sovereign decision under 
international law.”423 Another emphasized the sanctity of sovereign immunity—an international legal 
doctrine no longer so effective in shielding sovereigns from litigation in American and British courts. 
As specific as these sovereignty concerns were to Argentina in light of its recent experience, they 
resonated with a broader range of debtors, anxious about the “wave of litigation expected in the wake 
of the controversial US ruling against Argentina.”424 They also found support among emerging powers, 
which consistently emphasize national sovereignty as the guiding principle of international relations. 
China in particular spoke out in support of principles emphasizing sovereignty, noting that 
government debtors, because of their sovereign status and their consequent obligations to their 
citizens, are fundamentally different from commercial debtors and should be treated as such. 
 
While the emphasis on sovereignty was understandable, it sat uncomfortably with the goal of creating 
a ‘multilateral legal framework,’ which—by definition—would entail a certain loss of sovereignty. This 
contradiction became apparent throughout the Committee’s discussions. For example, the Russian 
representative noted that his country was “not ready to support the “statutory” approach, because it 
touches on renouncing sovereignty,” but added that Russia wanted to make “a mandatory set of rules 
and principles the basis of sovereign debt restructuring” and considered it “very important that the 
above-mentioned rules and principles at some point could be considered legally binding for all 
stakeholders.”425 Even while declaring support for a binding framework, many of the most troubled 
debtors, including Argentina and Venezuela, continued to stress the importance of preserving 
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sovereignty.426 Although debtors seemed convinced of the virtues of a legally-binding approach, many 
were clearly not prepared to sacrifice their sovereignty in any meaningful way. Thus, while American 
and British resistance was sufficient to limit the ambitions of the UN initiative, it was not fully 
necessary. Debtor states had their own reservations about committing to a binding framework.  
 
Previous studies illustrate the difficulties debtor states have faced in forging a coherent and durable 
reform coalition, but they focus on collective action problems that arise when some debtors—
particularly the wealthier and larger ones that issue lots of foreign bonds—start to worry about how a 
given debt restructuring framework might impact their access to affordable credit, eroding their 
support for reform and preventing debtors from realizing their collective long-term interests.427 A 
prime example of this dynamic, one with parallels to the UN initiative, can be found in the late 1970s 
when the G77 last tried to establish a more formal international arrangement to deal with sovereign 
debt problems. In that episode, the G77’s proposal for an “International Debt Commission”—
comprising impartial experts that would oversee and arbitrate debt restructurings—collapsed because 
it was rejected by the US and Western multinational banks, but also because “divisions emerged 
amongst the debtor countries, as a number of the wealthier developing countries expressed concerns 
that the endorsement of debt restructuring and debt relief might discourage future capital flows to the 
developing world.”428 By contrast, such divisions were not an issue for countries during the recent UN 
initiative, despite attempts by the US and Europe to “break unity” and divide the G77.429 Concerns 
about access to global capital markets were imperceptible this time.  
 
Debtor states hesitated to follow their 2014 UNGA proposal for a multilateral framework to its logical 
conclusion not because of credit concerns, as existing literature might lead us to expect, but rather for 
the sovereignty-related reasons alluded to above and in Chapter 3. Yuefen Li, who led the UNCTAD’s 
work on sovereign debt and played a central role in coordinating elements of the UN reform process, 
noted afterward that such sovereignty concerns had been an important obstacle that kept debtors 
from committing to a binding bankruptcy mechanism.430 Previously, sovereignty concerns in this 
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domain were assumed to be a consideration only for powerful states that feared losing their privileged 
position in the global debt regime. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2), defaults and debt 
restructurings are often extremely costly for debtors, and so it makes sense that these states would 
want to maintain maximum discretion over as many aspects of their debt situation as possible.431 This 
reality, highlighted by the UN initiative, presents an additional obstacle to the emergence of a hard-
law SDRR—one that has been largely neglected by the existing literature. The implication for the 
politics of reform in the SDRR is that even if borrowing-cost concerns can be mitigated, and even if 
US and UK power were to fade, sovereign debtors would likely remain reluctant to cede decision-
making power over sensitive choices that could impact their international debt payments. 
 
4. The UN Principles: Political and Functional Limitations 
In light of American and British opposition as well as their own sovereignty concerns, the G77 and 
China were forced to scale-back any ambition of establishing a multilateral framework with formal 
standing or authority under international law. In other words, the political constraints described above 
dashed any remaining dreams of a hard-law mechanism that could supersede national laws and 
empower a supranational bankruptcy authority to guide debtors and their creditors toward more 
cooperative and comprehensive debt solutions. As reform debates continued in this political context, 
discussions of a hard-law framework faded and were replaced by a greater focus on building consensus 
around a set of soft-law principles that could guide sovereign debt restructuring processes. The second 
Ad Hoc Committee meeting featured a presentation from the UNCTAD highlighting its recently 
published Roadmap and Guide for Sovereign Debt Workouts.432 The Roadmap contained five 
principles for debt restructuring: legitimacy, impartiality, transparency, good faith, and sustainability. 
A number of countries welcomed these principles as providing a solid basis to build “a working 
instrument” that “could enjoy broad consensus.”433 The Committee’s final meeting produced 
consensus on a set of principles. Among the benefits of  these principles, India’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN noted that their non-binding nature preserved the sovereign policy space 
of  debtor countries to design their own borrowing and repayment plans.434 
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On 10 September 2015, the UNGA voted to adopt the Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Processes.435 The nine principles agreed upon reflected a fusion between those proposed by Argentina 
and those outlined in UNCTAD’s Roadmap. International support for these UN Principles was 
widespread, with 136 countries voting in favour, 41 abstaining, and only six voting against (the US, 
the UK, Germany, Japan, Canada, and Israel). The full version of the Principles is reproduced below.  
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UN Basic Principles on Sovereign Debt Restructuring Processes 
1. A Sovereign State has the right, in the exercise of its discretion, to design its macroeconomic policy, including 
restructuring its sovereign debt, which should not be frustrated or impeded by any abusive measures. 
Restructuring should be done as the last resort and preserving at the outset creditors’ rights. 
 
2. Good faith by both the sovereign debtor and all its creditors would entail their engagement in constructive 
sovereign debt restructuring workout negotiations and other stages of the process with the aim of a prompt and 
durable re-establishment of debt sustainability and debt servicing, as well as achieving the support of a critical 
mass of creditors through a constructive dialogue regarding the restructuring terms. 
 
3. Transparency should be promoted in order to enhance the accountability of the actors concerned, which can be 
achieved through the timely sharing of both data and processes related to sovereign debt workouts. 
 
4. Impartiality requires that all institutions and actors involved in sovereign debt restructuring workouts, including 
at the regional level, in accordance with their respective mandates, enjoy independence and refrain from 
exercising any undue influence over the process and other stakeholders or engaging in actions that would give 
rise to conflicts of interest or corruption or both. 
 
5. Equitable treatment imposes on States the duty to refrain from arbitrarily discriminating among creditors, unless 
a different treatment is justified under the law, is reasonable, and is correlated to the characteristics of the credit, 
guaranteeing inter-creditor equality, discussed among all creditors. Creditors have the right to receive the same 
proportionate treatment in accordance with their credit and its characteristics. No creditors or creditor groups 
should be excluded ex ante from the sovereign debt restructuring process. 
 
6. Sovereign immunity from jurisdiction and execution regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States 
before foreign domestic courts and exceptions should be restrictively interpreted. 
 
7. Legitimacy entails that the establishment of institutions and the operations related to sovereign debt restructuring 
workouts respect requirements of inclusiveness and the rule of law, at all levels. The terms and conditions of the 
original contracts should remain valid until such time as they are modified by a restructuring agreement. 
 
8. Sustainability implies that sovereign debt restructuring workouts are completed in a timely and efficient manner 
and lead to a stable debt situation in the debtor State, preserving at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting 
sustained and inclusive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic and social costs, 
warranting the stability of the international financial system and respecting human rights. 
 
9. Majority restructuring implies that sovereign debt restructuring agreements that are approved by a qualified 
majority of the creditors of a State are not to be affected, jeopardized or otherwise impeded by other States or a 
non-representative minority of creditors, who must respect the decisions adopted by the majority of the creditors. 
States should be encouraged to include collective action clauses in their sovereign debt to be issued. 
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These 2015 UN Principles were hailed by some as “an historic breakthrough”436 and “the most 
important international action since the failed 2002-2003 IMF-led initiative on the Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism.”437 Joseph Stiglitz and Martin Guzman called the UN Principles “a big step 
toward filling the void” in sovereign debt governance, arguing that they could form the basis of an 
effective soft-law framework.438 Some even see the Principles as a potential stepping-stone to harder 
forms of international law. Gelpern, for example, notes that “[i]f governments and their creditors use 
and invoke these principles when they restructure, they can infuse them with practical meaning and 
make them effectively binding.”439 Despite this optimism about the role the Principles can play in 
promoting better restructuring outcomes, it is unlikely that this or any other soft-law arrangement will 
serve on its own as an effective governance mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring. 
 
To be sure, there are understandable reasons for seeing practical potential in the UN Principles, despite 
their non-binding character. Scholars have already shown that informal norms play an important role 
in the SDRR, although these norms are backed-up by powerful disciplinary mechanisms.440 Soft-law 
standards are also widely considered to be the backbone of  global financial governance more generally. 
However, the UN Principles face two broad obstacles that are likely to limit their impact on the debt 
restructuring regime. The first is political and relates specifically to the Principles and their content. 
Here, the issue is that the strength of  non-binding mechanisms often depends on the degree of  
consensus surrounding them, and particularly on the extent to which powerful states and market 
actors buy into them. In the case of  the UN Principles, the support of  powerful capital-exporting 
states and private creditors does not exist and is unlikely to emerge in the foreseeable future. Although 
some of the individual tenets of the UN Principles—particularly good faith, transparency, and 
equitable treatment, which echo the content of the IIF’s 2004 Principles—could conceivably 
command support from these actors, others are much more contentious. 
 
Particularly contentious is the first of the nine principles. It declares that states have a right to 
restructure their debt as part of their broader sovereign right to self-determine national economic 
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policy. While this principle does not, of course, establish a higher international authority that could 
trump contracts governed by New York or English law, it does challenge these legal foundations of 
transnational debt markets rhetorically. It suggests, contrary to domestic contract law in the US and 
the UK, that private contracts are not sacrosanct; that there are higher political priorities and principles 
that come before contractual obligations. The idea of a right to restructure also challenges what Odette 
Lienau calls the debt ‘repayment norm’—the deeply entrenched idea that sovereign debt must always 
be repaid, regardless of  how it was contracted or used.441 Backed by the powerful belief that anything 
less than full repayment will be punished via higher borrowing costs, the repayment norm works in 
tandem with the role of US/UK contract law in the sovereign debt regime to promote a state of affairs 
in which creditors have some degree of confidence in the security and predictability of their cross-
border sovereign bond investments. Anything that throws into question the legal and/or normative 
underpinnings of this regime is unlikely to gain the support of powerful capital exporters and the 
private financial markets that benefit from the relatively predictable, apolitical, and creditor-friendly 
status quo. In short, the UN Principles faced political backlash from powerful actors because they also 
clashed with the established legal foundations of sovereign debt markets, if only at a rhetorical level. 
 
It is hardly surprising, then, that US and European officials—the latter representing UK interests in 
particular—not only rejected the UN Principles, but also attacked their legal validity. Jill Derderian, 
the US Counselor for Economic and Social Affairs, criticized the Principles for being problematic “in 
several respects, including language that could be construed as acknowledging a certain ‘right’ to 
restructure sovereign debt, which does not exist.” The EU common position largely echoed this view, 
arguing that the Principles contained “a number of statements that do not accurately reflect existing 
law or international practices.”442 It also denounced the UN Principles’ assertion that “[s]overeign 
immunity from jurisdiction and executive regarding sovereign debt restructurings is a right of States 
before foreign domestic courts,”443 noting “the need to respect the decisions of competent Courts for 
the restructuring of Sovereign bonds issued under foreign jurisdiction.”444 The fact that the Principles 
indirectly challenged the legal sanctity of debt contracts (via principle 1: the right to restructure) and 
directly challenged the authority of US and UK domestic courts in the SDRR (via principle 6: 
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sovereign immunity. 
444 EU common position on the UN draft resolution A/69/L.84, p. 6.  
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sovereign immunity) obliterated any hope of winning the approval of capital-exporting states or 
private creditors even for a soft-law set of commitments. And without the support of these powerful 
actors, the Principles lack the buy-in necessary to promote their use and acceptance among creditors 
and debtors alike, as well as within the key jurisdictions of the international sovereign debt market. 
 
Beyond these specific political constraints, there are functional limitations for soft-law arrangements 
in the SDRR more generally that will prevent the UN Principles from having much impact on future 
debt workout processes. Although soft law is the dominant form of  global financial regulation, the 
characteristics of  sovereign debt restructuring as an issue area challenge the effectiveness of  soft 
modes of  governance in this domain. With the regulation of the banking, insurance, and accounting 
industries, soft law operates through international standards adopted by self-regulating firms or 
applied by regulatory authorities at the domestic level. When it comes to regulating global ‘systemically 
important financial institutions’ (SIFIs), for example, there are a relatively small number of  firms 
concentrated in an even smaller number of  countries. While it may be politically difficult to write and 
enforce robust regulation, it is easy enough in a functional sense to imagine SIFIs and/or their national 
regulatory authorities adopting common standards.  
 
To be sure, EMDE debtors have voluntarily adopted relatively standardized CACs in their bonds to 
facilitate debt restructuring, and private creditors have gone along with these standards by purchasing 
bonds that contain CACs. But this particular mode of  anchoring international standards in domestic 
private-law contracts only works for specific commitments with precise legal meanings. The type of  
broad normative commitments outlined in the UN Principles—for example, legitimacy, sustainability, 
and impartiality—would never be inserted into sovereign bond contracts for this reason. They are too 
vague and ambiguous to offer useful guidance to domestic judges, and they would introduce far too 
much uncertainty for both debtors and creditors. Considering that the recent New York-court ruling 
against Argentina hinged on the judge’s particular interpretation of  the otherwise relatively technical 
pari passu clause, it would be quite risky to introduce far more ambiguous terms into debt contracts. 
Moreover, in the UN case, one of  the political objectives was to reduce, not expand, the influence of  
domestic courts over the resolution of  sovereign debt disputes. Finally, even if  debtors felt like they 
could benefit from including broad principles in their contracts, they would almost surely be deterred 
by the interest-rate premiums they would have to pay for issuing bonds with terms whose meanings 
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were highly uncertain and contestable. As has been well documented, the authorities that issue and 
manage sovereign debt tend to see their overarching priority as minimizing borrowing costs.445  
 
International soft law has little weight on its own. It needs a delivery mechanism, such as domestic 
legislation or contracts, to ground it and give it legal force. In the sovereign debt realm, the contract 
mechanism can be useful in operationalizing certain precise commitments, but is limited in its ability 
to translate a range of  broader norms and ideas into effective governance mechanisms. Beyond 
inserting the UN Principles into their bond contracts, national governments could always simply 
invoke principles such as sustainability or good faith to justify their approach during a debt 
restructuring. But this would not protect them from litigation or ensure that a speedy and sustainable 
debt reduction was achieved without alienating creditors and leading to steeper future borrowing costs. 
 
What about private creditors themselves? Could they be relied upon to adhere to soft-law principles 
on their own accord, much as firms and industry bodies in other areas of  global finance self-regulate? 
It seems unlikely. In the world of  sovereign debt, creditors are too disparate and heterogenous to be 
expected to universally and voluntarily adopt common standards. Even if  some creditors wanted to 
endorse certain principles to demonstrate their cooperative spirit, why would specialized investors that 
pursue holdout strategies voluntarily adopt and adhere to, say, principle 9 of  the UN Principles, which 
states that minority creditors must respect the decisions of the majority? And the problem is that 
anything less than full creditor participation with a soft-law framework would leave sovereigns 
exposed, as it only takes one holdout to disrupt a restructuring. Sovereign debt restructuring is thus 
characterized, in the terminology of  global public goods, by a ‘weakest link’ logic.446 Even with the 
cooperation of  most creditors, restructurings can be spoiled by a single weak link: holdout creditors. 
Moreover, the fact that no creditor group has yet endorsed the UN Principles should not inspire much 
confidence in the self-regulatory model of  soft law. 
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The UN Principles are not, of  course, the first soft-law mechanism in the SDRR. In important ways, 
they follow the template and even mimic some of  the content of  the IIF’s 2004 Principles. But the 
UN Principles also differ from the IIF version in ways that would lead us to expect that, if  anything, 
the latter should be stronger and more impactful than the former. Despite their soft-law character, the 
IIF Principles were designed to induce debtor compliance via market discipline. To oversee the 
Principles, the IIF set up a ‘Group of  Trustees’ and a ‘Principles Consultative Group,’ the latter of  
which releases a report each year assessing whether countries have followed the Principles. This 
document serves as something of  a report card, scoring debtor countries on their performance in 
areas such as data transparency and investor relations. Because getting a poor score from the leading 
global financial industry association could damage a country’s creditworthiness in the eyes of  foreign 
investors, it has been argued that debtors are likely to adhere closely to the IIF Principles.447  
 
Some commentators even worried that such compliance would further tilt the SDRR in favour of  
creditor interests, since the Principles themselves emphasized creditor priorities. For example, the IIF 
Principles encouraged debtors to do whatever they could to return to financial markets as soon and 
with as little disruption as possible, rather than doing what might be needed—including large debt 
write-downs—to resolve deep solvency crises. As Barry Herman wrote, adherence to the Principles is 
“bound to produce creditor-friendly debt workouts that debtor governments will accept if  they feel 
they have no choice but to quickly normalize access to foreign credit, even if  it does little to ameliorate 
the economic and social consequences of  excessive debt servicing.”448  
 
Yet, despite all of this, there is little evidence that the IIF Principles have had any impact on making 
debt restructuring processes smoother, quicker, fairer, or more orderly. In the IIF’s own evaluations, 
activities that debtors would have done otherwise, and have done with no reference to the IIF 
Principles, are treated as evidence of compliance with this soft-law framework, overstating its 
significance. In the reform debates since 2012, it is striking just how little the IIF Principles have even 
been mentioned. In 2012, the IIF even updated its Principles in light of recent experience in the 
Eurozone, adding an Addendum that builds on the original content in minor ways. This act was largely 
ignored by the official sector, sovereign debtors, and the broader community of policy practitioners 
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and academics involved in debt restructuring debates. Unlike the original version, the Addendum was 
not endorsed by the G20 or any major capital-exporting countries. When the IIF asked the IMF to 
endorse its updated Principles, the Fund’s members—including major capital exporters and large 
debt-issuing countries—saw little value in doing so and refused.449 None of this bodes well for the 
new UN principles, which have neither the backing of the most powerful actors in the system nor the 
market incentives that could conceivably lead to voluntary compliance. As a result, their significance 
is likely to be more symbolic than practical. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Analyzing the reform processes and outcomes of the recent UN initiative, this chapter has argued that 
international hard-law mechanisms designed to govern the sovereign debt restructuring process face 
enormous political obstacles that make their realization unlikely. Several of these obstacles have been 
identified by previous studies, but this chapter highlights additional barriers: notably, overlooked 
sources of US and UK preferences (stemming from their concerns about how a hard-law framework 
would impact transnational property rights and the functioning of sovereign debt markets), the 
structural power of these states within the SDRR, and the sovereignty-related concerns of debtor 
governments. I also argued that, contrary to optimistic prognostications, the non-binding principles 
that ultimately emerged from the UN reform initiative are unlikely to have much concrete impact, due 
to specific political challenges but also, importantly, the general functional limitations of soft-law 
mechanisms in the SDRR. Taken together, these arguments suggest that public international law 
techniques—along the hard law-soft law spectrum—are unlikely to succeed as regulatory devices for 
sovereign debt restructuring processes, mainly for political but also for functional reasons.  
 
It is not entirely surprising that hard-law mechanisms have not emerged in the SDRR. One of the key 
impediments to a treaty-based SDRR is the sovereignty cost to which scholars of institutional design 
point.450 Because hard-law arrangements can infringe upon sovereign autonomy and authority in 
sensitive areas, the inter-state bargaining process to establish this sort of arrangement is likely to be 
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hard-fought and time-consuming, leading scholars to argue that these high negotiation costs can also 
be a deterrent from the pursuit of international treaties.451 Finally, analysts have noted that treaty-based 
agreements tend to be rigid and difficult to adapt, making them a tough sell in issue areas, such as 
global finance, that are characterized by high levels of change and uncertainty and thus require more 
flexible governance arrangements.452 But this chapter highlighted other important barriers that differ 
from the more generic factors these scholars identify. Most notably, an important objection to hard-
law solutions among key capital-exporting states relates not to their sovereignty, negotiation, or 
flexibility costs but to their potential to erode certain transnational legal and market structures, which 
in turn uphold particular forms of power, privilege, and market governance.  
 
When scholars write about the pros and cons of international hard law, it is almost always in 
comparison to soft law, such that the weakness of harder forms of governance are seen as the strengths 
of softer forms. For example, authors point out that soft-law arrangements have lower sovereignty 
and negotiation costs and are more flexible than their hard-law counterparts, making them easier to 
agree upon and more desirable in certain policy domains or for certain regulatory purposes. It is 
certainly true that the UN Principles were able to emerge because of their soft-law status and the fewer 
veto points for powerful oppositional actors to block soft-law agreements. But much of the existing 
literature suggests that hard-law and soft-law tools are selected from a broader governance toolkit 
based on the functional needs of a given problem or issue area, and that when soft law is selected, it 
is often because it provides a more effective option for dealing with the issue in question.453 In the 
UN case, however, hard law was not rejected and soft law was not chosen primarily for these 
functional reasons. Although the sovereignty concerns of debtor states could be interpreted more 
from this functionalist perspective, regulatory outcomes were shaped, first and foremost, by a political 
contest between two coalitions with divergent preferences and power capabilities. Moreover, the UN 
Principles were clearly not adopted because of their anticipated functional superiority to the hard-law 
alternative. As this chapter has emphasized, there are few reasons to expect these non-binding 
principles, or any other soft-law arrangement for that matter, to be a very effective functional 
mechanism in the SDRR. 
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Because of these limitations, the main regulatory alternative to a hard-law framework in the SDRR 
has not been soft law—as existing literature would predict—but rather private-law contracts, the 
subject of the next chapter. This and the subsequent chapter thus challenge the dominant view that 
global governance tools exist along a spectrum of international hard and soft law, and that soft law is 
the only feasible option for global finance. In addition to highlighting the importance of legal-
institutional design in determining the political (and functional) prospects for success of different 
reform initiatives, these chapters also argue that the historical legacy of earlier initiatives played a 
supplemental role in shaping recent reform preferences and processes, but mainly in a way that further 
diminished or enhanced the prospects of mechanisms whose political utility had already been 
determined by their design features. Legacy effects were seen in a relatively minor way during the UN 
initiative—notably through US officials’ immediate rejection of a reform idea that harkened back to 
the SDRM proposal—but played a more significant role in the contract reforms analyzed in following 
chapter. Although the role of the early 2000s is not the primary explanatory factor in these cases, it 
provides additional analytical leverage not available to scholars who studied earlier reform efforts in 
the SDRR but have not examined the more recent initiatives detailed in this dissertation. 
 
This chapter constitutes an important puzzle piece in the broader explanation of regulatory variation 
advanced in this dissertation. It reinforces the claim that the process-trigger distinction is only the first 
dimension of regulatory variation, and that to understand why certain process-oriented reforms fail 
while others succeed, it is necessary to look at their specific legal-institutional design features. This chapter 
discussed and showed the political and functional limitations of two such design options: international 
hard law and international soft law. The next chapter moves on to analyze recent reform initiatives 
that advanced a process-oriented mechanism with a very different regulatory design: private-law 
contracts. In doing so, it helps to complete our analytical framework for understanding regulatory 
variation in the debt restructuring regime according to, first, the process versus trigger distinction and, 





Sovereign Bond Reform 
The Restructuring Process and the Promise of Contract Mechanisms 
 
1. Introduction 
Before the UN initiative took off, efforts were already being made to improve sovereign debt 
restructuring processes. In response to Greece and Europe’s broader debt crisis, Eurozone leaders 
agreed that all members of the currency bloc should have some mechanism for rewriting their debts 
in the event of a crisis and mandated the inclusion of a standardized CAC in all Eurozone sovereign 
bonds issued after 2012. Overnight, new restructuring rules were applied to bond markets worth 
trillions of euros.454 Meanwhile, Greece’s restructuring of its English-law bonds in 2012 and 
Argentina’s legal defeat in New York courts that same year highlighted the growing capacity of holdout 
creditors to disrupt debt workouts in the key jurisdictions where foreign debt was issued, prompting 
a separate reform initiative. Led by US Treasury officials, this initiative unfolded through a series of 
working-group meetings among representatives of EMDE debtor states, capital-exporting countries, 
and private creditors. Within a year, the group had agreed on new ‘super-CACs’ capable of significantly 
neutralizing holdouts in EMDE foreign debt. Since October 2014, these clauses have been widely 
adopted by debtor states.455 Importantly, they introduce a key bankruptcy feature that motivated past 
proposals for a more centralized system: the ability to bring together all bondholders and restructure 
debt through a single supermajority vote that forces any minority holdouts to go along with the deal. 
 
Both reforms focused not on establishing a sovereign bankruptcy regime under public international 
law, as the UN initiative had, but rather on replicating key features of a bankruptcy process within the 
contract terms of the bonds that governments issued under domestic private-law regimes. They also 
succeeded in strengthening the debt restructuring process where the UN initiative had failed. What 
explains the success of these contract reform initiatives? As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 4), the existing 
literature provides few clues as to why private-law contracts flourished where public international law 
floundered. Although the early 2000s saw the introduction of an earlier, more basic version of CACs, 
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that episode has been treated as a one-off event shaped by idiosyncratic and context-specific factors, 
thus failing to explain the return and strengthening of contracts in the more recent context and in 
response to new challenges. The few accounts of recent contract reforms offer useful guidance, but 
they overlook politically-salient aspects of regulatory design by treating the new CACs as either a 
symbolic solution (discounting material motivations) or a functional one (ignoring the fact that other 
mechanisms, including hard-law arrangements, are equally justified on functionalist grounds). 
 
This chapter argues that private-law contract mechanisms possess two key qualities that set them apart 
from the regulatory arrangements discussed in previous chapters and that have enabled their success 
in the SDRR. First, unlike the IMF lending rules analyzed in Chapter 4, they are designed to govern 
the debt workout process rather than trigger restructurings. The fact that process mechanisms provide 
an opportunity for joint gains without making restructurings more likely in the first place was crucial 
in mobilizing political support for contract reforms, especially during the Treasury-led initiative. 
Second, in contrast to the other process mechanisms examined in Chapter 5, their legal-institutional 
design is politically acceptable and functionally effective. That is because contract tools are embedded 
within—rather than located above—existing domestic legal structures, thus avoiding the political 
pitfalls of international hard-law mechanisms. They are also precise and legally binding, making 
contracts functionally superior to international arrangements of a purely soft-law variety. Private-law 
contract mechanisms like CACs can enhance the efficiency of the restructuring process without 
overriding state sovereignty or the legal foundations of transnational property rights, making them a 
unique and politically useful device for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt restructuring, 
especially for the leading capital-exporting states but also for EMDE debtors and private creditors.     
 
I also argue that the historical legacy of the original CACs introduced in the early 2000s was important 
in shaping and reinforcing preferences in favour of further contract innovation more recently. I point 
to four reasons for this historical effect. First, the debates of the early 2000s clarified and reinforced 
US regulatory preferences. When the need for further improvements to the debt restructuring process 
arose recently, US officials moved immediately to promote the contractual approach as their preferred 
option. Second, both US and Eurozone officials found it easier to adopt and adapt an existing 
governance tool rather than construct a brand new one. The original CACs provided reformers with 
a blueprint to follow. In the case of US Treasury-led reforms, the blueprint included instructions on 
how to engineer a voluntary shift in contract terms, and the presence of ‘repeat players’ from the early 
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2000s made these instructions easier to follow. Third, experience with the original CACs shifted debtor 
and creditor preferences, such that they went from accepting contract reform as a lesser evil in the 
early 2000s to embracing it as desirable in its own right after 2012. This shift was particularly important 
to the Treasury-led contract reform initiative, whose success hinged on the active cooperation of 
debtors and creditors. Fourth, in the recent crisis and reform context, familiarity with CACs increased 
the political utility of contract mechanisms as a tool for enhancing legal and market certainty around 
the debt restructuring process. The role of historical legacies resonates with historical institutionalist 
approaches, which recognize the importance of prior institutional developments in shaping 
subsequent preferences and processes.456 But it is important to stress that these legacies play a 
supplemental explanatory role: they enhanced the prospects of a regulatory mechanism whose 
politically utility had already been determined by its process-orientation and legal-institutional design. 
 
To represent it visually, this chapter advances the broader argument of the dissertation by addressing 
the remaining branch of the feasibility tree presented below: the “Private Law Contracts” branch 
situated on the lower right-hand side under the broader “Process” heading. 
 














                                                        















This chapter contributes to IPE and global governance literatures by filling important empirical gaps 
in our understanding of sovereign debt governance. The reforms analyzed in this chapter have 
received little scholarly attention and, despite their similarities, have not yet been examined within the 
same analysis. The argument developed here makes sense of both initiatives and also lays down the 
third and final puzzle piece that, when combined with the insights of the previous two chapters, 
completes a novel framework for understanding regulatory variation in the SDRR, thus contributing 
to the theoretical development of an important but overlooked area of global financial governance. 
 
The arguments advanced in this chapter also contribute to broader theoretical debates about 
institutional design and development and the role of contracts in global governance. While the last 
chapter emphasized the limitations of public international law mechanisms in the SDRR, this one 
highlights the political utility of an alternative—private-law contracts—that does not fit within the 
hard law-soft law dichotomy and is generally ignored as an instrument of global governance. When 
contracts are analyzed by scholars of world politics, they are often treated as generic agreements—
hard-law and soft-law arrangements could be understood as contracts from this perspective—or as 
tools of private order. 457 In showcasing the use of contracts as regulatory mechanisms in public-private 
reform initiatives, this chapter also helps to broaden current understandings of the use and purpose 
of contracts in global governance. Finally, the chapter highlights the role of historical legacies and 
processes not as stand-alone explanations but as factors that interact with, and shape understandings 
of, regulatory design features in ways that have shifted the politics of reform in the SDRR over time. 
In doing so, it contributes to discussions of where, when, and how—rather than if—history matters 
to contemporary political developments.   
 
In the next section of this chapter, I analyze the initiative that led to the introduction of Eurozone 
CACs, showing how the key characteristics of contract mechanisms, combined with the historical 
legacy of the original CACs, made a contractual solution politically easier, more acceptable, and more 
useful than alternative arrangements, especially given the delicate context in which European decision-
makers found themselves. I then describe the US Treasury-led initiative and explain how continued 
US preferences for a contract approach, also combined with the historical legacy of the original CACs 
and, in particular, its impact on debtor and creditor preferences, paved the way for the speedy 
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introduction of robust contract reforms in EMDE bonds. The following section briefly evaluates the 
effectiveness of CACs and suggests that new contract mechanisms represent a tangible and 
significant—though not transformative—strengthening of the SDRR. The final section concludes.  
 
2. Eurozone Contract Reform 
Debates about reforming Europe’s financial governance architecture began in 2010, shortly after the 
2010 Greek bailout discussed in Chapter 4. In addition to the controversies surrounding the IMF’s 
role, the Greek rescue generated a political backlash in the core surplus Eurozone countries, notably 
Germany, where citizens complained that their taxes were being used to rescue profligate countries 
and private investors from their own mistakes. In response, European leaders quickly launched 
discussions about creating new institutions to better safeguard financial stability and facilitate burden-
sharing in the resolution of future crises. In October 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel met in Deauville France, where they agreed to pursue a permanent 
European crisis resolution regime, including a debt restructuring mechanism for Eurozone states. The 
declaration that emerged from that Franco-German summit noted that treaty amendments would be 
required to establish “a robust crisis resolution framework,” but it was extremely vague about what 
the new restructuring mechanism might look like, stating only that it would secure “adequate 
participation from private creditors” in the resolution of future crises.458 
 
Around that time, the idea of a treaty-based sovereign bankruptcy framework had gained renewed 
attention and was being discussed in the context of Europe.459 In November 2010, Anne Krueger and 
colleagues published a paper arguing that Europe should adopt its own version of the IMF’s earlier 
SDRM proposal.460 Many speculated that this kind of arrangement might indeed be what Germany 
had in mind. Shortly after the Deauville summit The Economist published an article titled, “What do 
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German calls for an orderly sovereign-default scheme mean in practice?”461 Other major news outlets 
reported that the new framework would likely include CACs but might also involve the creation of a 
European SDRM.462 The speculation and uncertainty about the details of a mechanism designed to 
facilitate creditor losses roiled financial markets, triggering a dramatic spike in sovereign bond yields 
referred to as the “Deauville effect.”463 As Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin Zettelmeyer reported 
roughly a month after the Deauville summit, “proponents of a European Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring Mechanism are currently facing a backlash. Calls for a European-wide mechanism are 
viewed as the principle cause for the escalation of the crisis in Ireland and contagion within the 
Eurozone.”464 
 
On November 28, 2010, under immense pressure from financial markets to reveal their plans, 
Eurozone finance ministers announced their intention to introduce standardized CACs in the 
sovereign bonds of all Eurozone states, starting January 1, 2013.465 The task of drafting these new 
clauses was delegated to the Sub-Committee on EU Government Bonds and Bills, a technical group 
under the Economic and Financial Committee of the EU.466 Their objective was to create a uniform 
set of restructuring terms that could be inserted into otherwise non-standardized bond contracts and 
applied across substantially variegated domestic jurisdictions. To help with the design challenge, the 
Sub-Committee hired Cleary Gottlieb—the law firm that represented Mexico when it first issued 
CACs in 2003. The drafting process involved extensive consultations with the financial industry, which 
gave feedback on the design of the new mechanism.467 Roughly two years after the announcement to 
move toward CACs, the reform process culminated in September 2012 with the ratification of the 
treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Among other things, the ESM treaty 
mandated Eurozone states to include identical CACs in all international and domestic sovereign bonds 
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that had a maturity of more than one year and were issued after 2012.468 Overnight, uniform debt 
restructuring rules were imposed on government bond markets worth trillions of euros.469 
 
The CACs adopted in Europe differed from the traditional ones in a few important respects. Unlike 
the contract terms adopted by EMDEs starting in the early 2000s, euro CACs were mandated by an 
intergovernmental treaty. This approach did not fit with the dichotomous debates of a decade prior, 
which consistently emphasized the voluntary nature of contracts and contrasted them with top-down, 
government-imposed measures. Mandating contract reform in this way reflected the power and desire 
of European institutions to implement standardized rules across all Eurozone countries. It also 
changed the dynamic of the reform process compared to the early 2000s or the US Treasury-led 
initiative that came later, both of which relied on the voluntary adoption of new contract terms by 
debtors and their private creditors. That said, Eurozone officials from different countries—including 
debtors—had to strike bargains amongst themselves before settling on their collective approach, and 
they remained attuned to how their plans would impact private financial markets.  
 
At this point, one might quip that Europe’s restructuring rules were introduced through an 
international hard-law mechanism, therefore invalidating the claims made in the previous chapter. But 
this reading would be mistaken. In no way did the ESM treaty establish sovereign bankruptcy rules 
and procedures under international law, as the UN initiative and the SDRM proposal before it sought 
to do. It simply gave an authoritative directive to Eurozone states to embed standard CACs into the 
private-law bond contracts they issued under domestic and foreign jurisdictions. The bonds 
themselves would continue to be governed by the local laws and courts of these jurisdictions—not a 
supranational bankruptcy court. 
 
The content of euro CACs also differed from the original model, with the former being simultaneously 
more and less ambitious than the latter. On one hand, euro CACs contain an aggregation feature that 
enables more comprehensive debt restructuring than traditional CACs. Bonds with first-generation 
CACs can only be restructured on a series-by-series basis—that is, with each individual bond series 
being restructured separately, provided it achieves the consent of a qualified majority (typically 75 
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percent) within that particular series. By contrast, euro CACs allow for cross-series modification (also 
known as aggregation), which brings together bondholders from different series, allows them to vote 
as a collective, and, if a threshold of consent is achieved, binds them to a more comprehensive 
restructuring agreement. On the other hand, this aggregation feature is hamstrung by a key limitation: 
it relies on a ‘two-limb’ voting structure, which means that amending the bonds requires a minimum 
threshold of support both (a) in each individual series (66 2/3 percent of outstanding principal) and 
(b) across all series being restructured.470 The implication is that, under euro CACs, no individual bond 
series can be restructured without a minimum level of support (75 percent) across all series.471 This 
‘two-limb’ voting structure thus introduces a new obstacle to restructuring—one that did not exist in 
the original CACs—while at the same time helping to remedy an old one: the inability to effectively 
aggregate bondholders. 
 
Introducing CACs in Europe made some intuitive sense. Before the Eurozone crisis, the conventional 
wisdom had been that sovereign bankruptcies only happen in the developing world. Advanced 
economies had done little contingency planning for their own potential debt difficulties. Although 
European governments had agreed to include first-generation CACs in their international bonds back 
in 2003 as a show of solidarity with their EMDE counterparts, the vast majority of their debt took the 
form of domestic-law bonds, which did not include CACs or any other mechanism to coordinate 
debtor-creditor action in the event of a restructuring. When the Greek crisis erupted and debt 
restructuring in Europe began to look like a distinct possibility, the policy response was thus to fill 
this gap by importing the contractual framework into the Eurozone where it previously did not exist. 
But the lack of a mechanism to facilitate the restructuring of both domestic and international bonds 
could have equally been solved, from a functional or technical perspective, by establishing a European 
SDRM. As some observers pointed out, creating a hard-law sovereign bankruptcy regime might also 
be more politically feasible in Europe, “where the practice of ceding some national legal powers to a 
larger entity is long established.”472 Why, then, did Eurozone leaders opt for contract mechanisms? 
 
                                                        
470 IMF, ‘Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring,’ IMF Policy Papers (October 2014).  
471 Ibid. 
472 The Economist, ‘What do German calls for an orderly sovereign-default scheme mean in practice?’ See also Odette Lienau, 
‘Extending the European Debt Discussion to Broader International Governance,’ Cornell Law Faculty Publications 
(2011). At:  http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2018&context=facpub 
 170 
The first and simplest answer is that an earlier form of CACs already existed and thus provided a 
template for Eurozone policymakers to build upon. Rather than re-inventing the wheel, Eurozone 
reformers turned to CACs as a ready-made solution that could quickly and easily be adapted and 
transplanted to Europe. As a then senior IMF official put it:  
 
Even though intellectually many of the Europeans would have liked to have a 
European SDRM, there was just no appetite to basically have that fight again. They 
needed to come up with some practical reforms that they could implement. So I think, 
not surprisingly, they reached for a collective action framework. They looked around, 
and they took what was the most ambitious framework in place at that time.473 
 
Indeed, when European officials presented the idea of Eurozone CACs, they explicitly framed them 
as an extension of earlier reforms and existing market practice, stating that they would “be based on 
those commonly used in the UK and US.”474 Asked about the origins of euro CACs, a former US 
Treasury official responded: “I think that some of the people, the Germans and the French staff, may 
have reverted to the IMF playbook, or things they were familiar with from their IMF background, and 
that’s where they may have come up with euro CACs.”475  
 
Although Eurozone reformers modified the existing CACs in a number of ways to fit their needs and 
context, some observers argued that CACs looked like an ill-fitting solution in Europe. As Gelpern 
and Gulati pointed out, “in contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, no policy maker had identified a collective 
action problem for Collective Action Clauses to solve in Europe.”476 The authors use this point to 
support their argument that euro CACs were more symbolic than substantial. But the lack of a perfect 
fit between the problem and solution can equally be seen as a reflection of the fact that CACs were 
borrowed from a different context rather than designed for post-2010 Europe specifically. Moreover, 
euro CACs were not a response to collective action problems in Europe because no Eurozone country 
had yet restructured its debt. Policymakers could, however, anticipate such problems, since they were 
a consistent feature of debt restructurings—one that indeed materialized during the later Greek debt 
workout. This does not imply that CACs were a functionally optimal solution from a rational design 
perspective, or that they were devoid of any symbolic content. The point, rather, is that European 
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officials were guided by previous regulatory developments in their decision to adopt and adapt an 
existing governance tool that, while imperfect in various ways, could prove useful in future 
restructurings and in setting out a predictable framework for such events ex ante. Building upon an 
established and fairly market-friendly framework was also a particularly useful regulatory approach 
given the fragile financial-market conditions in Europe at the time and the desire of Eurozone 
policymakers not to further destabilize markets via more radical and unknown reforms.     
 
This account is consistent with historical institutionalist perspectives that emphasize the importance 
of prior institutional choices in shaping the trajectory of later policy developments. In the language of 
historical institutionalism, the emergence of CACs in the early 2000s was a ‘critical juncture’ that 
established definitive grooves along which subsequent reform efforts were more likely to travel.477 
Rather than a brand-new arrangement, Eurozone CACs resemble the type of institutional ‘layering’ 
that occurs when new rules are attached to existing ones.478 The historical legacy of Eurozone contract 
reforms is also consistent with insights from Nikhil Kalyanpur and Abraham Newman’s ‘design by 
bricolage’ approach, which argues that institutional design “is often driven by the means available to 
the designer rather than the problem that the designer faces.”479 Instead of designing an optimal 
solution from scratch to precisely fit the problem at hand, as rational design theory suggests, reformers 
typically use and reconfigure instruments from the existing stock of governance tools.  
 
The role of historical processes in this episode did not diminish the importance of the underlying 
characteristics that made contract reforms politically acceptable and useful in the first place: their 
process-orientation and their legally-embedded design. The fact that euro CACs were a mechanism 
that would govern the restructuring process but play no role in triggering debt write-downs in the first 
place was an important aspect of their success, relative to the IMF reforms of Chapter 4 but also to 
other proposals in the European context. When reform debates first got underway among European 
officials, reports circulated that German policymakers envisioned a new Eurozone SDRR comprising 
both a trigger and process element.480 Their idea was to make private creditor haircuts a condition of 
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all ESM financing. When countries requested and were approved for financial support from the ESM, 
it would automatically trigger a restructuring, the modalities of which would then be worked out 
between the debtor and its creditors through a process facilitated by CACs. The idea of automatic 
haircuts was extremely sensitive at the time. The IMF’s trigger mechanism had just been undermined 
to pave the way for the 2010 Greek bailout. Many peripheral Eurozone countries were teetering and 
feared the market reaction to such proposals. And France, the main counterweight to Germany in 
Eurozone politics, was strongly in favour of case-by-case decision-making when it came to questions 
of whether and when countries—especially European ones—should go through a debt restructuring.  
 
By their own account, French officials managed to convince their German counterparts that plans for 
an automatic trigger mechanism had to be scrapped to keep financial markets stable and avoid 
undermining the euro.481 In subsequent discussions and documents, Eurozone representatives went 
out of their way to clarify that CACs were simply about the process and big decisions about bailouts 
and restructurings would proceed on a case-by-case basis without any ‘automaticity.’482 In a December 
2010 memo, the European Commission made a point of emphasizing that “[t]he insertion of collective 
action clauses does not per se increase the risk of restructuring. The clause is a simple tool to facilitate 
the discussion between a debtor and its creditors.”483 A July 2011 explanatory note from the Sub-
Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets reiterated that the standardized CACs to be implemented 
in 2013 will “not increase the probability of a euro area issuer defaulting on or modifying its debt 
securities.”484 Unlike the early 2000s when the trigger and process were tightly and intentionally 
coupled, European officials were now making efforts to de-couple these two concepts and reassure 
financial markets that their reforms would not result in more debt restructurings.  
 
Beyond fears of an adverse market reaction, Europe’s rejection of an ESM-based trigger mechanism 
reflected a deeper set of preferences within France, as well as Italy and other southern European 
countries, which were keenly aware of the financial instability that restructurings could generate. For 
them, a key lesson of the IMF’s 2010 systemic exemption reform was that trigger mechanisms could 
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prove highly undesirable in certain crisis situations and that discretion and case-by-case decision-
making were thus preferable. German policymakers, who were also weary of provoking market turmoil 
and whose views had also been somewhat tempered by the systemic exemption episode, accepted that 
the automatic trigger proposal had to be dropped to maintain broad political support among Eurozone 
countries for the ESM treaty, including its commitment to a new restructuring process based on CACs. 
Getting the political bargain right mattered, because the ESM treaty would have to be approved by all 
member states and ratified by national parliaments before taking effect.  
 
Process orientation was therefore important, but so too was the fact that Eurozone CACs were 
embedded within—not located above—existing systems of contractual rights and obligations. As 
Chapter 5 showed, the idea of a treaty-based regime was not just a sovereignty issue; capital-exporting 
states also worried it would contradict and clash with the domestic legal foundations of cross-border 
property rights in ways that politicized and increased uncertainty in sovereign debt markets. The 
context in which European leaders were operating in 2010 was already one of intense market turmoil. 
Any announcement related to debt restructuring was bound to arouse concerns among market 
participants. But these concerns could be mitigated through the use of a contract mechanism that 
rearticulated—rather than trumped—investor rights, that was relatively clear and predictable in its 
workings, and that shared the same name as an already well-known instrument in EMDE bonds. In 
fact, introducing euro CACs could even reduce uncertainty in some areas by spelling out for investors 
how the sovereign debt restructuring process would work in Europe after 2012.  
 
Here, the legal-institutional design of contracts combined with the historical legacy of the original 
CACs in a way that only enhanced the political acceptability and utility of further contract reforms, 
especially in the precarious context of an ongoing debt crisis in Europe. The market reaction to 
Deauville was a forceful reminder of the uncertainty and instability that even speculation about a 
SDRM-style arrangement could sow. The Franco-German decision to open this Pandora’s Box was 
heavily criticized by other Eurozone governments, particularly those struggling to maintain market 
access, as well as officials outside the currency bloc.485 Financial press and market participants further 
stressed the uncertainty that vague discussions of a new debt restructuring mechanism were creating. 
                                                        
485 A private interview with a US government official confirmed that American decision-makers were critical of the 
Deauville summit and the ambiguous pronouncements of a new European debt restructuring regime that emerged from 
it.  
 174 
As one financial daily put it: “Markets can deal with tough decisions. Even debt restructuring can be 
orderly and planned for. The one thing markets do not like is policy uncertainty.”486 The chief 
economist at IHS Markit, a global financial information company, confirmed: “This whole scenario 
of burden-sharing for bondholders is scaring people. The plans have changed so many times, investors 
don’t know what to believe any more.”487 At the same time, high-profile market actors were indicating 
that, in their view, CACs could be an appropriate and useful compromise for resolving the situation. 
Josef Ackermann, then president of Deutsche Bank and chairman of the IIF, expressed his support 
for euro CACs shortly before Eurozone leaders announced their plans for contract reform.488 So did 
the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), which noted that the inclusion of CACs and 
other standard bond terms would give Eurozone debt securities greater appeal by clarifying their legal 
terms and conditions.489 Observers suggest that these developments indeed shaped the decision to go 
with CACs and abandon the more radical proposals that had been floated.490  
 
Familiarity with the original CACs made the prospect of contract reforms less frightening to markets 
than it was in the early 2000s. Since that earlier episode, private creditors had learned that CACs did 
not lead to more debt restructurings or undermine investor rights. Efforts to frame euro CACs as 
simply an extension of the existing contractual model—even though they differed from those issued 
in the US and UK—was both an indication of where the idea for CACs came from and a tactic to 
convince markets that this reform was not a radical departure from the status quo. “Markets would 
accept CACs,” noted Gelpern and Gulati, “if they remembered them as the benign reform that had 
diffused the last PSI flare-up and ended SDRM.”491 In short, the fact that euro CACs could provide a 
debt workout mechanism that neither triggered restructurings nor trumped investor rights—and that 
market actors could understand this as a result of their experience with the original collective action 
approach—made contract reform a particularly useful approach for Eurozone leaders looking to 
strengthen the SDRR at a time of tremendous market sensitivity. 
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Even after euro CACs were announced, Eurozone governments continued to debate their merits. In 
late 2011, with market confidence in Eurozone debt fading, France, Italy, and Spain even tried to 
convince Germany and other northern countries that CACs should be dropped from the draft text of 
the ESM treaty.492 But the potential for euro CACs to serve as a stabilizing rather than disruptive force 
in European debt markets became clearer after the spring of 2012, when Greece restructured roughly 
€200 billion worth of bonds owed to private investors.493 The majority of Greek government debt was 
in the form of domestic-law bonds that did not yet include the new CACs. However, because the debt 
was governed by domestic law, the government was able to apply CACs retroactively through 
legislative fiat—a move that proved crucial to achieving a very high level of creditor participation in 
the domestic portion of its debt exchange. Scholars who saw euro CACs as symbolic pointed to the 
Greek restructuring as evidence that new contracts were not actually needed.494 After all, if most 
Eurozone debt was governed by domestic law that states could retroactively change to include CACs 
if needed, why write CACs into the bonds in the first place? 
 
But this assessment misses a key point: Greece’s retrofitting of CACs trampled on the private contracts 
governing Greek debt obligations, generating market outrage as well as uncertainty about whether 
other Eurozone governments might do the same in the future.495 In this context, creating a predictable 
restructuring process through the ex ante adoption of Eurozone CACs began to look like a market-
friendly solution to what one German official called “ex-post blackmail” in reference to the Greek 
restructuring.496 Coming into force in 2013 and providing a fresh start after Greece, CACs could help 
reduce market uncertainty by spelling out how future restructurings would be handled. In this context, 
CACs could be seen by market actors not as a lesser evil to an international hard-law arrangement, as 
they were in the early 2000s, but as a genuine market improvement, “providing greater transparency 
to debt holders with regard to the effects of a sovereign debt crisis on their property rights.”497 
 
After the Greek restructuring, market attitudes toward the introduction of Eurozone CACs turned 
decidedly favorable, indicating that they did indeed have a positive effect on market expectations. As 
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a memo from PIMCO stated in October 2012: “On balance, the introduction of CACs in European 
government bond markets in 2013 is positive for investors.”498 Likewise, a Credit Suisse memo called 
the Eurozone CACs “an important first step” to “increase transparency in the Eurozone sovereign 
debt markets” and “provide clarity to sovereign bondholders regarding their rights.”499 It also ranked 
the attractiveness of different categories of bonds in terms of bondholder rights, from most to least 
attractive, in the following way: (1) foreign-law bonds without CACs, (2) foreign-law bonds with 
CACs, (3) domestic-law bonds with CACs, and (4) domestic-law bonds without CACs.”500 In foreign-
law bonds, having no CACs is most desirable because they are harder to restructure, but in domestic-
law bonds, those without CACs are the least desirable because they are shrouded in the most 
uncertainty in terms of how they might be restructured.  
 
Since being rolled-out at the start of 2013, evidence suggests that euro CACs have indeed reduced the 
perceived risk and uncertainty of Eurozone sovereign bonds in the eyes of private investors. A recent 
study on the market treatment of Eurozone CACs finds that “CAC bonds trade at lower yields than 
otherwise similar no-CAC bonds” because “markets see CACs as reducing the legal risk embedded in 
domestic law sovereign bonds.”501 The finding that CAC provisions are viewed favorably by market 
participants is directly linked to market perceptions in the aftermath of the Greek restructuring. As 
the authors explain, compared to bonds without CACs, bonds with CACs are viewed as carrying a 
lower “legal risk” of “being subject to a Greek-style retrofit.”502  
 
It would have been impossible for European policymakers to predict the impact of euro CACs when 
they first proposed and were subsequently developing this approach. But there are good reasons to 
believe that the idea that Greece would change its domestic laws to facilitate debt restructuring was 
well-known to European reformers as they were discussing and drafting their new contract terms. In 
2010, the preeminent sovereign debt lawyer Lee Buchheit had co-authored a widely discussed paper 
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describing how to restructure Greek debt by retroactively applying very strong CACs to the domestic 
bonds through an act of legislation.503 Signs that this strategy might indeed be used became significantly 
stronger when the Greek government hired Buchheit in 2011 in preparation for their 2012 debt 
exchange.504 Surveying this landscape, European decision-makers likely saw the introduction of 
uniform and market-friendly restructuring rules throughout the Eurozone starting in 2013 as, among 
other things, a useful way to enhance legal predictability for bondholders once the Greek mess had 
been cleaned up, and in the wake of any fallout from that the tactics of that clean-up.    
 
So what explains the introduction of Eurozone CACs? In sum, I argue that the process-oriented and 
legally-embedded nature of this contract mechanism, combined with the historical legacy of the 
original CACs, made a contractual solution politically easier, more acceptable both to governments 
and financial markets, and thus more useful than the main alternative (a European SDRM), especially 
given the sensitive context in which European policymakers were operating. Not only were contracts 
expected to be less disruptive than a hard-law arrangement; in the midst of heightened market 
uncertainty about how restructurings in Eurozone countries might shake out, deploying now-familiar 
and relatively non-threatening contract changes could even be seen as a way of introducing greater 
predictability and legal certainty for bondholders.  
 
It is useful to briefly clarify what this argument does not explain. It does not explain the exhaustive 
range of motivations behind the decision to pursue and promote SDRR reform in Europe in the first 
place. Of course, some of these motivations are relatively straightforward in light of the challenges 
Europe was facing and the pressures to resolve them through institutional innovations. But other 
potential driving forces include, as Gelpern and Gulati have outlined, the desire to both promote and 
signal greater debtor-creditor burden sharing in crisis resolution, the demand for an explicit rulebook 
for European crisis management, and the need to introduce more market discipline by indicating that 
not all Eurozone sovereign bonds were risk-free assets.505 These factors speak to the various reasons 
for pursuing reform but not to the choice of the specific institutional mechanism for the task. My 
claim is that CACs were chosen because of their design and history, which enabled the emergence of a 
contract fix where alternative arrangements faced major roadblocks. Contracts were more politically 
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feasible than alternative options, but they were also more useful in light of some of the motivations 
for pursuing reform. For example, the desire to lay out a consistent and predictable restructuring 
rulebook was better served by layering new rules onto existing legal frameworks rather than creating 
a separate framework whose relation to existing legal obligations was ambiguous or even antagonistic. 
 
3. US Treasury-Led Contract Reform 
If the Greek episode showed that CACs could be useful in the domestic debt markets of Eurozone 
economies, it simultaneously highlighted a significant weakness of traditional CACs: their inability to 
prevent holdout creditors from derailing debt restructurings. This shortcoming became apparent 
during the restructuring of Greece’s English-law bonds—a smaller segment of the country’s overall 
debt but one that already included CACs as a standard feature of bonds issued in the English market. 
Despite the inclusion of these contract terms, attempts to restructure the bonds were marred by 
holdout creditors. As noted in Chapter 5, only 17 of Greece’s 36 English-law bonds were successfully 
renegotiated. The remainder were obstructed by specialized holdouts who bought ‘blocking positions’ 
(16 percent in series requiring 85 percent supermajority approval, and 26 percent in those requiring 75 
percent approval) in individual bond series that were sufficient to unilaterally prevent their 
restructuring.506 This outcome highlighted an important design flaw with the original CACs. Because 
these clauses applied to each individual bond series rather than the total stock of outstanding bonds, 
restructuring had to be done on a series-by-series basis, allowing for a situation where some bonds 
achieved the supermajority approval to restructure while others did not.  
 
From a technical standpoint, this issue could be resolved by writing new CACs that applied to all 
outstanding bonds rather than each series individually. This type of ‘aggregation’ would pool all 
bondholders and have them vote as a single group, making it prohibitively costly for a lone holdout 
to establish a blocking position (say 26 percent) over the entire stock of a country’s bond debt. When 
a restructuring offer was rejected, it would be more likely that a large portion of creditors were 
unhappy with the deal than that a strategic holdout had interfered to spoil an otherwise widely accepted 
agreement. The potential pitfalls of a series-by-series collective action mechanism had been recognized 
as far back as the early 2000s, but introducing bond aggregation in the original CACs was seen as 
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politically unrealistic at the time—more than the already-recalcitrant market would be willing to 
accept—and was not shown to be clearly necessary until the Greek restructuring. As discussed earlier, 
the Europeans had decided to build upon the traditional template by including an aggregation feature 
in their new CACs. One will recall, however, that their ‘two-limb’ approach, while opening up a 
pathway to a single restructuring across all bonds, in some ways created more blocking opportunities 
along the way. Votes at the level of the individual bond series could block the aggregate level; the 
aggregate vote could likewise block the modification of individual bonds.        
 
The lack of aggregation in traditional CACs had non-trivial consequences in the Greek episode. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the only-partial restructuring of Greece’s English-law bonds provided less 
debt relief to the country than it could have, produced highly unequal distributional results for 
different creditors, and strengthened incentives for all creditors to holdout from future sovereign debt 
workouts.507 
 
An even bigger shock to the debt restructuring system came in the form of a controversial New York-
court ruling against Argentina just months after the Greek restructuring. As Chapter 5 noted, the case 
was driven by a small group of vulture fund holdouts—led by NML Capital, a subsidiary of the hedge 
fund Elliott Management—and the judge’s ruling turned on his interpretation of the pari passu clause 
in Argentina’s bonds. These bonds had been defaulted on since 2001 and, as a result of their age, did 
not contain CACs that could be used to sweep the holdouts into restructuring deals that had been 
accepted by 93 percent of the country’s bondholders. The vultures were free to litigate for full 
repayment. The New York judge’s 2012 ruling ordered Argentina to repay the holdouts the full original 
value of the bonds plus accrued interest and damages and forbade the country from making payments 
to creditors whose claims had been restructured until it did so. To enforce his ruling, the judge 
threatened to hold in contempt of court any third parties that helped Argentina circumvent the 
judgment. When Argentina tried to pay restructured bondholders in the summer of 2014, the money 
was frozen at the Bank of New York Mellon, triggering another default and piling an additional $29 
billion atop the mountain of Argentina’s unpaid debt. US courts even managed to prevent the 
Argentine government from issuing local-law bonds in Buenos Aires, where the local branch of the 
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American Citibank served as the trustee. “The net effect,” wrote Gelpern, “was a court-imposed 
financial boycott of the government.”508   
 
In response to the Greek and Argentine shocks, US Treasury officials convened a working group in 
April 2013—the ‘Sovereign Debt Roundtable’—with the aim of reforming the SDRR to address the 
issues described above. The group comprised select debtor states (including Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil, 
and Turkey), capital-exporting countries (including the UK, France, and Germany), private creditors 
(including the IIF and the ICMA), IMF representatives, and sovereign debt experts.509 From the outset, 
it was clear that American officials were only interested in reforms that built upon the contractual 
framework, which remained politically palatable compared to other process mechanisms because of 
its legal-institutional design. Mark Sobel, the Treasury official who chaired the Roundtable, continued 
to frame contract reform in opposition to the statutory approach of a SDRM—as in the early 2000s—
and explicitly rejected the latter. In his words, “[t]he [reform] effort was premised on the US retaining 
its long-standing reservations about statutory approaches and instead examining what changes in the 
‘pari passu clause’ and in ‘bond aggregation’ could strengthen and impact renewed vigor to the 
contractual framework.”510 
 
The enduring US preference for contracts over treaties thus continued to reflect American interests 
in maintaining the primacy of US laws and courts in the debt regime.511 But it also reflected US interests 
in maintaining predictable investor rights even as officials sought to strengthen the capacity of debtors 
to re-write the terms of their bonds. As US officials had pointed out in the early 2000s, CACs would 
produce less market uncertainty than a SDRM because they would embed restructuring procedures 
within a transparent, apolitical, and voluntary system of contracts, rather than create a supranational 
system that could trump contracts on the basis of broader economic considerations. Reflecting upon 
US thinking at the time, Randal Quarles, the former Treasury official who led the development of 
model CACs in the early 2000s, remarked that “providing a mechanism in the debt contracts 
themselves for modifying the terms of the foreign bonds […] would be a better alternative than 
creating an external, supranational legal regime that would override the terms of those contracts.”512 
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Even if the SDRM could have been agreed upon, he noted, “the ability to avoid politicization of such 
a tribunal’s decisions was slim […] so the benefit of additional restructuring flexibility in distress would 
be bought at too high a cost in increased uncertainty about the outcomes of the insolvency process.”513  
 
Not only did this remain true for US officials in 2013, but, in this context, contract reforms started to 
look like a useful way to actively stabilize expectations and respond to the heightened uncertainty 
stemming from the Greek and Argentine episodes—similar to the effects of Eurozone CACs. If a 
SDRM was seen as something that would rock the boat, and the original CACs had been viewed as 
more neutral, contract reforms now looked like a potential stabilizer. This owed to a combination of 
their legal-institutional design and the historical legacy of the original CACs. Prior to 2003, there was 
a degree of uncertainty associated with regulatory change of any sort, despite it being lower for CACs 
than for the SDRM.514 But once CACs were implemented, the question marks largely vanished along 
with much of the opposition to this approach, making further incremental contract reform capable of 
enhancing the predictability of restructuring procedures without generating major concerns about 
upsetting the status quo.515  
 
The potential capacity of contract reforms to mitigate uncertainty only enhanced their political utility 
after 2012. By strengthening incentives for creditors to hold-out and litigate for full repayment, both 
the Greek and Argentine episodes generated major questions about the future of debt restructuring. 
Creditors worried that rampant holdouts would lead to more unequal outcomes among creditors and 
less predictability in sovereign debt investments. They were especially agitated by the injunction against 
Argentina, which took the majority of its creditors hostage and hijacked the international payments 
system to enforce a favorable judgment for a small group of holdouts. The American Bankers 
Association noted that “permitting injunctions that preclude pre-existing obligations whenever 
expedient to enforce a judgment against the debtor will have significantly adverse consequences for 
the financial system.”516 A representative for the Bank of New York Mellon warned that the judgment 
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would “create unrest in the credit markets and result in cascades of litigation.”517 Debtors were 
concerned about falling victim to this rising tide of litigation, particularly under New York law where 
the Argentine case had set a precedent. US Treasury officials worried that debtors might respond by 
issuing more of their bonds in alternative jurisdictions, chipping away at New York’s role as a leading 
center for the issuance of foreign-law bonds.518 This could begin to erode the central position of the 
US legal, financial, and monetary systems in the sovereign debt regime, in turn diminishing the benefits 
the US derives from this position (those described in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 3). A Treasury official 
interviewed for this project summarized US thinking at the time in the following terms: 
 
this is not good for New York as a financial center. Would people then take the business 
to London? Because we had indications that London courts would not rule as the US 
courts had. And would issuers denominate in euro to avoid being ensnared in the dollar’s 
global network?519  
 
Evidence suggests that participants in the Treasury-led Roundtable saw contract reforms as a response 
to uncertainty—something that could quell the fears described above and keep the business of 
sovereign lending and borrowing moving as usual—as well as an attempt to solve the anticipated 
concrete problems of future restructurings. Leland Goss, ICMA’s representative in the Roundtable, 
described the impetus for reform as such: “People were very, very frightened and concerned at the 
time. So as a result, something had to be changed in the global financial architecture.”520 Another 
Roundtable participant remarked, “the truth of the matter is that there was massive uncertainty at the 
time,” noting that contract change “could help introduce some certainty.”521 The IMF agreed that 
contract reforms could “enhance legal certainty and consistency across jurisdictions.”522  
 
The US commitment to contract reform set the parameters for discussion within the Roundtable, 
which held three meetings between April 2013 and April 2014. During the first, participants discussed 
the technical issues that had plagued Greece and Argentina and agreed on the need to deploy new 
contractual mechanisms to address these challenges. Two main reform ideas were put forward: one 
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focused on removing or changing the standard pari passu clause on which US courts had ruled against 
Argentina; the other focused on introducing ‘aggregation clauses’ that would replace series-by-series 
restructuring with a single vote for all bondholders, thus making it difficult for minority creditors to 
establish blocking positions and undermine restructuring efforts as they had during Greece’s 
restructuring of its English-law bonds. How to operationalize these proposals was the subject of the 
second meeting, which took place in October 2013. During the third and final meeting in April 2014, 
the group agreed to support a new model pari passu clause that disavowed the ‘ratable payments’ 
interpretation taken by US courts, as well as new model CACs that included a robust aggregation 
feature. The London-based ICMA—a leading financial industry association—agreed to take 
responsibility for drafting and marketing the new contract terms, a move welcomed by the rest of the 
working group. In August 2014, the ICMA published Standard Aggregated CACs and a Standard Pari 
Passu Provision to serve as models for EMDE debtors to emulate.523  
 
The new ICMA CACs, which have been called super-CACs, provide a menu of options sovereigns 
can use to modify their bond contracts in the event of a restructuring. One is series-by-series voting, 
as in traditional CACs. Another is the two-limb approach to aggregation used in Eurozone CACs, 
which requires a vote both at the individual series level and among the wider universe of bondholders. 
The final and most innovative option is the ‘single-limb’ approach, allowing sovereigns to overcome 
the aggregation problem by bringing together all bondholders and binding them to a common 
restructuring agreement “on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments.”524 The new 
super-CACs thus managed to replicate a key feature of corporate debt restructuring under domestic 
bankruptcy regimes: the ability of a supermajority of creditors from a particular asset class to agree to 
new debt payment terms and bind any dissenting minorities to that agreement. This type of 
aggregation had been a key objective of the SDRM initiative. Setser notes that “[i]n the end [that is, 
after revisions to its proposal], the IMF’s case for the SDRM rested almost entirely on the need to 
allow a sovereign to restructure its international sovereign bonds through a single aggregated vote.”525 
In substance, then, Treasury-led reform achieved through private-law contract change something 
many had argued a hard-law solution was needed for a decade earlier. 
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After receiving endorsement from the IMF, the G20, and the IIF, these new clauses were quickly 
adopted.526 In October 2014, Kazakhstan became the first to issue bonds with the new clauses under 
English law. In November, Mexico was the first to do so under New York law, pioneering the new 
standard as it had first-generation CACs in 2003.527 These early moves paved the way for the rapid 
and widespread adoption of these mechanisms. Since Kazakhstan’s issuance, roughly 60 countries 
from five continents have issued bonds in New York or London that contain the new CACs (most 
have also included the new ICMA pari passu provision), amounting to approximately 85 percent (in 
nominal principal amount) of all new international sovereign bond issuances.528 To be sure, it will take 
several years to replace the entire outstanding stock of bonds with new ones that include these clauses, 
due to the volume and lengthy maturities of existing bonds.529 But once operative, the new clauses 
provide stronger tools for neutralizing holdouts and achieving more comprehensive restructurings. 
Gelpern, Heller, and Setser—all of whom participated in the Roundtable—described the new tools as 
generating a “far bigger change in sovereign bond documentation than what had emerged from the 
public debates of the 1990s and early 2000s.”530 
 
As in the early 2000s, Treasury officials were crucial in setting the agenda and orchestrating the process 
of contract reform. But then as now, realizing the Treasury’s preferred reforms depended heavily on 
the cooperation of sovereign debtors and their private creditors, who would have to actually adopt 
and accept the new contract terms. In that earlier episode, creditors and debtors initially opposed 
CACs because of their expected distributional consequences. Eventually both came around to 
supporting CACs, but mainly as a way of strategically killing the even-more-hated SDRM rather than 
because of any inherent appeal of CACs on their own. This time around, however, creditors and 
debtors embraced contract reform from the beginning, paving the way for a swift and uncontroversial 
introduction of new CACs that are significantly stronger than the original model. Importantly, their 
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support was not a strategic move to pre-empt a more threatening alternative—the UN initiative had 
not yet been launched and no such alternative existed. 
 
What changed between the early 2000s and the post-2012 period? Why did creditors and debtors 
support reforms that went substantially further than the original CACs? There are two key reasons. 
The first was that their need for reforms that could neutralize holdout creditors increased in the 
aftermath of the Greek and Argentine episodes. In the early 2000s, the push for CACs was driven 
more by US interests in finding an alternative to bailouts than by intractable collective action problems 
that threatened the interests of debtor governments and their creditors. From a technical standpoint, 
the original CACs had been “a solution in search of a problem.”531 In the aftermath of Greece and 
Argentina, by contrast, the threat posed by free-riding holdouts had become very real and costly to 
debtors and creditors alike.  
 
Second, debtor and creditor perceptions of CACs had changed after a decade of experience with them, 
shifting preferences in favour of further contract reforms and changing the political dynamics of 
reform substantially compared to the early 2000s. During that earlier episode, debates about SDRR 
reform framed the restructuring trigger and the process as “inseparably linked” and even conflated 
the two, such that, as Gelpern and Gulati argued, CACs became a symbol for more bail-ins and fewer 
bailouts.532 In this earlier context, creditors understandably saw contract reform as something that 
could result in more restructurings and thus shift distributional outcomes in favour of debtors. In 
short, creditors did not view CACs as a process mechanism that was separate and distinct from 
decisions about whether and when to trigger restructurings. The trigger and process were deeply 
entangled. While creditors saw CACs as raising the odds of financial losses, debtor states worried that 
adopting them would lead to higher borrowing costs, a distributional loss for states that would have 
to either borrow less or transfer more money in the form of interest payments to foreign creditors.  
 
By 2013, as a result of their actual experience with CACs, debtors had learned that this mechanism 
did not in fact increase their borrowing costs—a conclusion supported by numerous bond pricing 
studies.533 More importantly, private creditors had learned that CACs did not mean more debt 
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restructurings, as these contract terms “went from being a symbol of “bail-ins” to being a symbol of 
market-friendly reasonableness.”534 As a senior IMF official who was involved in both the earlier and 
more recent reform episodes commented: “The reason why they [private creditors] were worried 
about the collective action clause originally was that they thought that it was going to be used to 
increase the frequency of debt restructuring. I think that this time around they knew that that wasn’t 
going to happen.”535 The notion that CACs would make debt write-downs more frequent, and the 
resistance this engendered, was directly related to the conceptual and practical linking of process and 
trigger mechanisms in 2001-2003. As explained by the same ex-IMF senior staffer, in the early 2000s 
the official sector’s message was: 
 
You cannot look at CACs or the SDRM in isolation. You have to view it as an integral 
part of an overall reform process, which the private sector interpreted as meaning: the 
official sector wants to shift the burden to the private sector, there’s going to be an 
increase in debt restructuring, we have to push back on everything. That dynamic 
wasn’t there in 2011-2012.536   
 
In short, resistance to contract reform had faded because, over time, the process and the trigger had 
become de-linked and CACs had come to be understood as a tool that could increase the efficiency 
of the restructuring process without making it any more likely that these events would happen in the 
first place. As one participant in the Treasury-led Roundtable put it, “CACs kind of become this stand-
alone tool that is de-linked at this point from both SDRM and from the access policy [i.e., the IMF 
trigger rules] … All the sudden CACs become a tool that’s political-context neutral almost, that gets 
de-coupled from all these things that it was a product of.”537 This de-coupling was informed by 
historical experience but also reinforced by the context of reform debates in and around 2013. As 
Chapter 4 highlighted, the IMF’s trigger mechanism had been exposed as faulty in 2010, and when the 
Fund launched discussions about how to fix it in 2013, many important state officials articulated a 
very different preference than their predecessors in 2002: they wanted much more discretion and case-
by-case decision-making going forward. At the same time, however, all expressed their full-fledged 
support for strengthening the restructuring process via new collective action and pari passu clauses. 
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This context thus reinforced the idea that the process and trigger were separate and that one could 
support a more robust restructuring process while opposing a stronger trigger mechanism. 
 
As a result of these historical and contextual factors, when Treasury officials launched their recent 
reform initiative, the contractual approach had become familiar and non-threatening. In contrast to 
the early 2000s, when CACs were pressed upon the market, this time around, noted one participant 
in the Treasury Roundtable, “you really did have kind of industry ownership very early on, and I think 
partly because it was a known product.”538 Not only were CACs a known product, but it was now 
known what exactly this product did and, perhaps more importantly, did not do—that is, it did not 
trigger more debt write-downs. 
 
In this new context, contract reforms were seen as a way to improve the efficiency of restructuring 
processes to the benefit of debtors and creditors alike, rather than altering the distributional status 
quo. As ICMA’s Leland Goss put it: “what we were striving for was a Pareto-optimality; we were 
going to make at least one or more things better without making anything or anyone else worse off.”539 
Contrasting this attitude with the more zero-sum mentality that pervaded the early 2000s, another 
Roundtable participant remarked: “All of a sudden by 2012-2014 a much more aggressive form of 
CACs than anybody had ever contemplated was becoming a win-win.”540 To the extent there remained 
a distributional impact of the new enhanced CACs, it was not one that shifted power from creditors 
to debtors—as creditors had initially feared of the original CACs—but rather one that shifted power 
from minority holdouts to the majority of creditors as a broader group. Within a decade, debtor and 
creditors preferences toward deeper institutionalization of debt restructuring via contractual 
mechanisms had changed as a result of their greater desire for reform and the positive historical legacy 
of first-generation CACs. 
 
This legacy also made it more likely that officials would look to contracts when the need for further 
reforms arose. This owed partly to the role of ‘repeat players’ involved in the both the original shift 
to CACs and the recent reform process, including key individuals from the US Treasury Department, 
the IMF, the Mexican government, and leading law firms that specialize in sovereign debt. None of 
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these players were more important than Mark Sobel. Having worked at the Treasury Department since 
1978, Sobel was “part of a group of influential career officials who have worked in the administrations 
of both parties” and who made up ‘the institutional memory’ of the Treasury’s international affairs 
office.541 He had been on hand during the first contract reform initiative and believed strongly in the 
capacity of the contractual approach to deliver further improvements to the SDRR. As one 
Roundtable participant remarked: “The interesting thing to me is how quickly everybody went to 
contract reform as a fix for Argentina and Greece—that was very much a Mark Sobel move.”542 As a 
Treasury insider during the 2001-2003 CACs versus SDRM debate, Sobel had a very clear sense of US 
interests when new challenges to the SDRR emerged in 2012. It was not necessary to relive that debate, 
and he wasted no time in presenting contract reforms as the US’s preferred solution. 
 
Finally, the original CACs episode and the presence of repeat players—who formed something of a 
transnational regulatory network—also helped facilitate the reform process by providing a ready-made 
blueprint for how to achieve a market shift in contract terms and a number of experienced individuals 
who knew how to implement it. As Gelpern and others put it, “the adoption of CACs beginning in 
2003 had created a process playbook.”543 Following this playbook in 2013-2014, it was again Treasury 
officials that called for contract reform and brought together creditor and debtor representatives to 
implement the change, with Mexico again acting as the first mover to issue the new bonds under New 
York law. The prior experience of some of the lawyers that draft standard bond contracts—the so-
called ‘boilerplate’ documents that, according to legal theory, almost never change—also helped to 
smooth out and speed up the contract change process. In the words of a former Treasury official 
involved in the process, “we spent a lot of time behind the scenes, talking to lawyers and some of the 
deal-makers, and they knew what they were doing and they just started cutting and pasting the new 
clauses and throwing them into their prospectuses and contracts.”544 In short, the early 2000s provided 
US policymakers with a roadmap for how to bring about contract change as well as a more established 
transnational support network with which to do it. 
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In sum, contract reforms prevailed as the leading regulatory response to recent challenges in debt 
restructuring for many of the same reasons they did in 2003. Crucially, this approach was preferred by 
US officials because it embeds restructuring mechanisms within private-law contracts, allowing the 
US to strengthen the SDRR without undermining either the authority of its own laws and courts or, 
by extension, the foundations of transnational contract law in the sovereign debt regime. The legally-
embedded quality of contracts should be considered a necessary condition for successful reform in 
both the early 2000s and more recently. So too should the fact that contract mechanisms govern the 
process rather than the trigger component of sovereign debt restructuring.  
 
But recent reforms also benefited from the historical legacy of the original CACs, which rendered 
reform a useful response to uncertainty and substantially reduced creditor and debtor opposition to 
contract change based on the realization, over time and in the new reform context, that these contracts 
only affected the restructuring process and, in that domain, could actually be useful. The experience 
of the early 2000s also provided a roadmap and a network of actors who knew how to follow it to the 
destination of a market-wide shift in standard contract terms. Thus, if contract reform emerged and 
succeeded in 2003 because of the mixture of the legally-embedded nature of CACs and a number of 
highly contingent factors such as the threat of a SDRM, that initial episode laid the foundations for 
the further locking-in of the contractual model once the need for additional reforms arose. 
 
4. The Question of Efficacy 
Do contract mechanisms such as CACs actually improve debt restructuring outcomes? Most of the 
literature on the impact of CACs has focused on the question of borrowing costs. For example, since 
the early 2000s, there have been numerous empirical studies on how these clauses affects sovereign 
bond prices. Several concluded that they did not meaningfully raise borrowing costs.545 Others argued 
that there was a pricing impact but it differed depending on the creditworthiness of the borrower: 
CACs raised borrowing costs for less creditworthy issuers but lowered them for more creditworthy 
debtors, “who benefit from the ability to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process.546 As 
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early as 2003, Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody also found evidence of an aggregation problem, 
showing that spreading debt across a larger number of bond instruments that cannot be aggregated in 
the event of a restructuring increased sovereign borrowing costs.547 While these results suggest that 
CACs could enhance the anticipated efficiency of debt restructuring processes as long as they did not 
raise the anticipated probability of default, there are few direct studies about the actual impact of CACs 
on ex post outcomes. Those that exist are predominately theoretical modelling exercises. In this vein, 
Kenneth Kletzer argues that CACs produce welfare gains by reducing the inefficiency caused by 
holdouts.548 Others also contend that CACs help to coordinate creditors in ways that deliver efficiency 
gains.549 
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that contract mechanisms have been helpful in a number of cases. 
The use of CACs under New York law in the cases of Belize (2006, 2012) and Cote d’Ivoire (2012), 
under English law in the cases of Moldova (2002) and Seychelles (2009), and under a mixture of 
jurisdictions in the case of Uruguay (2003) was associated with extremely high creditor participation 
rates in the restructuring and zero creditor litigation.550 The two problem cases since the widespread 
adoption of CACs have been Argentina, whose bonds were issued under New York law before 2003 
and therefore did not contain these clauses, and Greece, whose efforts to restructure English-law 
bonds in 2012 revealed the limitations of series-by-series voting. These episodes catalyzed reforms 
that led to the introduction of much stronger contract mechanisms with robust aggregation features. 
Although these newer contracts have yet to be tested in an actual restructuring, there are good reasons 
to believe that they will have a significant impact on eliminating opportunistic holdout behaviour, to 
the benefit of debtors and the majority of their creditors. Greece’s restructuring of its domestic-law 
debt in 2012 is instructive. Here, the retroactive insertion of a single-limb CAC in Greek bonds proved 
critical to securing near-universal creditor participation in the domestic portion of its debt exchange.551 
 
                                                        
547 Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, ‘Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign Debt Restructuring?’ The American 
Economic Review 93(2)(2003): 80-84.  
548 Kenneth M. Kletzer, ‘Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Collective Action Clauses and Official Crisis Intervention,’ IMF 
Working Paper No. 03/134(2003): 1-24.  
549 Federico Weinschelbaum and Jose Wynne, ‘Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets,’ Journal 
of International Economics 67(2005): 47-72; Sayantan Ghosal and Kannika Thampanishvong, ‘Does strengthening Collective 
Action Clauses (CACs) help?’ Journal of International Economics 89(2013): 68-78. 
550 See Juan J. Cruces and Christoph Trebesch, ‘Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts,’ American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics 5(3)(2013): 85-117. 
551 Zettelmeyer, Trebesch, and Gulati, ‘The Greek debt restructuring.’ 
 191 
To be sure, my claim is not that contract mechanisms are a panacea and have solved the myriad 
problems associated with sovereign debt restructuring. Among other things, CACs do not guarantee 
that an indebted country will receive fast enough or deep enough debt relief, since they provide no 
means of triggering debt restructuring in the first place and no higher authority to dictate new payment 
terms to the debtor and its creditors. Indeed, the decision of how much debt to write-down will remain 
a matter of debtor-creditor bargaining. Moreover, the new CACs can aggregate bondholders but they 
do not apply to the loans provided by commercial banks, foreign governments, and multilateral 
institutions.552 In cases where these other forms of debt are significant, CACs will be less effective in 
delivering a comprehensive and equitable restructuring broadly shared across the creditor base. That 
said, in contrast to the other reforms examined in this dissertation, recent contract changes represent 
a significant and tangible—though not transformative—strengthening of the institutional toolkit for 
rewriting sovereign debt in European and international bond markets, where the lack of sufficiently 
strong restructuring rules and procedures has caused a great deal of financial pain and uncertainty.    
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that private-law contract mechanisms have two key qualities that have enabled 
their success in the SDRR relative to the regulatory arrangements discussed in previous chapters. First, 
they are designed to govern the debt workout process rather than trigger restructurings, which is key to 
understanding their fate compared to the IMF lending rules analyzed in Chapter 4. As noted in Chapter 
3, the stakes for powerful capital-exporting states are generally lower at the process stage, particularly 
when it comes to concerns about financial stability, and the prospects for joint efficiency gains for 
debtors and private creditors are generally higher at this stage. Moreover, debtors, creditors, and capital 
exporters all have a growing interest in process mechanisms that can neutralize holdout creditors. 
These factors are key to understanding the recent strengthening of the debt restructuring process via 
enhanced CACs, compared to the weakening of the restructuring trigger via IMF reforms documented 
in Chapter 4 (as well as the decision not to pursue an automatic trigger mechanism in the Eurozone).  
 
Second, in contrast to the other process mechanisms examined in Chapter 5, their legal-institutional 
design is more politically acceptable than hard-law arrangements and more functionally effective than 
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soft-law mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 3 and shown throughout the current chapter, private-
law contract mechanisms like CACs can enhance the efficiency of the restructuring process without 
overriding state sovereignty or the legal foundations of transnational property rights, making them a 
politically useful device for navigating the trade-offs of regulating debt restructuring, especially for the 
leading capital-exporting states, but also for EMDE debtors and private creditors. For the US and the 
UK in particular, the fact that contract mechanisms were fully compatible with the existing (American 
and British) domestic legal arrangements that anchor international sovereign debt markets was critical. 
It allowed these states to strengthen the restructuring process while preserving the privileges they 
derive from their centrality in the current order (as discussed in Section 2.1.2 of Chapter 3). But leading 
Eurozone states also preferred contract tools in part because of their consistency with domestically-
rooted cross-border property rights. In contrast to a hard-law European SDRM, euro CACs could be 
expected to generate less legal uncertainty within the already-delicate Eurozone bond markets.    
    
The chapter also argued that the historical legacy of the first-generation CACs introduced in the early 
2000s was important in shaping preferences in favour of further contract innovation more recently. 
There are four reasons for this historical effect. First, the debates of the early 2000s had clarified and 
reinforced US regulatory preferences when the need for further improvements to the SDRR arose. 
Second, the original CACs provided a blueprint for reformers, making it relatively quick and easy to 
adapt existing governance tools. Third, experience with the original CACs shifted debtor and creditor 
preferences, such that contract change came to be understood less as a distributional issue and more 
as a Pareto-improving one (particularly in the context of the Treasury-led initiative). Fourth, in the 
recent crisis and reform context, familiarity with CACs increased the political utility of contract 
mechanisms as a tool for enhancing legal and market certainty around the debt restructuring process. 
While significant emphasis on put on the role of historical factors, the chapter argues that these factors 
play a supplemental explanatory role: they enhanced the prospects of a regulatory mechanism whose 
politically utility had already been determined by its process-orientation and legal-institutional design. 
 
How do these arguments contribute to the fields of IPE and global governance? Most immediately, 
they help to fill important empirical gaps in our understanding of sovereign debt governance. The 
reforms analyzed in this chapter have received little scholarly attention and, despite their similarities, 
have not yet been examined within the same analysis. The argument developed here makes sense of 
both initiatives and also sheds light on the underlying design features that enabled the emergence of 
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CACs in the early 2000s. It also lays down the third and final puzzle piece that, when combined with 
the insights of the previous chapters, completes a novel framework for understanding regulatory 
variation in the SDRR according to, first, the process-trigger distinction and, second, the legal-
institutional design of different mechanisms.    
 
But the arguments advanced in this chapter also contribute to broader theoretical debates about 
institutional design and development and the role of contracts in global governance. While the last 
chapter emphasized the limitations of public international law mechanisms in the SDRR, this one 
showcased the political utility of an alternative—private-law contracts—that does not fit within the 
hard law-soft law dichotomy and is generally ignored as an instrument of global governance. When 
contracts are analyzed by scholars of world politics, they are often treated as generic agreements—
hard-law and soft-law arrangements could be understood as contracts from this perspective—rather 
than specific legal tools within particular jurisdictions. That does not mean, however, that these 
broader conceptions of contracts have nothing to offer our understanding sovereign bond contract 
change. Important aspects of contract reform can be seen through a family of rational functionalist 
perspectives referred to as contractualist approaches.553  
 
In the tradition of neoliberal and rational design institutionalism in international relations theory, these 
approaches view contracts and other institutions as coordinating devices used by rational actors to 
solve collective action problems in ways that advance their mutual interests. From this perspective, 
CACs were a functional solution to the unique coordination problems posed by sovereign bond 
restructuring—namely, the difficulties of coordinating dispersed creditors and preventing holdouts 
from free riding. CACs can also be viewed as a response to the ‘incomplete contracts’ governing 
sovereign debt. Because pre-CAC contracts lacked provisions for majority restructuring and for 
constraining costly litigation, “the key to more orderly restructuring,” as Eichengreen put it in 2003, 
“is to encourage lenders and borrowers to specify more complete contracts that lay out the procedures 
for restructuring at the time the debt obligation is incurred.”554 Recent contract reforms can be seen 
as making bond contracts even more ‘complete’ than the original CACs by providing aggregation 
features and clarifying the meaning of pari passu.  
 
                                                        
553 Cooley, ‘Rationalist theories of institutions in American IPE.’ 
554 Barry Eichengreen, ‘Restructuring Sovereign Debt’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4)(2003): 75-98, p. 83. 
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This view of contracts as positive-sum solutions to coordination problems fits the official narrative 
promoted by those involved in contract reforms, and, as I have argued in this chapter, the fact that 
debtors and creditors saw the recent Treasury-led contract changes as producing joint gains was crucial 
to the success of this initiative. However, it is important to remember that sovereign borrowers and 
their financiers did not always see contract innovation in this light. In the early 2000s they viewed it 
as a distributional issue whose risks outweighed potential efficiency gains. CACs came to be 
understood as Pareto-improving coordination devices largely as a result of historical factors, which 
changed the preferences of debtors and creditors and the political dynamics of contract reform. The 
role of prior institutional developments is thus crucial to understanding subsequent preferences and 
policy processes. Here, the role of history was to reveal something about the nature of a previously 
unknown mechanism in a way that rendered the further strengthening of that mechanism Pareto-
improving in the minds of key actors in the reform process. 
 
Insights from socio-legal contract theories can also help make sense of this shift in preferences and 
reconcile aspects of my explanation with symbolic accounts of bond contract reform. Mark Suchman 
argues that contracts can be both technical devices that order and govern relationships and symbolic 
tools that communicate bigger ideas.555 Although I have argued that symbolic arguments do not 
capture the specific design features that make contracts a particularly useful tool for regulating this 
area of global finance, I do not deny that contracts can have symbolic content in addition to the 
specific commitments they spell out. In fact, this dual functionality of contracts and the connection 
between their symbolic and technical characteristics may be a useful way of thinking about the change 
in debtor and creditor preferences toward CACs over time. As these actors learned from their 
experience with CACs, the symbolic content of this mechanism as something that would encourage 
more debt restructurings was stripped away and replaced by a clearer understanding of its technical 
meaning as something that simply facilitates the restructuring process when it gets underway.  
 
There is therefore a role for functionalist explanations, when combined with historical institutionalist 
and other eclectic insights, in explaining certain aspects of recent contract reforms, particularly debtor 
and creditor preferences in favour of strengthening a positive-sum collective action device. But these 
perspectives—as well as any theories that see contracts as generic agreements—are more limited in 
                                                        
555 Mark Suchman, ‘The Contract as Social Artifact,’ Law & Society Review 37(1)(2003): 91-142. 
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their ability to explain why contract tools rather than other institutional designs, which could be equally 
justified on functionalist grounds, emerged as the preferred approach to debt workouts, especially for 
the powerful capital-exporting states that play a leading regulatory role but are not directly involved in 
restructurings in the same way as debtors and creditors. To solve this puzzle, contracts have to be 
understood as private-law tools in specific jurisdictions instead of as generic coordination devices. As 
I have argued throughout this chapter, it is the legally-embedded character of contracts that make 
them a particularly useful mechanism for governing the debt restructuring process.    
 
By showing that CACs are preferred not because their design characteristics are more functional but 
rather because they allow important actors to improve the restructuring process while maintaining 
certain structures of power and privilege, my argument resonates with critical theory approaches that 
treat private contracts as embodiments of power relations. For example, Claire Cutler and Thomas 
Dietz focus on the rise and power dynamics of private transnational governance by contract, departing 
from the observation that “[p]ublic policy and collective decision making have thus largely been 
replaced by contractual modes of governance.”556 While their approach usefully highlights the power 
dimensions of contracts—often seen as neutral due to their voluntary and seemingly apolitical 
nature—it is unable to account for the type of contract governance described here. In the cases at 
hand, contract governance has not replaced policy; contract reform is international policy-making and 
reflects public (euro CACs) and public-private hybrid (Treasury-led reforms) modes of governance 
rather than simply the rise of private authority. In showcasing the use of private-law contracts as a 
form and instrument of global public rule-making rather than a substitute for it, this chapter expands 
current understandings of the use and purpose of contracts in global governance.  
 
Another strand of theory that aspects of this chapter draw upon and contribute to comes from more 
constructivist-oriented scholars who write about contracts as ‘legal fictions’ that stabilize expectations 
by spelling out in advance how certain contingencies such as debt restructurings will be dealt with if 
and when they arise. The idea of contracts as legal fictions complements the argument that clear and 
consistent property rights—especially but not exclusively those embedded in US and UK contract 
law—are valued in the debt regime for their ability to stabilize market expectations regarding cross-
border bond investments. This view is quite different from the idea of contracts as symbols of broad 
                                                        
556  Cutler and Dietz, The Politics of Private Transnational Governance by Contract, p. 5. 
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policy significance. A legal fiction can only be compelling because it rests on specific technical language 
that spells out contingencies. This observation also reminds us that the legal fictions interpretation of 
contracts, while ideational, is not separate from questions of legal-institutional design. The capacity of 
contracts to serve as convincing fictions is directly linked to their design as legally-binding agreements 
backed up by strong domestic juridical institutions. For example, Elena Carletti et al. find that while 
euro CAC bonds are associated with lower borrowing costs than similar Eurozone bonds with no 
CACs, the price impact is more pronounced in countries with perceived high-quality legal systems.557 
 
Stephen Nelson even writes about the pari passu clause as one such legal fiction but sees it as a tool of 
private governance arising from the norms and practices of market actors—one that is likely to persist 
due to its stabilizing nature.558 He does not envision the changing of this standard contract term 
through an elaborate public-private regulatory initiative that uses reform to clarify the meaning of this 
legal fiction and thus address market uncertainty. The implications of this case are that stabilizing legal 
fictions can be useful not just for market actors but also for the public authorities that regulate and 
oversee markets. Moreover, the ability of contract terms to serve as stabilizing fictions is not 
dependent on their unchanging persistence; changes in contract terms can also stabilize expectations 
when older clauses have themselves become sources of uncertainty. 
 
Nelson’s analysis thus exhibits a tendency for which constructivist and sociological institutionalist 
approaches are often criticized: viewing social norms and institutions as persistent and under-
theorizing how they might change. Rational design approaches are, of course, accused of having the 
opposite problem. They see a world of sharp, punctuated changes that occur when existing institutions 
are no longer optimal, which often does not depict the reality that scholars observe and does not really 
describe the contract reforms analyzed in this chapter. Although these reforms were responses to 
discrete shocks that precipitated institutional change, the form of change was more incremental and 
built upon earlier institutional developments. By highlighting the role of prior institutional 
developments in promoting outcomes that fall somewhere between stasis and radical reform, historical 
institutionalist accounts can again enhance our understanding of recent initiatives in the SDRR. So 
too, as argued earlier in the chapter, can related but more specific theories that see the adaptation of 
                                                        
557 Carletti, Colla, Gulati, and Ongena, ‘The Price of Law.’ 
558 Nelson, ‘Market Rules.’ 
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existing institutional arrangements as more probable than the creation of new arrangements from 





Summing Up and Looking Ahead 
 
1. Summarizing the Question and Argument 
The regulatory politics of sovereign debt restructuring is an important but poorly understood facet of 
global financial governance. Scholars have paid little attention to recent reform initiatives in this area, 
and scholarly accounts of previous outcomes in the SDRR—while helpful—are limited in their ability 
to explain newer developments. This dissertation provides the first in-depth analysis of these recent 
initiatives, filling an important empirical gap in our knowledge of the global governance of sovereign 
debt restructuring. For students of IPE who want to know what has happened in the SDRR since the 
initiatives of the early 2000s, which received considerable attention, this dissertation paints a more up-
to-date picture of regulatory efforts and outcomes aimed at governing sovereign bankruptcies. 
 
The dissertation set out to explain variation in the outcomes of recent reform initiatives. I wanted to 
know why IMF reforms weakened the existing regime, why sovereign bond reforms strengthened it, 
and why the UN initiative failed to produce much change in either direction. All of these initiatives 
took place in the same historical context and sought to govern the same issue area, so why did they 
turn out so differently? The existing literature has only limited answers to this question. It offers useful 
insights into certain aspects of recent initiatives but is unable to explain other important outcomes. 
Beyond its inability to account for specific outcomes, the literature is not well set up to explain 
variation in any kind of systematic way. As noted in Section 2 of Chapter 1, existing analyses tend to 
focus on a single initiative or, at most, consider a specific type of reform proposal at different historical 
moments. They do not engage in the kind of comparative analysis of failed and successful initiatives 
that can help to generate broader insights about the patterns and determinants of variation in this 
domain. Accounts of individual initiatives do point to important reasons why the reform in question 
either failed or succeeded, but when assembled and read as a broader body of work, they do not add 
up to a coherent or systematic picture of variation. Rather, they leave the reader with the misleading 
impression that regulatory reform in the SDRR is either virtually impossible or largely random. 
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Analyzing and comparing recent regulatory initiatives revealed new insights and reinforced existing 
ones in ways that were particularly useful for generating broader inferences about the politics of 
sovereign debt restructuring reform. What emerged was a more systematic and generalized framework 
for understanding which types of governance arrangements are feasible in the SDRR and why. It 
became clear, in developing this framework, that existing explanations of SDRR reform suffered from 
three significant blind spots that hindered their ability to explain variation in recent outcomes, as noted 
in chapters 1 and 2. First, they failed to distinguish analytically between mechanisms aimed at triggering 
debt restructurings, such as the IMF’s lending rules, and mechanisms that seek to facilitate the 
restructuring process once the decision to renegotiate debt has already been made, such as contract 
reforms and the arrangements pursued within the context of the UN initiative. Second, they pay 
insufficient attention to how different process-oriented mechanisms would complement or clash with 
the current legal foundations of the sovereign debt regime—mainly but not exclusively US and UK 
laws and courts. Third, they overlook the role of historical legacies and processes—particularly 
surrounding the reform initiatives of the early 2000s—in shaping recent outcomes (an understandable 
omission given that many accounts of SDRR reform are focused on the early 2000s themselves).  
 
Filling these gaps, this dissertation presents an analytical framework for understanding recent variation 
in the SDRR according to, first, the process versus trigger distinction and, second, the legal-institutional design 
of different process-focused regulatory mechanisms. For a visual representation, see figure 7 below.  
 

























The framework suggests that an effective trigger mechanism is hard to institutionalize because of the 
time-inconsistent preferences of powerful capital-exporting states, as well as their more general 
desire—expressed most strongly by the US, supported by debtors and creditors, and amplified by 
recent experiences—for case-by-case decision-making when it comes to the question of if and when 
to trigger debt restructurings. First and foremost, it was the potential for foreign debt restructurings 
to generate financial instability in core capital-exporting states that shaped their preferences toward 
IMF lending reforms in 2010 and 2016, weakening the Fund’s trigger mechanism and underscoring 
the political difficulties of institutionalizing this kind of regulatory arrangement. The preferences of 
sovereign debtors and private creditor groups for a case-by-case approach to IMF lending only 
strengthened the policy position of the US and other powerful states, further reinforcing the political 
obstacles to an effective trigger mechanism.  
 
Compared to the trigger, I argue that some but not all process mechanisms have greater odds of success. 
It depends on their legal-institutional design. International hard-law designs face huge political opposition 
from capital-exporting states, whereas soft-law tools can encounter political challenges—as did the 
2015 UN Principles—but are also of limited effectiveness in the SDRR. By establishing international 
legal procedures that authorize breaking or changing the payment terms of sovereign debt contracts, 
hard-law restructuring mechanisms would trump the domestic legal foundations of the current debt 
regime, threatening the power and privileges that dominant states—principally the US and UK—
derive from the current order, as explained in Chapter 3. Key capital-exporting states have thus 
rejected and used their power to block hard-law initiatives, as seen in the context of the recent UN 
initiative examined in Chapter 5. Beyond the power and preferences of dominant states, many of the 
EMDE debtor governments driving the UN initiative were also unprepared to relinquish sovereignty 
over their repayment and restructuring decisions for the sake of an international treaty-based sovereign 
bankruptcy process—a further obstacle to the emergence of this type of regulatory arrangement.  
 
In contrast to public international law, private-law contract tools such as CACs provide functions that 
soft law cannot without incurring the same political costs of a hard-law framework. By embedding the 
ability to restructure debt into existing systems of contractual rights and obligations, contract reforms 
allow capital-exporting states to create stronger restructuring processes without undermining the 
authority of their own laws and courts or creating new forms of uncertainty around sovereign bond 
investments. The compatibility between existing legal structures and contract-based restructuring tools 
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has made the latter a politically useful regulatory mechanism—not only for the US and UK but also 
for Eurozone states—and is key to explaining the success of the sovereign bond reforms detailed in 
Chapter 6. Legal-institutional design features also made contract change more attractive than hard-law 
alternatives to debtors and especially private creditors, whose cooperation was necessary to the success 
of recent bond reforms (especially in the context of the Treasury-led initiative). But debtor and creditor 
preferences toward contract reform have not stayed the same over time; they have changed fairly 
drastically and in ways that were important in shaping recent outcomes. This observation points to 
one other factor that is crucial to explaining recent regulatory variation along the lines discussed above: 
the role of earlier policy developments in shaping subsequent preferences and reform processes. 
 
As shown throughout this dissertation, historical processes and policy sequencing played important 
roles in shaping recent reform outcomes, most notably but not exclusively in the context of contract 
reforms. The original CACs episode laid the groundwork for the strengthening and spreading of this 
model more recently, reinforcing the US position, providing US and Eurozone officials with a tried-
and-true reform option that would be relatively quick and easy to implement (and less likely unsettle 
already-shaky markets in the Eurozone context), shifting debtor and creditor preferences in favour of 
substantial contract innovation, and enhancing the utility of contracts as a tool for responding to the 
uncertainty generated by recent shocks. At the same time, US officials had no desire to relive the some 
of the heated debates of the early 2000s and refused to even discuss the merits of a hard-law regime, 
further suffocating efforts to establish this type of arrangement.  
 
But the fact that the contractual approach had established a foothold in the early 2000s did not 
automatically lead to its recent strengthening. The IMF lending framework created in 2002 has been 
incrementally weakened over time, with historical experience and policy sequencing also playing an 
important role. Experience with this framework in 2010 eroded political support for strong lending 
rules in ways that fed back into subsequent reform processes, weakening the trigger mechanism by 
locking-in less constraining rules. The fact that CACs and IMF lending rules were pushed in opposite 
directions only reinforces the qualification about historical factors made throughout this dissertation: 
that they are an important but supplementary explanatory factor. They have exerted influence mainly 
through their ability to further enhance or diminish the prospects of mechanisms whose political 
acceptability or utility had already been determined by their underlying attributes.   
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The reform initiatives examined in this thesis played out in different venues and involved different 
combinations of actors. The politics of SDRR reform can thus be thought of as a multi-player game 
that unfolds within and across multiple venues. As detailed in Chapter 3, the core players are the key 
capital-exporting states, sovereign debtors, and private creditors. Their preferences toward different 
regulatory options are informed by, but not directly derived from, their material positions within the 
global financial order. As suggested above and at various points throughout this dissertation, 
interpretations of how a particular reform might affect one’s material interests can shift over time in 
response to historical developments and changes in the regulatory context. In terms of power, the 
capacity of the leading capital-exporting states—principally the US but also the UK, France, and 
Germany—to influence outcomes within and across the gamut of venues and reform initiatives 
examined in the preceding pages makes them particularly powerful in shaping the overall contours 
and trajectory of the SDRR. In emphasizing the central role played by these dominant states, this study 
resonates with state-centric perspectives on global financial governance and international regulatory 
regimes. But it also stresses the decisive role that private creditors and debtor governments played in 
bringing about institutional changes already favoured by more powerful states, as well as their role in 
helping to further stifle reform efforts that key states already opposed. The dissertation is thus cast 
within a multi-actor framework that privileges powerful states.  
 
2. Summarizing the Research Contributions 
This dissertation makes a number of important contributions to knowledge within the fields of IPE 
and global governance. As alluded to at the outset of this chapter, the project advances our empirical 
understanding of contemporary debt politics by drawing on extensive primary material to present the 
first in-depth study of recent efforts to reform the SDRR. It also makes a key theoretical contribution 
by developing a broader analytical framework for making sense of regulatory variation in this 
important but often overlooked area of global financial governance. By delineating the role of earlier 
regime developments in shaping recent reform outcomes, this study sheds light not only on the politics 
of reform at a given moment in time, but also on the evolution and development of the SDRR since 
the turn of the century. The academic and policy literature on sovereign debt has been dominated by 
lawyers and economists, many of whom contribute to a massive and growing collection of proposals 
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calling for new and improved debt restructuring mechanisms.559 The analysis offered here 
complements this literature by shedding light on the political prospects of different regulatory options.   
 
In developing the framework described in Chapter 3 and substantiated throughout the case chapters, 
this dissertation builds upon existing IPE literature on SDRR reform, particularly the studies focused 
on the early 2000s.560 It deploys new evidence that reinforces important earlier insights, including the 
significance of US power and preferences and the role of sovereignty-related concerns in shaping 
American government views on the SDRM proposal.561 But it also highlights the analytical limitations 
of existing literature, particularly by pointing to the three previously overlooked factors mentioned 
above: the process-trigger distinction, the importance of compatibility between new international 
process mechanisms and the existing domestic legal foundations of the debt regime, and the role of 
historical legacies and processes in enhancing or diminishing the prospects of certain reform options. 
Even the vast IPE literature on the IMF overlooks the Fund’s lending framework and its role as a 
mechanism for triggering restructurings.562 This study calls attention to the Fund’s central role in the 
SDRR, while also reinforcing power-political interpretations of IMF behaviour by showing that 
dominant states disproportionately shape the organization’s approach to debt restructuring.563 It also 
identifies other previously neglected elements of sovereign debt politics, including the structural power 
of the US and UK in the SDRR and the sovereignty considerations that constrain debtor states from 
pursuing a hard-law restructuring regime, which would otherwise presumably benefit them. 
 
The current study also contributes to broader IPE and global governance debates about the design 
and development of international institutions. It shows how mainstream institutionalist literature can 
illuminate aspects of the regulatory outcomes in question. Particularly useful for understanding recent 
US Treasury-led contract reforms, for example, are neoliberal institutionalist theories that emphasize 
                                                        
559 For an example of these proposals, see Chapter 1, footnote 27. 
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the collective action problems that define world politics and the role of institutions in providing 
mutually-beneficial solutions to these problems.564 Also helpful are analyses that highlight the impact 
of distribution and uncertainty on institutional choice.565 The anticipated distributional implications of 
a hard-law restructuring mechanism—particularly in terms of disrupting the power and privileges 
accruing to capital-exporting states—played an important role in shaping reform preferences, as did 
concerns about the uncertainty such a mechanism would generate. IMF reforms were also shaped by 
a desire for flexible lending arrangements in light of the uncertainty inherent in global financial markets 
and future sovereign debt crises. Flexibility would accommodate the interests of key capital exporters. 
While their interests were defined more in terms of preserving financial stability than maximizing 
distributional gains, they also included a distributional component insofar as lending to countries with 
unsustainable debt burdens tends to produce distinct winners and losers. 
 
The analysis of SDRR reform advanced here thus resonates with elements of institutionalist theory, 
but it also highlights the limits of rationalist and functionalist work in this tradition. A fuller picture 
of international debt politics can be gained by combining insights from this tradition with historical 
institutionalist perspectives, which emphasize the importance of prior institutional developments—
including the emergence of US and UK laws and courts as legal anchors of the international sovereign 
bond regime—in shaping subsequent preferences and political processes.566 But I also suggest that the 
significance of historical institutionalist insights should not be overstated, nor should the direction of 
change promoted by historical forces be assumed—a tendency of IPE scholarship focused on the 
incremental, rather than radical, bolstering of global financial governance after 2008.567 As noted 
above, historical factors play an important but supplementary role in explaining outcomes, which 
themselves display both incremental strengthening (contract reforms) and weakening (IMF reforms) 
as a result of policy sequencing and feedback over time. 
 
Finally, this dissertation challenges global governance debates that focus on institutional design along 
a spectrum of international hard and soft law,568 as well as accounts that see soft law as the only option 
                                                        
564 Keohane, After Hegemony.  
565 Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’; Abbott and Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft 
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for global financial governance.569 It highlights the utility of an alternative—private-law contracts—
that does not fit into the hard law-soft law dichotomy. To be sure, there are already strands of literature 
that examine the role of contracts in global politics, and some of these contributions can help to make 
sense of the cases that motivate this study.570 At the same time, existing literature is somewhat limited 
by its tendency to treat contracts as either generic agreements571—hard- and soft-law arrangements 
could both be ‘contracts’ from this perspective—or as tools of private order and governance.572 Studies 
that focus on the latter do tend to emphasize the power dimensions of contract governance, which 
resonate with a central claim of this dissertation: that choosing contracts over hard-law mechanisms 
was about preserving existing structures of power and privilege for dominant states. But they also tend 
to view contracts as tools of private authority that are coming to replace public governance functions. 
This study expands current understandings of the use and purpose of private-law contracts in global 
governance by showcasing their central role in public and public-private hybrid regulatory initiatives.  
 
3. The State of the SDRR and Future Research Directions 
Sovereign debt restructuring is a common and recurrent feature of global finance. Between 1950 and 
2010, there were over 600 individual restructurings in some 95 countries.573 Since 2010 alone, there 
has been a handful of major debt write-downs. Greece’s 2012 debt exchange claimed the title of the 
largest debt restructuring in history. Ukraine restructured roughly $15 billion worth of privately-held 
bonds a few years later in 2015.574 And at the time of writing, it is widely expected that Venezuela is 
destined for a large-scale debt restructuring, which many analysts believe has the potential to be one 
of the most complicated and messy debt workouts to date. In addition to the enormously complex 
web of creditors (including China and Russia) and asset claims, a number of bondholder groups have 
already filed lawsuits in US courts over debt the country defaulted on in 2017.575 Because Venezuela 
has not issued international bonds since the broad shift to the new CACs in 2014, none of its debt 
will enjoy the type of protection from holdout creditors that the new instruments discussed in Chapter 
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 206 
6 afford. The point is that sovereign debt restructurings are not going away in the foreseeable future, 
and they will remain complicated. 
 
The recent reform initiatives analyzed in this dissertation are clearly insufficient to “fix” the various 
problems associated with sovereign debt restructuring. Indeed, only bond reforms even strengthened 
the SDRR compared to its configuration after the last round of regime updates in the early 2000s. 
Most EMDEs that issue sovereign bonds have adopted the new CACs and pari passu clause, and all 
Eurozone states have incorporated CACs into their bonds since 2013. These states will thus have an 
important tool for dealing with holdout creditors should they have to restructure their new CAC 
bonds in the future. But many other problems remain unresolved. The tendency to delay necessary 
restructurings, bail-out private creditors from sovereign solvency crises, and—in doing so—generate 
moral hazard will continue thanks to the recent weakening of the IMF’s lending framework, which 
was designed to address these issues. Moreover, there remains no single comprehensive sovereign 
bankruptcy mechanism—one that could deal with creditors as diverse as Chinese state-owned banks, 
dispersed private bondholders, and multilateral lenders all within the same restructuring process—in 
light of the persistent political obstacles to establishing a multilateral treaty-based framework capable 
of governing global debt claims in this far-reaching manner. 
 
But this is not the end of the line for the SDRR. As long as sovereign debt restructurings continue to 
highlight new and existing gaps in the regime, we can expect more reform initiatives and governance 
innovations of the sort examined in this study. This is indeed how international debt restructuring 
arrangements have developed over time, not proactively and comprehensively but as a set of piecemeal 
responses to new challenges and changing conditions. Contrary to depictions of debt restructuring as 
a “non-system”576 that relies only on “ad hoc machinery”577 or, at the other end of the extreme, as 
taking place within a “formal framework,”578 this dissertation reveals a more nuanced picture of the 
SDRR are characterized by partial and uneven institutionalization. The reactionary, piecemeal, partial, 
and uneven nature of regime construction does not mean that the development of the SDRR has been 
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random, of course. As we have seen, there has been a certain consistency to the type of institutional 
arrangements that have emerged and succeeded, as it has generally served powerful interests to 
institutionalize some aspects of debt restructuring more than others. The most successfully and 
strongly institutionalized regime elements have had two key qualities: they have looked to govern only 
the debt restructuring process that occurs after the decision to restructure has been made, and they 
have been embedded in the domestic legal systems and tools that already govern sovereign debt claims. 
 
Looking ahead, the arguments and framework laid out in this dissertation can be used to anticipate 
and analyze further regulatory developments in the SDRR. Future reform initiatives can be assessed 
in terms of whether they conform to or deviate from the expectations of this analytical framework, 
which should help to reinforce and/or refine the insights of this project. For example, Eurozone 
leaders agreed in December 2018 to further strengthen their contractual framework for sovereign 
bond restructuring, aiming to replace the two-limb CACs introduced in 2013 with the type of single-
limb CACs advanced by the US Treasury-led initiative by 2022.579 This incremental improvement of a 
contract-based process mechanism clearly fits with the explanation of regulatory variation developed 
throughout this study. But there are likely to be larger regime disruptions and reform initiatives on the 
horizon, perhaps in the wake of a future Venezuelan debt restructuring. It is not uncommon for a 
large and particularly difficult debt restructuring, even a “deviant case” such as Argentina’s recent legal 
battle, to become a “trend setter” by demonstrating weaknesses in the regime and catalyzing the move 
to a new regulatory normal, as seen in the case of the contract reforms analyzed in Chapter 6.580  
 
Whenever and wherever the next major efforts to reform the SDRR spring up, the ideas developed in 
this dissertation should serve as a useful lens through which to anticipate their outcomes, analyze their 
shape and nature, and make sense of the overall trajectory of this international regime as it continues 
to change and develop throughout history. These real-world changes will, in turn, help to revise and 
refine the ideas outlined here, making them an even more useful guide going forward. 
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